E U R O P 



IN 

MDCCGXL. 



EUROPE 

IN 

MDCCCXL. 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF 

WOLFGANG MENZEL. 



EDINBURGH : 

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK ; 

LONGMAN, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, & LONGMANS, 
LONDON. 



MDCCCXLI. 



THINTED BV NEIU AND CO.. OLD FISHMABKET, EDINBURGH. 



The simultaneous translation in England 
and in America of Wolfgang Menzel's 
" German Literature," is the best proof of 
the general estimation in which the author 
is held; and though the peculiar charac- 
ter, and the ephemeral title, of the following 
work, might be supposed to preclude its 
reception in this country, its value will 
be duly appreciated by those who have re- 
flected on the past history of the world, and 
desire to trace, in the sentiments and expres- 
sions of our neighbours, the signs of coming- 
events. Elicited in some measure by another 



and hostile production ; written in a style 
of argument which appears occasionally to 
deviate from strict logic ; and addressed 
solely to Germans, with the patriotic inten- 
tion of warning them against the evils of 
disunion, — British concerns obtain merely 
incidental notice. Yet it is unnecessary 
to point out how closely the welfare of 
England is associated with the political se- 
curity of Germany : nor, in the present me- 
nacing aspect of Europe, can a slight im- 
portance be attached to the opinions of 
enlightened foreigners, regarding those na- 
tional feelings and interests on which chiefly 
depend the cessation or the maintenance of 
Peace. 

To the benevolent individuals who look 
forward to an era of happiness and con- 



vii 



tentment, — or to that class who imagine 
the possibility of Britannic isolation, in mo- 
dern times, as when our shores were first in- 
vaded by Csesar, — an exposition of foreign 
views on European policy will hold out 
slender attractions. The author encourages 
no such visionaries. With respect to Ger- 
many in particular, his brightest hopes 
are saddened by many gloomy forebodings. 
While dwelling, with Teutonic confidence, 
on her commercial and social prospects, he 
entertains a most anxious dread of impend- 
ing calamities. 

It is proper to observe that the " Com- 
mercial League," so frequently mentioned, 
and in high terms of approval, is what 
is otherwise denominated the " Prussian 
Union of the Customs." 



Vlll 

Of the translation itself it may suffice to 
add, that, for the purpose of avoiding am- 
biguity, " Germany" and " Germans" have 
been substituted where the first person had 
been employed in the original. 

February 1841. 



CONTENTS. 



Page 

European Pentarchy — defined, . . 1 

England, 13 

Russia, ....... 25 

France, 59 

Austria 81 

Prussia, ....... 107 

Minor Confederate States of Germany, . 131 

Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, . . 157 

Scandinavia, 217 

Spain and Portugal, ' 221 

Italy, ....... 223 

The East, 227 

Postscript, . 237 



EUROPE 

IN 

MDCCCXL. 



THE 

EUROPEAN PENTAROHY. 



It may be necessary to inform the English 
reader, that the original, of which a translation is 
now offered, had been preceded by a treatise pub- 
lished at Leipsic, under the title of " The Euro- 
' : pean Pentarchy" ; a work written by some par- 
tisan of Russia, with the view of sowing dissensions 
among the German States, and conciliating favour 
to Russian encroachment. As will soon be per- 
ceived, the following inquiry was undertaken with 
no such object. 

In speaking of the Great Powers of Europe, the 
first question is, what do we properly understand 

A 



2 



EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 



by the term political power ? That term cannot at 
the present day be confined to Dynasties and Go- 
vernments. There must be other powers to which 
Dynasties and Governments are indebted for the 
strength they have attained ; powers occasionally 
threatening them not only from without but also 
from within. Not unfrequently these powers have 
become so mighty that, overthrowing ancient states 
and kingdoms, and introducing others in their 
stead, they have carried Europe along as by a hur- 
ricane, and have created entirely new interests. 
We recognise as such powers, the power of Na- 
tionality ; the power of Religious Opinion ; the 
power of Political Principles ; and the power of 
Material Interests. These are the great powers 
of our day, which, intimately conjoined with the 
power of existing Dynasties and Governments, 
form the proper Pentarchy of Europe. The power 
of skill and science does not here come particularly 
under consideration ; because that power serves 
only to exalt national renown, to increase or lessen 
the power of religious opinion, and of political 
principles, and through a knowledge of nature to 
advance Material Interests ; besides, the power 



EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 3 



of skill and science is comprehended in all the 
others. 

The power of Nationality displayed itself ear- 
liest. From the collision of migratory tribes in 
quest of settlements, arose that territorial arrange- 
ment of Europe, which has continued to the pre- 
sent day ; notwithstanding the many shocks it has 
undergone, and the liability in the course of years 
to be superseded by other lines of demarcation. 
However often nations may have been parcelled 
out among many native and foreign masters, and 
however often nations may have been united under 
the rule of one ; still in every instance it will be 
found that each nation has retained its peculiar 
character, its native language, its several customs, 
and local interests ; these interests in the progress 
of time again acquiring more or less influence. 
The natural force with which nationality is com- 
bined baffles all attempts at alteration. Imper- 
ceptibly, obtrusive modes are dislodged. Thus 
German habits in Italy were supplanted by the old 
Romanic ; and Italian manners, once prevalent in 
Germany, were extinguished by the Reformation. 



4 EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 



In other cases, existing Dynasties and Govern- 
ments have judiciously availed themselves of the 
power of Nationality to strengthen their position, 
or to repel foreign attacks. Napoleon triumphed 
by exciting the enthusiasm of the so-called Great 
Nation, and was overthrown by the recoil of na- 
tional feeling in Europe. Even the weakest and 
most severely depressed nations have imbibed cou- 
rage from the indestructible vigour of nationality, 
which has excited them to make wonderful efforts, 
at times successful, at times unsuccessful, to effect 
their regeneration : witness latterly the deeds of 
the Poles and of the modern Greeks. 

The power of Religious Opinion, comprehend- 
ing the power of an established Church, is the 
second in regard to antiquity. This power first 
encroached on national frontiers, shattered native 
sovereignties, and from their ruins formed new 
states and dynasties, of which not a few arose on 
the decline of the Papal power. All the states 
whose integrity was guaranteed by the peace of 
Westphalia, were either the residue of the old sove- 
reignties ; as the dominions of the House of Haps- 



EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 5 



burg, the French, Spanish, English, Swedish, 
Danish, and Polish kingdoms ; or had emancipated 
themselves, first, as the states of the German Elec- 
tors, Savoy, and Switzerland, in the war of Inves- 
titures, which was the earliest diminution of the 
strength of the Empire; secondly, as Holland, which 
owed its emancipation at a later period to the great 
wars of the Reformation. Excess of enthusiasm in 
religion, is invariably followed by religious indif- 
ference. But the Power of Religious Opinion has 
never been, and never can be, extinguished ; so 
deeply is it rooted in the feelings of mankind. It 
may rise above and sink beneath the level, but to 
the level it ever returns ; and as no one in our day 
can fail to know, continues fully as much as Na- 
tionality, to be one of the great moving powers in 
Europe. 

The power of Political Principles, and the 
power of Material Interests, arose almost simul- 
taneously during the great struggle of the Refor- 
mation. These powers first introduced into the 
world that spirit of innovation which humbled 
the Romish Church ; though at the beginning 



6 EUROPEAN PENT ARCH Y. 

both these powers were employed by the reli- 
gious parties as mere instruments. The powers 
which thus served . as instruments, were soon dis- 
pensed with and laid aside, when the object in 
view was attained. The Catholics engaging in con- 
flict with the new reformed party, and requiring, 
not only spiritual, but worldly force, adopted as 
their political creed the principle of absolute mo- 
narchy ; against which the Reformers set up Re- 
publicanism as an antidote. Afterwards, on both 
sides, men became more tolerant as regards reli- 
gion ; but the adverse principles remaining in full 
force, by degrees expanded themselves, and in 
more recent times have, on the ground of right, 
laid claim to the supremacy of Europe. About the 
same period, what are termed the Material Inte- 
rests first began to assume importance. The reli- 
gious wars demanded immense exertions ; money 
was wanted ; and necessity, even in Spain, fostered 
the improvement of navigation and commerce, not- 
withstanding the general indolence of that coun- 
try. In fact, maritime ardour may be said to have 
disappeared in Spain as the religious wars died 
away. But the Reformers, especially the Dutch, 



EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 7 



who were certainly the most inveterate, perhaps 
the most personal adversaries of the Spaniards, 
during the heat of the war, had appropriated to 
themselves, and were better able to wield, the 
weapons supplied by navigation and commerce. 
The example of Holland proves most clearly that 
both the power of Political Principles, and the 
power of Material Interests, sprang from one 
and the same origin. These last named powers 
were long concentrated in the Dutch Republic, 
and, while the rest of Europe lay torpid, were the 
cause of its astonishing prosperity. But in the 
course of time Holland became too limited a stage. 
The power of political principle withdrew to France, 
while the power of material interests settled in 
England. 

Freedom, which, viewed as a principle, had been 
at the era of the Reformation merely the means 
to an end, and in subserviency to a religious 
party ; became self-existent, and recognised by its 
own title, powerful, nay, at the French Revolu- 
tion, overpowering. After an arduous struggle this 
power could be overcome only by a combination 



8 EUROPEAN PENT ARCH Y. 



of all the other powers ; a combination of nation- 
ality, of religious opinion, and of material interests ; 
and it would perhaps have been still more difficult 
to subdue, had not freedom been betrayed by the 
great son of the Revolution himself. In this in- 
stance, too, enthusiasm was followed by indiffer- 
ence. But who that lived to witness the tempest 
can yet doubt the extensive power of the principle 
of freedom ? 

By the revolutionary contest, as by the war of 
religion, the divisions of Europe and the relations 
of dynasties and states were again altered. Many 
small states disappeared ; some large states became 
still larger; a new dynasty reared itself in Sweden ; 
through the constitutional system, or through hos- 
tility to it, the old states were animated with new 
life ; Germany, in particular, having ceased to be 
an empire, assumed a quite different physiognomy. 
Since the treaty of peace, the conflict of principles 
has continued in detail, producing new relations, 
a kingdom in Belgium, and important changes in 
France, Spain, and Portugal. 



EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 9 



Nevertheless the power of political principles 
was proportionally weakened, and their effects 
were no longer the same as fifty years before ; the 
power of material interests the more decidedly gain- 
ing the ascendant. England, during the revolu- 
tionary war. had leant chiefly on this power, to 
which she owes her enormous preponderance in the 
European scale. England was regarded with envy 
or with the imitative instinct of poverty. Peace 
favoured the material interests : everywhere people 
longed for calm that their voices might be heard ; 
especially in Germany, which had suffered most by 
interruptions of trade. In France alone the ques- 
tion of political principles has been invariably pre- 
ferred to that of material interests ; though the pre- 
sent dynasty, in opposition to the republican party, 
has attached itself to the material interests as to an 
anchor. France has vainly sought in industry and 
commerce to forget political reasoning. The other 
countries of Europe promoted their material inte- 
rests in proportion to the tranquillity they enjoyed ; 
though too often with the characteristic selfishness 
of a former age, which, by encouraging native in- 
dustry, and prohibitions against articles of foreign 



10 



EUROPEAN PENT ARCH Y. 



manufacture, deprives the country itself of much 
internal benefit, without warranting any greater 
advantage abroad. But in general the power of 
material interest is, of all others, in our day, the 
least misapprehended ; it even animates poetical \ 
fancy, and excites visionaries of every kind, among 
whom the St Simonians are most conspicuous. 

The character of the Dynasties and Govern- 
ments composing the fifth great power in Europe, 
is thus, necessarily, imparted by the four great 
powers already named. Whatever country in our 
day is powerful, derives its power from the energy, 
the vitality, the recollections and the hopes, the' 
renown and the ambition of the people ; — from re- 
ligious sympathies, sincere piety, and constancy in 
belief, and from the still active interests of church 
parties ; — from the strength of principle, and the 
firm resolves of political associations ; — or from the 
advancement of material interests, along with the 
wellbeing and activity of the working- classes ; — 
or, lastly, from several, or from all these sources 
of power combined. 



EUROPEAN PENT ARCH Y. 11 



But much depends on how far, within any coun- 
try, these powers are not in opposition to each other ; 
and to what extent the government is at liberty to 
employ them, — and, further, what is the degree of 
external sympathy and antipathy toward that coun- 
try ; what natural allies or natural enemies there 
are abroad. Only according to these circumstances 
can the true power of a country be estimated. Se- 
veral appear to have many means at their com- 
mand, but cannot freely employ them ; others can 
employ their means freely, and are in reality power- 
ful, but are thwarted by greater antipathies from 
without. 

Moreover, in every country at present, the go- 
vernments alone wield the initiative. Risings of 
whole nations, or of great religious sects, violent 
outbreaks of political parties in favour of a prin- 
ciple, without regard to existing states, are very 
improbable events. Even if these national and reli- 
gious questions, and questions of political principle, 
were to attain a European importance, they would 
immediately be converted by the governments into 
questions of interest ; and would go to form ad- 



12 EUROPEAN PENTARCHY. 



ditional weight in the European scale ; or some 
government, more fortunate and more prudent than 
the rest, would appropriate all the advantages the 
increase and the triumph of a party would ensure. 

Thus, without overlooking the fact, that Euro- 
pean Governments derive their power from very 
different, and not always from permanent sources, 
still in them we behold the manifest possessors, and 
the outward representatives, of every thing which 
is denominated power. 

From this point of view we shall now proceed 
to consider more closely the sources of power in 
European nations : and while endeavouring to re- 
duce power to its true value, and to weigh the in- 
dividual powers against each other, we shall per- 
haps be in a condition to elucidate some particulars 
which seem to have received less than their due at- 
tention from our contemporaries. 



( 13 ) 



ENGLAND. 



Not without cause is the name of England here 
placed first. Russia, perhaps, might have claimed 
precedence on the ground of her colossal military 
force, were it not counterbalanced by antipathies 
and interests which are not equally available 
against England. A great and manifest advantage 
to England is, that she cannot excite apprehen- 
sions by the supposed desire of possessing territory 
on the Continent, and by these means establishing 
a universal monarchy. This circumstance at once 
secures to England permanent sympathies and al- 
liances among Continental nations. 

But even by herself England is great in every 
respect ; her power being derived from all the 
sources from which the power of a state can flow. 



14 



ENGLAND. 



England has preserved the strength, the conscious- 
ness, the pride of her nationality ; no part of 
which has been lost, even hy the constrained ac- 
knowledgment of the independence of the United 
States. It is a proud boast, and an infallible proof 
of her national vitality, to have impressed on her 
conquests and colonies the stamp of the English 
character ; that the children and the grandchildren 
should resemble their original parent, in no way 
degenerated ; in the New, as in the Old World, ex- 
hibiting the same vigour and manliness. From a 
hardy stem only could such healthy shoots have 
been put forth. "What other people can point to 
similar conquests and colonies, while in its native 
soil the old stem flourishes with undecaying you.th ? 
Although there are other European nations who 
vie with England in national pride ; yet in this re- 
spect the English maintain the superiority, that 
they not only evince that pride externally, by carry- 
ing on their wars with the energy of national wars ; 
but even in peace, and in ordinary civil life, they 
always continue mindful of the high tone and ho- 
nourable feeling that becomes a free and a noble 
nation. 



ENGLAND. 



15 



Religion also exercises great influence on the 
English character. At an early period England 
adopted the Reformation, purchased it at a far 
smaller sacrifice than Germany, and enjoyed from 
it many greater advantages. Strict morals, manly 
devotion, and true piety, originally belonged to the 
native character of the English ; but these qualities 
were disciplined, and gained more strength from 
the Reformation. The Catholic opposition in Ire- 
land never was, is not even now, and never will be- 
come dangerous, so long as the reformed party con- 
tinue firm ; and yet, in accordance with the hu- 
mane spirit of the age, secure toleration and equa- 
lity of rights. Still less has England to dread from 
an irreligious opposition, such as was, and still is, 
to be deprecated in France. 

The unceasing contest of political principles, 
which has caused so much injury to other nations, 
has been to England entirely beneficial. It has 
long been remarked that England combines within 
herself the virtues of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy; while in other states these political 
principles are at variance, and reciprocally weaken 



16 



ENGLAND. 



each other. The practical sense of the English 
soon recovers itself ; they have for centuries un- 
deviatingly upheld the equilibrium, the mutual sup- 
port, and the gradation of the component parts of 
the state ; always advancing and improving ; always 
watchful ; never subversive, or supine. Hence the 
English are far ahead of every other people in poli- 
tical information, and in political tact ; nor are the 
latest efforts of Radicalism to undermine the fabric 
of the government, to be at all compared with similar 
attempts in France. In England the tendency is 
different ; and the chances are, that, should Radi- 
calism ever reach a crisis, the English legislature 
would not be revolutionized, only further reformed. 
In England, unworthy and noxious elements are 
rejected, but no disorganization ensues. The oak 
shakes off the withered leaves of autumn, while the 
roots hold fast. 

The Russian pamphleteer has, in his " Euro- 
pean Pentarchy," expressed the hope that England 
would be undermined by Radicalism, and through 
internal distraction externally weakened. But he 
ought to have recollected the English revolution in 



ENGLAND. 



17 



the 17th century; which, though horrors of every 
kind were provoked, yet at the same time rendered 
the kingdom more powerful at home, strengthened 
the British influence abroad, and raised the navy 
of England to a superiority never before attain- 
able. The navigation act, that habeas corpus of 
the sea, was the work of Cromwell, and a creation 
of Radicalism. 

While England steadily maintains freedom, and 
advocates reform within the bounds of moderation 
and lawful order ; she preserves to herself not only 
her own peculiar strength unimpaired, never ex- 
hausting itself nor relaxing into sloth ; but she 
secures very valuable and, if need be, inestimable 
sympathies on the Continent. However justly the 
Tories may be blamed ; abroad it is never doubted 
that England would finally take up arms on the 
side of freedom. Such is the firm belief on the Con- 
tinent ; nor is the belief unsettled even by actual 
disappointments. Whenever England may offer 
her assistance against any sort of tyranny, she will 
be implicitly relied on for support. Yet England 
herself is not revolutionary, and by her own inter- 

B 



18 



ENGLAND. 



nal tranquillity and well-known moderation inspires 
the Continental governments with confidence. Eng- 
land has thus an inexhaustible stock of political sym- 
pathies and alliances at command. A case where 
she would be without allies on the Continent, is in- 
conceivable. The marvellous efforts of Napoleon 
were rendered abortive ; even he only proved the 
constancy of foreign sympathies for England, while 
vainly straining every nerve to subdue her. 

Lastly, by attention to her Material Interests, 
England has made herself the richest country in 
the world ; and notwithstanding the fictitious na- 
tional debt, has a command of money to an ex- 
tent beyond that of any other state. In asserting 
the dominion of the sea, and, by direct as well as 
indirect means, enforcing a monopoly of trade ; she 
has, no doubt, often wronged the nations of the 
Continent, deeply mortified and injured them in 
their most essential rights and interests ; but the 
antipathies awakened by such conduct do not in 
general outweigh the sympathies in her favour. The 
jealousy existing among the Continental powers, 
and the necessity of an alliance with England in 



ENGLAND. 



19 



every great political crisis, prevails against the feel- 
ing of commercial indignity.* 

Without dispute Great Britain is very powerful ; 
relatively, the most powerful kingdom in Europe. 
From having no inclination or aptitude for Conti- 
nental conquests, her European policy is limited to 
preventing the formation of any rival maritime 
power in her neighbourhood ; to securing the great 
market of the Continent for her colonial produce 
and manufactured goods ; and to opening a passage 
by the Mediterranean through Egypt or Syria to- 
ward her East Indian possessions. On the first head 
she has almost nothing to fear. No European fleet, 
or combination of fleets, could successfully oppose 
England at sea. As to the second point, it has long 
been the policy of England to prevent any Conti- 
nental nation from monopolizing, to the same ex- 
tent as herself, the Atlantic colonial trade, and 
making the transit of produce through England 
unnecessary : in this endeavour she has succeeded 
admirably with Spain, Portugal, Holland, and 

* A verse of displeasure not to be reprehended in a chapter 
so laudatory. — Tr. 



20 



ENGLAND. 



France. It has also been part of the English sys- 
tem to maintain what is called the balance of power 
in Europe ; so that no state on the Continent may 
swallow up all the rest, and, like France under 
Napoleon, renew the famed Continental League. 
On these grounds England was Napoleon's most 
active antagonist, and would be no less hostile to 
Russia, were a universal European monarchy to be 
apprehended from that quarter. With regard to 
the third point, it is clearly the interest of England, 
that in the Levant, where she seeks a passage to 
India, no great power should be allowed to establish 
itself : consequently, that neither Russia should pre- 
dominate there, nor Mehemet Ali succeed in revi- 
ving the caliphate. 

England might indeed make a division with Rus- 
sia. But it does not in the least degree suit the 
interests of Russia to open for the English an over- 
land route to India. And still less does it accord 
with the interests of England to gain her object 
by conniving at any usurpation on the part of Rusr 
sia. Any division of Turkey affording an increase 
of territory to Russia, would only enable the Czar 



ENGLAND. 



21 



the more effectually to throw obstacles in the way 
of the proposed overland route to India. This route 
would lose incalculably in security the nearer it is 
approached by the Russian frontier ; and the fore- 
going this route for the present, is of much less im- 
portance to England than gaining it at the price of 
Russian aggrandizement. 

On this account all compacts between England 
and Russia only tend to prolong the provisional 
state of the East ; but can never result in any dis- 
memberment of Turkey. 

England beholding in Russia the most effective 
obstacle to her Eastern plans, counteracts Russian 
craft in many ways. Standing at the head of the 
Holy Alliance, Russia enforces in Europe absolu- 
tism and legitimacy. Against that alliance Eng- 
land formed the Quadruple Alliance of the consti- 
tutional and liberal states of the West : principle 
is thus ranged against principle. Perhaps Eng- 
land would also have espoused the cause of Poland 
against Russia, had not circumspection been re- 
quired in dealing with the other Continental 



22 



ENGLAND. 



powers ; nor, under the circumstances, was there a 
prospect of successful interference. But England 
has been indefatigable and most successful when 
she stirred up the question of the European equi- 
librium ; of that equilibrium which does not permit 
all the great powers of the Continent to desire an 
aggrandizement of Russia. 

England has thus the good fortune to preserve 
friendly relations with all the Continental powers 
except Russia. Spain and Portugal depend on her 
for support. The Scandinavian peninsula is too 
weak, and too much overshadowed by Russia, to 
regard with jealousy the maritime predominance 
of England. Political unanimity, the position of 
the reigning family, and lastly the wish to maintain 
Algiers, binds France to England. Austria is the 
natural and oldest ally of England on the Continent. 
A kindred necessity secures the friendship of Prus- 
sia and the rest of Germany ; though the Commer- 
cial League (Zoli-verein) is contrary to the inter- 
ests of England.* 

* Or in Germany is imagined so to be. — Tr. 



ENGLAND. 



23 



While Russia continues overpowerful, or seeks 
to extend her conquests, these friendly relations 
will not be weakened. The duration of the sym- 
pathy with France alone appears problematical. 
Should the French, in the course of time, lay aside 
the hope of renewing, by revolutionary means, 
their former glory and imperial grandeur ; should 
they become attached to monarchy ; then would 
France revert to the old cabinet policy of Louis 
XIV., and endeavour, by Russian aid, to reunite 
to her territory the left bank of the Rhine, — a re- 
sult not to be gained by any alliance with England, 



( 25 ) 



RUSSIA. 



The power of Russia, though undoubtedly great* 
has often been exaggerated by flatterers. So long 
as war lasts, exaggeration may serve to alarm 
opponents ; but it is otherwise during peace, when 
there is time for reflection. Russia would in reali- 
ty be what she only appears, the most formidable 
state in Europe, had she not awakened so many 
antipathies against herself, partly by awkward ar- 
tifices to gain sympathy. Russia, properly, has no 
natural allies except, in certain events, the condi- 
tional alliance of France. 

Still the power is enormous which Russia sum- 
mons forth from her own resources. The basis 
of her power is National Feeling, so much the 
stronger from being somewhat barbarous. The 

c 



26 



RUSSIA. 



Russians are numerous, united, blindly devoted to 
the Czar, faithful and obedient in peace, patient 
and courageous in war. 

The Russians also, without any political infor- 
mation, enjoy the first and greatest prerogative a 
nation can possess,- — unity and external independ- 
ence. No Russian ever dreams of breaking Russia 
asunder. Revolutions in the palace do not dissolve 
the integrity of the empire. Civil wars and foreign 
tyranny, so frequent and so baneful to more enlight- 
ened countries, have for many generations been 
unfelt by the Russians. On the contrary, they have 
learned to look upon themselves as the masters of 
the surrounding nations. One thing only is want- 
ing to the Russian people, moral strength ; the capa- 
city of displaying superiority of intellect, and not 
of the mere physical mass. Therefore is Russia 
destitute of all sympathy abroad, More polished 
nations revolt from the idea of being subjected to 
the sway of Russia ; and even the barbarians of the 
Caucasus, personally confronted with the Russians, 
are not overcome by that higher intelligence and 
feeling which in ancient times their forefathers ad- 



RUSSIA. 



27 



mired in the soldiery of Alexander the Great. This 
mental deficiency is what has rendered impossible 
the conciliation of the Poles, though a people of 
kindred origin. From the same cause arises a latent 
weakness throughout the Russian army, which not 
unfrequently has marred their courage and devo- 
tedness, even when engaged with much less nume- 
rous antagonists. 

Among the native Russians, both in the mili- 
tary and civil service, a jealousy of foreigners has 
recently displayed itself, which must undoubtedly 
be considered among the weaknesses of the Rus- 
sian monarchy, and a great political folly on the 
part of the Russians. Whether the generals and 
high officers of state have been born in Russia 
itself, or are Germans, Frenchmen, Poles, mat- 
ters not ; if they have faithfully and more skillfully 
forwarded the interests of Russia. That such 
has been the case, they have proved. A Russian 
ought not to complain, but be proud, that foreigners 
have served Russia. Does a German who enters 
the Russian service thereby benefit his native coun- 
try ? Rather the reverse. Ostermann and Munich 



28 



RUSSIA. 



were Germans. Catharine the Second herself was 
a German. And did they not do their utmost to 
make Russia great and powerful ? did they not, on 
account of Russia, leave their native Germany quite 
out of view ? Has Germany cause to be proud of 
such disloyal children ? Not Germany, but Rus- 
sia alone. How much value did Napoleon justly 
attach to the employment of talented men of all 
countries ? And how large a portion of the suc- 
cesses of France were owing to strangers I The 
case is similar in Russia. It must be further borne 
in mind, that the Slavonic population in the Rus- 
sian empire is not homogeneous. An assimila- 
tion, for example, of the Poles with the Russians 
is not the work of a day, or to be effected by an 
Ukase. Who then cannot, under these circum- 
stances, perceive that it becomes most desirable for 
Russia to employ against the Poles, not Russians 
only, but foreigners likewise, in order to neutralize 
the hatred against the Russian nation by the great- 
est possible mixture of other nations ? Besides, the 
Russomania which would exclude from their service 
every thing that is not of Russian birth, is in a 
manner a protestation against conquest, and in 



RUSSIA. 



29 



direct contradiction to the system of aggrandize- 
ment. 

The power of religion is the second stronghold 
of Russia. The Czar is at the same time Patriarch ; 
the supremacy of the Church and the State being 
conjoined. The popes, as the priesthood are termed, 
far from exhibiting any aristocratic pretensions, 
are under absolute subjection to the emperor. In 
Russia, it would never enter the imagination of a 
dignitary of the church to resist the power of the 
sovereign, like the Archbishops of Cologne and 
Posen. And as to learned theologians qualified to 
excite schisms, or lead astray to infidelity by vain 
sophisms ; of such men there are none in the Greek 
Church. The people are passively devout, believe 
what their priests tell them, enter into no inqui- 
ries or reasonings, and implicitly regard the will 
of the emperor as the will of the Almighty. In 
one respect only, the Greek Church in Russia, like 
the nation, is deficient ; it has no ability to excite 
respect, or awaken sympathy abroad ; at the ut- 
most, it exerts a feeble influence over those of the 
same creed in southern countries not Russian 



30 



RUSSIA. 



Russia owes to her political principles a por- 
tion of her excessive power. Russia is the only 
state which upholds an unlimited autocracy ; and 
within whose vast dominions one man rules un- 
controlled by opposition, nay without even the re- 
monstrance of a^ingle deliberative body. All her 
means are brought to a point, and ready for imme- 
diate application. The geographical extent of 
Russia alone retards the execution of an imperial 
mandate. Necessarily, from the adherence of Rus- 
sia to the principles of legitimacy and absolutism ; 
all other governments who adopt the same princi- 
ple, but of themselves cannot, without much trouble 
and danger, maintain it outright ; and who, on that 
account, require external aid and support ; become 
the friends, and relatively the clients of Russia. 
When such governments are molested by outbreaks 
of popular feeling, they have recourse to Russian 
diplomacy and intervention ; and if the worst hap- 
pen, they know a secure retreat is to be found in 
Russia. Accordingly, Russia appears to have many 
natural allies. But principle yields to interest ; 
and the same governments who, in regard to ab- 
solutism, most nearly coincide with Russia, have 



RUSSIA. 



31 



an interest adverse to her, as neighbours ; so far 
as they are strong enough, like Austria and Prus- 
sia, being natural rivals of Russia; while the coun- 
tries notoriously more feeble are afraid of losing, 
by Russian agency, their national existence. On 
the contrary, France has, indeed, many interests in 
common with Russia ; among others, to weaken 
the states of Germany; but in France the Con- 
stitutional, almost the Democratic, principle pre- 
dominates, the very principle of all others most 
opposed to that upheld by Russia. Consequently, 
Russia derives every possible internal advantage 
from her form of government, but externally none 
whatever. Governments agreeing in opinion sym- 
pathize cautiously with Russia, and always retain 
their peculiar interests in reserve ; while the people 
of Europe, enjoying, even under absolute monar- 
chies, greater freedom than Russia, view her prin- 
ciples with dislike. 

The Russian government most zealously for- 
wards the material interests of their own coun- 
try ; but only in so far as suits their prohibitive 
system, in regard to foreign articles. For this 



32 



RUSSIA. 



reason they still cling to the old maxims of trade"; 
and, perhaps, in Russia, which of itself affords 
so large a market, these maxims may be more 
applicable than in smaller countries ; besides, the 
consumption among the mass of the Russian peo- 
ple, is different from that in countries possessing 
a numerous and intelligent middle class of society. 
Meanwhile the exclusive system of Russia operates 
prejudicially on her external relations ; keeping alive 
in the neighbouring states a strong feeling against 
her. An opinion, indeed, has been artfully ex- 
pressed, that by her heavy imposts, Russia has pre- 
vailed on some of her Baltic neighbours to desire 
a union with that empire ; for were they to become 
Russian subjects, a larger market would at once be 
opened to them. But Providence perhaps designs 
otherwise ; and enlivens the harbour of Dantzig 
under more favourable auspices. 

Certainly, however, Russia is striving for a wide 
extension of her commerce in the Mediterranean ; 
the possession of the Dardanelles being not less 
necessary for the advancement of her material in- 
terests, than on military and political consider- 



RUSSIA. 



33 



ations. So long as she is not in possession of the 
Dardanelles, as the Emperor Alexander was wont 
to say, Russia holds not the key of her own house. 

Having thus made ourselves acquainted with the 
sources of the power of Russia within her own ter- 
ritory, we shall now survey her external relations ; 
the means she has at her command in other quar- 
ters ; and likewise the obstacles to the further ex- 
tension of her power. We must premise that 
Russia, though very successful in Asia, has never 
yet, by herself alone, made any conquests or acqui- 
sitions in Europe. There, every increase of her 
territory has been gained by alliances. It may also 
not be superfluous to remark, that the Russian 
armies, unless combined with other troops, have 
always failed in their encounters with an enemy 
of equal force ; though victorious, it is true, over 
opponents much weaker than themselves : to this 
fact the celebrated campaign of Suwarrow in Italy 
is a solitary exception. What has just been men- 
tioned, proves that the influence and extensive en- 
croachments of Russia in Europe, have been owing 



34 



RUSSIA. 



altogether to the dexterous use of the alliances she 
*has made from time to time, 

When the military armaments of Russia are so 
often represented as invincible, and as the means 
of establishing a future universal monarchy, we 
ought to bear in mind, and pointedly to notice, 
that Russia is indebted for her victories at Pul- 
towa, and in the winter of 1812, not so much to 
generalship as to the climate ; that her victories 
over the Tartars, Persians, and Turks, and over 
Sweden in 1809, are due only to her overwhelming 
superiority and to the imbecility and corruption of 
her foes ; that her successes against Poland were 
in consequence of the weakness of the Poles them- 
selves, and the behaviour of the adjoining states ; 
that she has to thank her allies for the victory at 
Kunersdorff, and the overthrow of Napoleon in 
1813 and 1814; — -that, on the other hand, when she 
has stood alone, or with feeble allies, she has al- 
ways, except under Suwarrow, been defeated by 
inferior numbers of the regular troops of Western 
Europe. The Russians were routed by Charles 
the Twelfth and Frederick the Great with very 



RUSSIA. 



35 



limited resources. They were beaten at Zurich 
and Austerlitz, at Friedland, (on the Moskwa) at 
Borodino ; nay, even in the last Polish war, till the 
way by Thorn was opened to them. If the great 
Continental powers be unfit singly to cope with 
Russia, any two of them would most assuredly be 
more than her match. The formidable character 
of Russia will thus bear some modification. There 
cannot be an apprehension of the military strength, 
or of the peculiar ability, of Russia ; but only a fear 
of her allies, — a fear of being circumvented by that 
insidious diplomacy with which Russia on all occa- 
sions endeavours to create dissensions in Europe. 

By these means Russia won every thing she has 
got hold of in Europe beyond her natural limits. 
And, in truth, she at one time encouraged the quar- 
rels of other great powers, and while they were 
struggling for life or death, she quietly seized upon 
the weaker states ; at another time joining in a 
formal alliance, she plundered or partitioned out 
some defenceless territory. For the most part, 
both these plans were pursued simultaneously. The 
power with which she was in alliance, she kept well 



* D RUSSIA. 

occupied elsewhere : not unfrequently she waited 
till an ally was entangled in some difficulty, and 
then, as being on the spot, took to herself the lion's 
share. In this way, while Austria was involved in 
the war of the Spanish succession, she, with the aid 
of the Prussians, Danes, and Saxons, seized the 
German provinces on the Baltic. In the same 
way, with the help of Austria and Prussia, she 
made the first partition of Poland in 1773. Simi- 
larly, she obtained the largest share at the second 
partition in 1794, while Austria and Prussia were 
intent on the movements of France. Again, she 
burst into the Crimea when Austria was engaged 
with the Netherlands, and Prussia was at variance 
with Holland. She took possession of Finland, 
with the concurrence of Napoleon, when busied in 
Spain. Under the same auspices, parts of Polish 
Prussia and Gallicia were appropriated, when Aus- 
tria and Prussia were much cast down. 

Thus, of the once-powerful neighbours of Russia, 
some have been blotted out of the roll of nations, 
others completely exhausted. Poland, in regard 
to her political existence, is annihilated. Swe- 



RUSSIA. 



37 



den, the bulwark of the Protestant faith, mourns 
the loss of her Baltic provinces and Finland. The 
Porte, so formidable of yore, has yielded to Russia 
the Crimea, Bessarabia, and the embouchure of the 
Danube ; to which may now be added Moldavia 
and Wallachia. The first barrier of surrounding 
states has been laid low by Russia, and has crum- 
bled away. Will it be indispensable for the next 
barrier, which, besides what is left of the old 
Swedish and Turkish realms, comprises Austria 
and Prussia, to arm against a similar fate ? or has 
the hitherto conquering policy of Russia suddenly 
veered, and henceforward will her thoughts be 
directed only to security and peace ? Is she never 
again to dare an enlargement of her territorial 
possessions in the West ? 

The Russian pamphleteer endeavours, in his 
" European Pentarchy," to raise an impression 
that Russia is not anxious for the possession of the 
Dardanelles, nor for the conquest of Constantinople. 
He says, " I cannot deny that it has always cost 
" me the greatest effort to discover any ground in 
" the least degree tenable, or a single object cal- 



38 



RUSSIA. 



" culated to produce a real advantage, which might 
" influence Russia to desire to become the joint 
" or sole heir of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. 
" It is quite incomprehensible how men, in judg- 
' ; ing of Russian and Turkish affairs, have so total- 
" ly neglected to pay any attention to the northern 
" parallel ; whether the Baltic and the Black Sea, 
" Copenhagen and Constantinople, the Sound and 
" the Bosphorus, Cronstadt and the Castles of the 
" Dardanelles, present relations in every way cor- 
" responding with each other. One may also go 
" yet further, and maintain that England, were she 
" to interrupt the free passage of Russia through 
" the Sound, would constrain Russia to take pos- 
" session of harbours on the German Ocean; so also, 
" were she to prevent Russia from taking posses- 
" sion of the Caucasian Isthmus, she would incite 
" the Czar to occupy Constantinople (! !) Den- 
" mark is a state as weak, and compounded of as 
" heterogeneous parts, as the Ottoman Empire ; and 
" for that reason can, like the Ottoman Empire, 
" maintain and secure her individual existence only 
" by confederacies and alliances. And yet no one 
" has gone the length of inserting among news- 



RUSSIA. 



39 



" paper falsehoods, the discovery of a secret design 
" of Russia to conquer Zealand and the Danish 
" Archipelago ; albeit such a novel report might, 
" notwithstanding its absurdity, have been raised 
" to some purpose. 

" But on what grounds shall Russia contemplate 
" her southern relations, from a point of view oppo- 
" site to that in which she contemplates her north- 
" era relations ? Why shall she give up, in re- 
" spect to the South, those conservative maxims (!) 
M which, in circumstances entirely alike, she ri- 
" gidly maintains in the North ? Because Eng- 
" land wishes to gain the position of Constanti- 
" nople (! !) But is not the case the same in re- 
u gard to Copenhagen also ? (! ! !) and is not the 
" larger export of Russia at the present time 
" through the Baltic and the North Sea ? Yet, 
" on closer examination, it actually appears that 
" the interest of England in Copenhagen is rather 
" negative, and in so far offensive ; in Constanti- 
" nople, on the contrary, positive, and on that ac- 
" count defensive; while the interests of Russia 
" are in a reverse order. England obtains a great 



40 



RUSSIA. 



" part of her imports through the Baltic and the 
" North Sea. Here she is the receiver, and for 
" that reason has the ability to assume the offen- 
" sive. On the other hand; it is the British Ex- 
" ports which are concerned in the East. And 
" just because England in the East is the giver, 
" she sees herself thereby limited to a defensive 
" policy. Now in the case of Russia the opposite 
" relation holds, so that this power gains her of- 
" fensive where England is placed on the defen- 
" sive, an offensive which is to be viewed as a re- 
" prisal for England's hold on the Baltic and the 
" North Sea. 

" But while in this manner we elucidate (!) the 
" Southern Turkish and the Northern Scandina- 
" vian question, we reach the only fit station for 
" judging of both questions. As Russia expects 
" the well-secured (! !) neutrality of the Scandina- 
" vian kingdoms ; so England requires the well- 
*' secured neutrality of the Ottoman Empire. Here 
" England is perfectly in the right ; and so far as 
" the British policy aims at nothing beyond, not 
" the slightest objection can be raised on the part 



RUSSIA. 



41 



' of Russia. Russia has never disputed the rea- 
' sonableness of this demand, but rather has con- 
' tinually respected it(!) The international law of 
' Europe then shall guard the Dardanelles as well 
' as the Sound; and a hostile combination of 
' powers, which could end only in the ruin of the 
' states immediately participating, will there, as 
' here, be avoided. Hence the Emperor Nicho- 
1 las, impressed with these views, has on every 
' opportunity been at pains to shew regard for (!) 
6 and to strengthen, as far as was possible, (! !) the 
' independence of the Sublime Porte. 

" The conflict of 1828 and 1829 arose from a 
' challenge of the Sultan, as is known to all the 
' world. When, however, Sir Robert Gordon ex- 
' plained that, if the Russian troops advanced far- 
6 ther, there would be an end of the Ottoman 
4 Empire, the Russian army halted ; since Russia 
4 desired no war of annihilation to Turkey, (!) but 
' on the contrary her preservation, (!) and her neu- 
£ tral permanence. Thus, with a view to the neu- 
1 trality of Turkey, the 7th article of the treaty 
' of Adrianople stipulated the free entrance into 



42 



RUSSIA. 



" the Black Sea of all commercial flags without 
" distinction, indeed on the same terms which had 
" been secured for trading vessels under the Rus- 
£< sian flag. Russia did not, in this instance, ex- 
" cept herself in the most remote degree; since the 
" neutrality of the Porte could not well be con- 
" joined with a preference in favour of any one 
il power : though here questions entirely commer- 
44 cial were alone brought under consideration; and 
;< a different stipulation in regard to such ques- 
" tions, would not have been in the least at vari- 
" ance with a relation of neutrality. 

" Further, when, in 1833, Ibrahim Pacha, having 
been victorious at Koniah, advanced on the Otto- 
cc man capital, with the fixed intention of putting 
" an end to the Turkish Empire ; the Porte thereon 
" had recourse to England, and the Emperor of 
" Russia declared he would view without jealousy 
" or mistrust the assistance Turkey might receive 
" from England. Nevertheless England delayed ; 
" the occasion was urgent. Then Russia supplied 
" her aid at the express solicitation of the Sultan. 
" Ten thousand Russians encamped on the Asiatic 



RUSSIA. 



43 



" shore of the Bosphorus. However, as soon as 
'■' Ibrahim had recrossed the Taurus, the Russian 
:£ auxiliary troops instantly quitted the Turkish 
' soil. The consequence was, as is well known, the 
' treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi. 

" Of the eight years for which this compact was 
' concluded, five have already expired ; and Eu- 
e rope can now decide whether that treaty has, in 
' the least degree, compromised or injured the in- 
1 dependent existence and neutrality of the Porte. 
■ The principle of the exclusion of foreign ships 
£ of war from the Dardanelles admits no exception . 
' Under the expression foreign (in regard to the 
' Porte) Russian ships of war are excluded, as 
: well as those of other powers. Russia did not 
s exempt herself ; and, as the separate article proves, 
' reserved to herself no privilege of access. In or- 
' der completely to annihilate every suspicion of 
' that kind, the emperor remitted to the Sultan 
' the last instalment of his debt which was due ; 
and the Russian troops evacuated Silistria, where 
an imperial gift of a hundred Russian cannon 
was left for the Sultan. Because the emperor 



44 



RUSSIA. 



66 is too noble not to stamp the character of Rus- 
" sian policy with her own greatness of soul (!) 
" But his sight is also too acute not to perceive 
" that the present frontier of Russia toward Tur- 
" key is the most advanced he can establish for his 
; - empire, without disjoining himself from power- 
" ful allied states, arid thus sacrificing more weighty 
" interests than the acquisition of a few provinces 
" could repay. And Russia is not unaware that 
" the possession of Constantinople would merely 
" be the cause of dissensions ; and that hence this 
" acquisition would be attended by the same con- 
" sequences to the colossal Empire of the North 
" which it formerly produced on Rome." * 

All this sounds very tranquillizing. But let us 
now hear likewise what a Frenchman, Armand 
Lefebvre, said not long since on the same topic, in 
the " Revue des deux Mondes." " It is clear as 
" day that Russia, in pressing forward to the Bos- 
" phorus, will not pause ; — though she would, she 

* A curious specimen of the dust gravely thrown in the 
eyes of the honest Germans. — Tr. 



RUSSIA. 



45 



" cannot. She can be at ease and well fenced about, 
" only when in possession of the Dardanelles. ; It 
" ' is necessary that I have in my pocket the key of 
" ' my house j said Alexander in the year 1808; 
" when, in anticipation of a speedy dismemberment 
" of Turkey, he insisted with his confederate Na- 
" poleon on having possession of Constantinople. 
" The whole designs of the Russian Cabinet are 
" compressed into these remarkable words. More- 
" over, the court of St Petersburg knew perfectly 
" well that slavery is an oppressive burden even 
" for the most abject minds. But how could such 
" a condition be otherwise than oppressive to the 
" energetic Sultan ; whose whole reign was a con- 
" test as persevering as ineffectual, against the 
" destiny which seems to have produced his suc- 
" cesses and his discomfiture for public admira- 
{< tion? The emperor was obliged to guard against 
" the Sultan's making a final effort to withdraw 
" from Russian protection, and place himself un- 
" der the shield of those powers whose imme- 
" diate interests demand the preservation of Tur- 
" key. Undoubtedly, though at the present mo- 
" ment the policy of Russia seems inclined to peace 



46 



RUSSIA. 



" and moderation ; yet, should events place in her 
" hand the long coveted prey, eagerly will she seize 
" and retain it, — unless it should be wrenched from 
" her again and appropriated by a stronger power. 

" Russia, stimulated by a craving ambition, must 
" endeavour to add to her political and military in- 
" fluence, the supremacy also in trade ; at least, in 
" so far as such supremacy is within her reach. 
" The Russian government is too clear sighted not 
" to know, that in the 19th century a really power- 
" ful state can exist; only by the development of all 
" the energies of the people, of all the natural 
" wealth, of all the elements of progressive civili- 
" zation. Russia seems to be ashamed of her bar- 
" barism ; and it is her greatest boast, gradually to 
" improve her material civilization, and to raise 
" herself to the level of the nations of Western 
" Europe. Once in the possession of the Bospho- 
" rus, and having the markets of the East subject 
' to her sway, she would not be slow to drive out 
' the English manufactures with the productions 
' of her own industry. 



RUSSIA. 



47 



" Hence the acquisition of Constantinople is for 
" Russia a question which, though most essential to 
" her policy, perhaps affects in a still higher degree 
" her commerce and marine. Were the finest pro- 
" vinces of Turkey, were the Dardanelles especially, 
" in the grasp of Russia; the consequence would be, 
" the acquisition of resources so abundant, and a 
" maritime position so favourable, that the Russian 
" navy would necessarily be advanced to an over- 
" whelming superiority; while now, on the contrary, 
" from the obstruction of the Porte, the Russian 
" fleets are as it were caught and imprisoned in 
" the Black Sea. The Mediterranean, also, has till 
" this time been closed to Russian enterprise. But 
" were Constantinople to become Russian ; Eng- 
M land would have in the waters of the Levant a 
" rival who, if conjoined with France, might suc- 
u ceed in despoiling Great Britain of the Ionian 
" Islands and Malta." 

This reasoning of a Frenchman is the best an- 
swer to that of the Russian Pamphleteer, and we 
have nothing to add. But, beyond all doubt — and 
we continue to repeat that we attach the highest 



48 



RUSSIA. 



importance to the fact — Russia, unaided, has not 
the ability to accomplish any of her projects in the 
East ; hitherto, and now more than ever, does she 
require an alliance. Her military force never was, 
and is at the present conjuncture still less, to be 
relied on. Her main stay must be her superior 
tact in the prudent choice and employment of 
those who act with her. 

Up to this time Russia has leant on the Holy 
Alliance, which was a confederacy based on poli- 
tical principle. So long as the struggle of politi- 
cal principles engaged the attention of Europe, 
and so long as the one principle to which Russian 
homage was paid, maintained the ascendency, em- 
barrassing even England by means of a Tory ad- 
ministration ; Russia occupied a very advantageous 
position in Europe : indeed she profited by making 
various conquests at the expense of Persia and the 
Porte* without interruption from England or Aus- 
tria. At the same time, Russia, by means of her 
embassies and the press, fanned, in Western Eu- 
rope, the flame of the war of principles, though 
herself carefully avoiding to become implicated. 



RUSSIA. 



49 



Having avowed the maxims of absolute monarchy 
and legitimacy, she roused in others a zeal for them 
with a spirit hostile to liberalism ; and by assuming 
the control, greatly fortified her own influence. 
But mere principles soon ceased to be a cause of 
strife. On the one hand, the second French Revo- 
lution subsided into a system of moderation and 
forbearance. On the other hand, the Tory admi- 
nistration fell; and England was seen to accept 
the proffered friendship of France. In both these 
countries the opposition parties successively lost 
their weight and credit. The cabinets had won 
the day ; and thenceforth their disputes with each 
other were no longer regarding principles, but pe- 
culiar interests. Thus were principles lost sight 
of, and the subject of national interests became 
conspicuous ; a turn of events very prejudicial to 
Russia.* 

* The Russian pamphleteer, who wrote " The European 
Pentarchy", cannot conceal his wrath at this unlooked for 
change ; and, hurried away by selfish views, so far denies his po- 
litical creed, as to indulge in the hope that Radicalism may oust 
the Whig Ministry in England ; totally subvert the British 
constitution ; abolish the antinational alliance with France ; 
and for the benefit of Russia, paralyse to the utmost the 

E 



50 



RUSSIA. 



From this time forward Russia could not awaken 
sympathies through the medium of principles. She 
endeavoured to gain the same object by starting 
kindred interests. 

The present moment is unfavourable for such 
views. When the attention of Europe is directed to 
any other quarter, Russia exults ; but she likes not 
to be herself the object of attention. Hence it is not 
improbable that the hired journalists of Russia may, 
regarding this point, divulge the truth, when they 
assure us that Russia is most peaceably inclined, 
and eager to avoid further conquests in the East — 
without any desire whatever for the possession of 
Constantinople, but merely to protect the Sultan. 
For this, as for every former undertaking of Rus- 
sia in Europe, alliances are requisite ; but latterly 

strength of Great Britain. Can Radicalism then be in secret 
league with the Russian autocracy % And does the rigour with 
which the principle of absolute monarchy is enforced by Rus- 
sia, in certain cases, admit of an exception 1 However, the 
author is right. In the intercourse of nations, principles are 
but lightly esteemed ; all questions are decided on the ground of 
interest ; and the Russian pamphleteer has only perhaps fallen 
into the error of disclosing what he ought to have concealed. 



RUSSIA. 



51 



allies have stood aloof, and demanded a greater 
price for their adherence. 

The coalition with Austria against the revolu- 
tionary phrenzy of the West, and arising from the 
political principle of the Holy Alliance, does not ap- 
ply in this case. Nor does the intimate connection 
with Prussia, founded on the same principle, and 
cemented by family ties, altogether set aside every 
question of interest. The idea, fondly entertained 
and advocated by Pozzo di Borgo, of a combination 
of Russian, Prussian, and French interests against 
England and Austria, cannot be realized. 

That anonymous Russian book, " The European 
Pentarchy," moreover asserts, that the interests of 
the nearest neighbours are not easily reconciled ; and 
plainly lays down as a general rule, that natural al- 
liances, such as rest on mutual interest, can be con - 
eluded, not with adjoining states, but only with their 
next neighbour. In order to test the soundness of 
this rule ; a more intimate connection of Russia 
is proposed with such countries as are separated 
from her by Austria and Prussia ; a conjunction, 



52 



RUSSIA. 



in the first instance with the smaller Confederate 
States of German}', in the second instance with 
France. 

The flattering prospect is held out to the smaller 
German States of a greater degree of independ- 
ence, to induce them to renounce the double guard- 
ianship of Austria and Prussia, as in 1806 they 
ronounced the constitution of the Empire. He 
suggests the forming among themselves a peculiar 
confederacy (what is termed a European Central 
Association) under a Russian Protectorate, resem- 
bling the former Confederation of the Rhine in the 
days of Napoleon. Russia would then afford them 
her protection ; in the hope of diminishing, for 
her own advantage, the influence of Austria and 
Prussia. 

But, he proceeds, should the small German States 
be slow to understand the hint, and should a Rus- 
sian protectorate not be agreeable to their tastes ; 
there is still another neighbour of the neighbours 
of Russia, and one from whom something more 
may be expected, namely, France. It would not 



RUSSIA. 



53 



be the first time that Russia and France have com- 
bined against one or other of the German powers ; 
and whenever the Government of France is firm- 
ly re-established, there would be no impediment 
in the way of a union of ussian and French inte- 
rests.* 

Respecting the said protectorate, the pamphlet- 
eer seems to have forgotten, that though, when 
constrained by a great superiority of force, and 
in circumstances of difficulty, small states may 
at times submit to a protectorate ; still it is what 
they never voluntarily seek. Besides, the Minor 
German States, since their happy release from the 
protectorate of Napoleon, have never yet felt a 
desire for new guardianship. No one has so as- 
sailed them, as to prove any thing like a protector 
or defender necessary for their existence. 

* With this feeling he hopes that the radical tendency in 
France will be subdued, and the authority of the government 
confirmed ; while, with reference to England, he prays that 
there the government may be embarrassed and undermined 
by Radicalism. A contradiction, so far as principle is con- 
cerned, but by no means in regard to interest. 



54 



RUSSIA. 



As for a closer alliance of Russia with France ; 
it is not merely the casual thought of a single pam- 
phleteer. Such an alliance has been often dwelt 
on by different persons of note, particularly by 
Pozzo di Borgo, with whom it was a project fondly 
cherished ; and even in France itself voices have 
been raised in favour of Russia. It is natural, that 
the two great powers encompassing Germany on 
opposite sides, should have a common interest in 
abridging and dividing as much as possible the 
strength of the German Confederacy ; whether by 
the endeavour to carry forward the conquests on 
German soil begun so far back as the peace of 
Westphalia ; or by accumulating power sufficient 
to turn the scale of the affairs of Europe, without 
control or opposition from any of the States of 
Germany. Thus, as early as the seven years' war, 
Russia and France united against Prussia ; and in 
1809, the same powers joined against Austria. 
After the downfall of Napoleon, Talleyrand most 
dexterously brought about a strong sympathy be- 
tween the Emperor Alexander and Louis XVIII. ; 
a sympathy which, as is well known, preserved 
Lorraine and Alsace to France. When Russia, in 



RUSSIA. 



55 



1828, attacked the Sublime Porte, England and Aus- 
tria remained most unwilling spectators ; Charles 
X., on the contrary, was ready to arm in behalf of 
Russia, and to march upon Vienna in the event 
of Austrian interference.* After the exile of 
Charles X., a warm disposition in favour of the 
Poles was no doubt shewn by the republican party 
in France ; but it was soon suppressed by Louis Phi- 
lippe, who employed his influence with the chiefs 
and leaders of the Polish insurrection, in a manner 
highly beneficial to Russia. 

Meanwhile the new alliance of Russia with 
France is not matured. Louis Philippe cannot 
yet act freely, while by procrastination he gains 
the advantage of being enabled to set a higher 
price on his adhesion ; nor is Russia herself injured 
by the delay. Here also we adopt the views of 
Mr Armand Lefebvre ; at the same time without 
intending him too high an honour, for we shall af- 
terwards have much to condemn in his writings. 

* Pozzo di Borgo's despatches of date 28th November 1828, 
have been printed in the portfolio. 



56 



RUSSIA. 



Mr Lefebvre, contemplating the position of Rus- 
sia with respect to the Porte, says, u The guardian 
permits his victim to live enchained, till without 
any danger to himself, he finds a favourable op- 
portunity to inflict the last blow. For even in 
their present condition, the "Western States are 
fully able to keep Russia within bounds. Should 
a war prematurely break out ; Russia would have 
to dread a collision with all the powers of Europe. 
This is the secret cause of her assumed moderation. 
Moreover, by such procedure, no risk is incurred. 
It is wonderful with what certainty Russia can abide 
her time ; in Turkey she has no further supremacy, 
no further opposition, to overcome ; she knows ex- 
actly the weakness of that empire. She has even 
excavated the abyss into which some day she will 
be tempted to hurl the Porte." 

" By means of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 
Russia has given herself a right of interference in 
the internal management of Turkey ; she has, so 
to speak, caused the key of the Dardanelles to be 
delivered up to her. The Porte became bound, 
at the simple demand of Russia, to close these 



RUSSIA. 57 

straits against foreign ships. What more can the 
court of St Petersburg desire ? Peace is to them 
a source of unquestionable benefit. In full enjoy- 
ment of prosperity, the southern provinces of Rus- 
sia are making gigantic progress ; their industry 
is marvellous ; each day brings them a step nearer 
to perfection. Upheld by her political superiority, 
Russia can inundate the markets of the East with 
Russian productions ; her population increases in 
number, in intelligence, in wealth. An inconsi- 
derate war might endanger all these advantages, 
and check the rapid growth of her power. We 
may therefore remain assured that Russia will, at 
least for a long while, desire the continuance of a 
state of things which is so profitable, without being 
accompanied by the smallest hazard." 



FRANCE. 



In a comparative estimate of national power, it 
must never be forgotten that the great preponder- 
ance which France maintained in Europe, first un- 
der Louis XIV, and subsequently under Napoleon ; 
was, on the one hand, owing to a greater degree of 
weakness and disunion among her enemies, than 
need be anticipated in every future'war ; on the other 
hand, to the great excitement of the Revolution, by 
its character only a temporary impulse. France 
is not naturally summoned to take the lead in Eu- 
rope ; she can only assume such a position occa- 
sionally and for a limited period. Still France 
ever remains a commanding power. 

The chief strength of the French resides in their 
nationality. The honourable acknowledgment 



60 



FRANCE . 



cannot be withheld from them of largely possess- 
ing the virtue of patriotism ; and of always main- 
taining inviolate their patriotic character, to what- 
ever other excesses they may abandon themselves. 
The most feeble party among them, which should 
lend itself to foreign schemes, would be branded 
with eternal infamy. The vast majority of the 
nation, though continually at variance with re- 
gard to their internal policy, are unanimous in 
their zeal to uphold the greatness and power of 
France, and her independence of all foreigners. 
Statesmen not otherwise remarkable for their pu- 
rity, have yet never swerved from promoting the 
true interests of France : of such men Talleyrand 
is a striking example. Under every circumstance, 
the people and the army may be relied on, when 
the object in view is national glory. The meanest 
Frenchman is capable of the noblest sacrifice for 
his country. In the hour of danger and of warlike 
excitement, the most profligate Parisian, as well as 
the most illiterate peasant from the provinces, 
were the honour of France at stake, would inva- 
riably prove himself a hero. Our admiration of 
the French is limited only by the circumstance, 



FRANCE. 



61 



that though irresistible in success, they become im- 
patient under misfortune, and are changeable in 
their inclinations. 

Of the power of religious opinion in France, 
there is none that can now be applied to pur- 
poses of state. The Catholic party is weak, and 
moreover is in opposition, rather a clog than ser- 
viceable to the government ; and infidelity, since it 
was made bankrupt in 1793, no longer excites any 
enthusiasm, though many writers are eager in their 
endeavours to revive its mischievous sway. All 
is sinking into indifference ; and it would be as im- 
possible to raise up a new religious sect in France, 
similar to the Theophilanthropism of the Revolu- 
tion, as it would be to return to the ancient church. 
St Simonianism has proved the impossibility of a 
religious sect ; while the dislike to the church 
is equally clear from the expulsion of the Jesuits ; 
nor was the attempt of Lamennais less desperate 
to reconcile the Hierarchy and the Democracy. 

Now though the state derives from this irreli- 
gious apathy, the advantage at least of there not 



62 



FRANCE. 



being in the country any strong religious party to 
contend with; yet the people suffer indirectly 
through the demoralization inseparable from reli- 
gious indifference ; which not only dissipates a large 
fund of zeal ; but likewise affects the public service, 
degrading the executive by the introduction of 
such a system of avarice, nepotism, and corrup- 
tion, as in the end the best government will be 
unable to control.* 

From the political principle, France, on the 
contrary, has long derived great advantages : Be- 
ginning with Louis XIV, who upheld, and infected 
most of the monarchs of his time with the princi- 
ple of absolute monarchy ; then at the Revolution, 
which exaggerated the opposite principle, imbuing 
the populace of other nations with republicanism ; 
again under Napoleon, who regenerated the prin- 
ciple of Louis XIV, and maintained it till his fall ; 
though latterly he endeavoured to figure again as a 

* With whatever sins of omission or commission the French 
people may be charged ; the expressions of the learned author 
are more applicable to the age of Louis XV. than to the reign 
of Louis Philippe. — Tr. 



FRANCE. 



63 



revolutionary and republican hero, courting the libe- 
rals in order to subvert the restored dynasty. This 
liberalism, hitherto so effectual, has once more done 
good service to the French ; namely, 3 by awaken- 
ing, almost immediately after the great war, sym- 
pathies in their favour, among those very nations 
who shortly before had invaded France herself with 
the utmost animosity. But every day their hopes 
diminish of being able, through means of a war of 
principle, and by revolutionizing Europe anew, to 
recover what they lost in 1814 ; the government 
is also too weak to attempt to glide back into the 
other extreme, and undertake a Russian alliance. 
In the mean while France can wait ; and as the die 
may be cast ; whether the'German States combine 
or remain at variance ; whether they act prudently 
or imprudently ; she can watch her opportunities. 
If the wedge of discord cannot be driven into Ger- 
many ; if no revolutionary outbreak takes place 
then ; if nothing is to be gained by advocating libe- 
ralism ; there still remains the old French policy, 
and an alliance with Russia. 

In promoting their material interests, the 



64 



FRANCE. 



French are not remarkably skilled. Individually, 
there is no lack among them of a desire of gain ; 
but the ministry and the chambers are, for the 
most part, otherwise employed. However import- 
ant, also, it may be for Louis Philippe to direct 
the views of the people into such a channel, and 
withdraw them from political opposition, he has 
not yet'been successful in his endeavour ; and in 
their system of agriculture, manufactures, and com- 
merce, there prevails neither unity nor liberality. 

Hence it appears that France has a very strong, 
and likewise a very weak, side. She rejoices, more- 
over, in the great advantage that she is secure 
against aggression ; that no one dare plunder her 
unless she herself becomes the assailant. Conse- 
quently she may remain at rest ; till, through the 
dissensions of her neighbours, or through potent 
alliances, an opportunity presents itself of realizing 
the old dreams of ambition, which the pages of the 
National have most faithfully retained. 

These day-dreams have become so thoroughly 



FRANCE. 



65 



incorporated with the national pride of the French, 
as to render impossible the assurance, that some 
future government of France, be it revolutionary 
or after the fashion of Louis XIV, may not endea- 
vour to put them in execution. The object of the 
French, if not again to take the lead in Europe, 
yet certainly is, to reunite with France the whole 
left bank of the Rhine. They are eager to obtain 
the Rhenish frontier, which in France is, by univer- 
sal consent, denominated their national boundary ; 
though by the rest of the world it has been admit- 
ted that not rivers but mountains form natural 
barriers, and that language forms the most natu- 
ral demarcation of all. The line separating the 
districts on either side of which the French and 
the German languages are spoken, does not actually 
follow the course of rivers, but the direction of 
mountains.. 

In the year 1814, Germany recovered only a 
part of the incontestably German soil, with Ger- 
man population and language, which, at an earlier 
period, had been forcibly and cunningly appro- 
priated by France. Another very valuable part, 

F 



66 



FRANCE. 



German Lorraine, Alsace, and Suntgau, remained 
with France. Nevertheless this division, so fa- 
vourable to the French, and so detrimental to Ger- 
many, is styled by Mr Armand Lefebvre, an igno- 
minious mutilation of France. He declares it ought 
not to be endured, and that the whole left bank of 
the Rhine must again be French. " The Belgian 
revolution first broke in two that frightful ring 
within which the modern Popiliuses would con- 
fine our beautiful country. The strong places 
raised against us, which were upheld and garri- 
soned by our conquerors, are now turned against 
them, and have become our northern bulwark. 
Justly, -therefore, has it been said, that hostile 
Europe has retired from the Maese as far as the 
Scheldt. Still our frontier is incomplete. It will 
be well defined, only when we extend ourselves 
again to the Rhine, and when Prussia and Bavaria 
withdraw to the right bank. Whoever in France 
bears in his bosom a heart devoted to the great- 
ness, the honour, and the safety of his country, must 
be filled with pain when he thinks of the weakness 
of our frontiers ; must with all his energies endea- 
vour to find an opportunity of escape from such a 



FRANCE. 



67 



perilous situation. Our patriotism must not be 
enervated in the soft enjoyments of peace. We 
must never forget what we once were. Since 
1830, we have borne the consequences of these 
changes with admirable moderation. Europe would, 
however, be in error, were it, on that account, to 
be concluded that we have for ever resigned pos- 
sessions, so imperatively required for the security 
of our soil and our capital. We are not to be eter- 
nally fettered to the system of peace. Peace is 
merely a respite. On the day when war breaks 
out on any side, we too shall appear on the stage 
to vindicate our rights." 

This language is very intelligible. Armand 
Lefebvre does not, however, misapprehend the dif- 
ficulties to be encountered in an ill advised attempt 
at regaining the left bank of the Rhine. He is 
fully aware that France would be able to execute 
her plans, only by means of potent alliances. His 
scheme is to employ for this purpose the conflict in 
the east ; and to employ it either in one way or in 
another. The one way is, a general league of all 
the rest of Europe against Russia, under a cove- 



68 



FRANCE. 



nant that France, as a reward for her participa- 
tion in that league, should obtain Egypt and the 
left bank of the Rhine. The other way is, an al- 
liance of France with Russia, with or without Prus- 
sia, against England and Austria ; in which case 
also he anticipates that equal advantages would 
accrue to France. 

He explains his views in the following manner : 
— First, in regard to the great Ajati-Russian league. 
Such a league, he remarks, is in no way conducive 
to the interests of France, but only to the interests 
of England and of Austria ; these two powers, 
however, must necessarily attach such importance 
to a coalition with France, that, for its attainment, 
no price can to them seem too high. " Were the 
Court of Vienna embarrassed by an equivocal po- 
sition with France, her troops dare not march for 
the East ; and Turkey would be irretrievably lost. 
Austria has most to gam in averting the downfall 
of the Porte. Her own independence would be 
endangered were Turkey abandoned to the Rus- 
sians. The Austrians cannot act freely against 
Russia unless they can rely on aid from France ; 



FRANCE. 



69 



and this aid the cabinets of Vienna and London 
must endeavour to secure on any terms. Weighty 
considerations might certainly determine France 
to unite with the forces of these two powers ; yet 
it is clear she will not resign herself to them uncon- 
ditionally." 

Mr Lefebvre then proposes, that Prussia being 
compensated with Warsaw and Saxony ; in return, 
her Rhenish Provinces, as well as the Rhenish 
Palatinate of Bavaria, should be transferred to 
France. Poland is given up entirely, and deli- 
vered over to Prussia ; who is thus to bear with 
calmness the cessions proposed to be made by her 
in the West. " It is certain that neither Austria 
nor Prussia will surrender their Polish provinces. 
Consequently, that portion of the duchy of War- 
saw which Alexander erected into a kingdom, 
could alone be restored to Polish nationality, 
But this would be a mutilation of Poland, a mere 
fragment of a mighty kingdom. Would not such 
a restoration perpetually recal the former national 
unity ? Would it not keep alive the feelings of 
disquiet and sedition ? Would it not afford re- 



70 



FRANCE. 



fuge, in the event of difficulties and provocation, 
to the Polish subjects, of Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia ? Hence neither Austria nor Prussia would 
ever consent even to a partial restoration of an- 
cient Poland. Still, without the co-operation of 
Austria and Prussia, France can effect nothing 
on the Vistula. On the contrary, should Prussia 
become possessed of the rich provinces between 
the Niemen and the Warta ; should she, more- 
over, obtain the whole of Saxony ; then not only 
would the title and distinction of a monarchy of 
the first rank be her due, but such, in truth and 
reality, she would be. Instead of placing her- 
self under the dictation of Russia ; like an ambi- 
tious man who, having his fortune to make, re- 
signs himself soul and body to the patron at 
whose hands he expects w r ealth and greatness ; 
Prussia would assume the commanding and tran- 
quil position of a State arrived at maturity, and 
having no further occasion to hazard a war, unless 
perhaps in order to quell the turbulence of an as- 
piring neighbour." 

" The reannexing to the French territory a part 



FRANCE. 



71 



of the great duchy of the Lower Rhine, would 
necessarily lead also to the appropriation of the 
Rhenish circle now under the dominion of Bava- 
ria. Doubtless, amid the changes to which the 
formation of a new European system would na- 
turally give rise, means would also be found to 
provide indemnities for the Court of Munich and the 
House of Saxony. Still there is one circumstance 
to be noticed. The possession of the left bank of the 
Rhine, would not only confirm to France her military 
line toward the north-east ; it would likewise bind * 
to her system the new kingdom of Belgium." 

Should this amusing scheme come to nought ; 
Mr Armand Lefebvre has a second in reserve. 
" If England and Austria, blinded by selfishness, 
and an innate jealousy of every thing that tends to 
promote the renown and the grandeur of France, 
were to manifest an intention of reducing her to 
the inferior rank of a secondary power ; with one 
hand taking her in tow to the waters of the Le- 
vant ; with the other confining her to those narrow 
boundaries which they designedly set for her, in 
order that she may always be held under their 



72 



FRANCE. 



control : then would France be relieved from all 
scruples and from all obligations in respect to 
Europe ; she would then be placed under the ne- 
cessity of fulfilling exclusively the obligations she 
owes to herself ; it would then become her duty 
to take heed for the maintenance of her own dig- 
nity, and of her relative power ; to stand arrayed 
on the battle field, to proclaim that she cannot be 
isolated. Soon, too, she would not stand alone. 
Russia would stretch forth her arms to France, 
and grounds would not be awanting to recommend 
such a league to her acceptance, with a view to 
profit, greatness, and fame. The cause of Russia, 
all things well considered, is the cause of humanity 
and civilization ( ! ! ) Providence seems to guide 
the steps of this power, and to favour her plans ( ! )" 

The hitherto existing connection with England, 
says Mr Lefebvre, can be dissolved ; it is besides 
unnatural. Principles must yield to interests. " In 
spite of the alliances now in force for gaining the 
ascendancy of political principles, the remaining in- 
terests will burst out afresh, as soon as they are 
restored to the energy of their tendencies. It is 



FRANCE. 



73 



also advisable that comprehensive and provident 
measures should be adopted, to reconcile and equa- 
lize the claims of the present with the warnings 
of the future. Who does not see that, from the 
rocky heights of Malta and Gibraltar, England 
strives for the sovereignty of the Mediterranean ? 
In this peculiarly French sea, England is, beyond 
all others, the most vexatious rival of France. 
The future greatness of her possessions in Africa 
has not a more formidable enemy. Hence, far 
from desiring to exclude Russia from the Medi- 
terranean ; with reference to maritime dominion, 
it suits, perhaps, better the interest of France even 
to invite the co-operation of the Czar ; for, with 
Russian aid, it might be possible for France to 
succeed in driving the British flag altogether from 
the Mediterranean waters." 

Napoleon at Erfurt and Tilsit ; the Bourbons too, 
after their restoration, as previously during the seven 
years'* wars, encouraged the idea of an alliance with 
Russia against Austria and England. Charles X. in 
1828 was on the very point of throwing off the mask. * 

* See the despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo of 14th Decern- 

G 



74 



FRANCE. 



And Louis Philippe, however outwardly hostile 
to Russia, has still surreptitiously done numerous 
small services to promote the Russian interests. 
Who else, by a diplomatic manoeuvre, paralyzed 
the arm of Skrzynecki, and sent astray General 
Ramerino? — notwithstanding the Polish festivals 
in Paris, and the bold speeches from the throne, 
which nominally affected to guarantee the nation- 
ality of Poland, , 

On the other side, the Russian author of ** the 
European Pentarchy" has likewise signified his ap- 
probation of the French alliance. But he remarks, 
" France must, above all things, endeavour to have 
her internal affairs, in the first place, thoroughly 
regulated ; before she can be in a situation again 
to inspire confidence abroad. So long as the mo- 

ber 1828, printed in the Portfolio. The Count announces to 
the Emperor Nicholas that the King of France (Charles X.) 
had said to him. " I wish to remain united to Russia. If the 
Emperor Nicholas attacks Austria, I hold myself in prepara- 
tion, and shall regulate my conduct according to circumstan- 
ces ; but if Austria attacks him, I march immediately against 
her. Perhaps war with the Court of Vienna will be beneficial 
to me; it will put an end to internal dissensions, and occupy 
the nation at large in the way it desires." 



FRANCE. 



75 



narchy continues obliged to make terms for its le- 
galized existence, the condition of France must be 
viewed merely as provisional." 

The difficulties in the way of an alliance between 
France and Russia, Mr Armand Lefebvre does not 
consider insurmountable. 

' ' The first requisite for a sincere approximation 
of France to Russia, would be, on the part of Russia, 
the withdrawal of all claims to precedence ; and an 
acknowledgment of the equality of France, as the 
basis of any future league. The alliance which, 
in the year 1807, Napoleon and Alexander con- 
cluded at Tilsit, was a genuine alliance ; because on 
the raft on the Niemen, the two emperors divided 
between themselves the supremacy of the civilized 
world. The one took under his control the north 
and the east ; the other the south and the west. 
They agreed that both empires should keep the 
same pace, in such manner that if the one enlarged 
itself on one side, the other should have the right 
of extending itself proportionally elsewhere." 



76 



FRANCE. 



" This alliance was, in reality, dissolved by the 
overthrow of Austria at Wagram ; because thence- 
forth there did not remain, between the territories 
of Russia and France, any power equivalent to 
Austria. But at the present time, were the prin- 
ciple of equality acknowledged by both ; no two 
other states could be found standing in a relation 
more favourable for a strict alliance. Evidently 
no immediate contact of frontier is possible. The 
whole of Germany intervenes to prevent every col- 
lision. Such an alliance would have the effect of 
restraining their common enemy, England ; and, 
without doubt, would afterwards destroy her pre- 
tensions to the dominion of the sea. On the one 
side is shewn a vehement ambition for oriental ag- 
grandizement ; on the other an anxiety to secure 
the defences of her Eastern frontier. Were both 
powers united, the whole Continent would be 
theirs ; no other power, no coalition, could with- 
stand them. They would dispose of every thing ; 
conduct every design ; and decide on every ques- 
tion without appeal. On one point only do their 
views differ ; their policy is not founded on the 
same principle. But since a wide space divides 



FRANCE. 



77 



them; since they belong each to very different 
grades of civilization ; it is hardly possible that any 
moral effect can be produced on their respective 
populations. With the simple exception of a war 
of principles ; the different forms of the two go- 
vernments can be no insuperable obstacle to their 
harmony. This approximation of France and Rus - 
sia has likewise been plainly indicated by the na- 
ture of things. For forty years, in spite of the 
endeavours of other courts to disjoin them, these 
two powers have always been disposed to enter 
into close alliance with each other. Paul I. in 1800, 
Alexander in 1809 and 1815, Nicholas from his 
accession to the throne till the year 1830, all 
sought to gain the support of France." 

44 On the Eastern question, the alliance of France, 
if imbued with a political character, would be of 
decided importance to Russia. It must at once 
be seen that could they agree about their plans ; 
Austria would have no choice, but must yield to 
circumstances, and reckon herself fortunate to 
share in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Em- 
pire. Thus, could Russia bring over France to her 



78 



FRANCE. 



policy, she would likewise secure the compliance 
of Austria. England insulated, and circumscribed 
within to her own resources, would not be in a 
posture to rescue Turkey. And the Czar would 
gain this great end almost without an effort." 

" The Court of St Petersburg is also deeply in- 
terested in securing the assistance of France in 
her Oriental measures. It may be confidently 
foretold that, should Russia be compelled by emer- 
gencies or ambition to relinquish her procrasti- 
nating and cautious policy ; she would on the same 
day forget all bygone resentments, and disclaim 
her prepossession for dethroned legitimacy : nor 
would her pride disdain an application for an al- 
liance with that dynasty which arose from the bar- 
ricades." 

A letter from Paris, inserted in the Algemeine 
Zeitung of 1839, No. 310, coincides exactly with 
these views. Therein it is stated, " Louis Philippe 
desires nothing more earnestly than a reconcilia- 
tion between France and Russia ; but he knows 
that the season is not yet come." It is hence be- 



FRANCE. 



79 



yond dispute that Louis Philippe has not done 
what Russia wished, simply because of his resolu- 
tion to shew the St Petersburg Cabinet his inde- 
pendence of them ; knowing, too, how much more 
his friendship was actually worth. By such pro- 
cedure Louis Philippe may have provoked animo- 
sity. " This animosity, however, gives him n6 
alarm. He is satisfied it has brought him so much 
the nearer to the object of his anxiety — an alliance 
with Russia ; and made the Cabinet of St Peters- 
burg feel, if not his positive, at least his negative 
strength. He is fully aware that no irritation, no 
chagrin, will eventually withstand the force of that 
peremptory interest; which must finally attach 
Russia to France." 



( 81 ) 



AUSTRIA. 



In order to understand the very peculiar posi- 
tion of Austria ; there must first be an accurate 
conception of her double character as a European 
and as a German State. 

The Imperial Government of Austria is the his- 
torical heir of the Roman dominion acquired by 
the Germans ; the heir of that universal monarchy 
of Christendom which ideally comprehended every 
Christian people. Even yet the Austrian Empire 
extends over Germanic, Romanic, and Slavonic 
tribes ; the three great branches of the European 
family. Austria has been unable to prevent the 
establishment of other centres of Germanic forms 
in England and Prussia ; of Romanic manners in 



82 



AUSTRIA. 



France ; and of Slavonic customs in Russia. Cir- 
cumscribed in this respect, she has felt the neces- 
sity of relinquishing the splendid idea of her ori- 
ginal grandeur ; without the good fortune of being 
able to retire on the support of one great undivi- 
ded nation. The circumstance of including among 
her subjects many distinct Nationalities, might 
be beneficial to Austria, were the scheme of a uni- 
versal Christian empire to be revived among man- 
kind. But since there is no prospect of any such 
scheme ; the numerous languages in which prayers 
are offered up to Heaven in behalf of the sove- 
reign, far from being advantageous, must rather 
be a cause of anxiety to the government of this 
mighty state. Not being placed in those favour- 
able circumstances which allow an offensive policy 
to be adopted by the English, the Russians, and 
the French ; Austria is obliged to limit herself to a 
policy conservative and defensive. Energetic po- 
pulations, trained in habitual loyalty, and in gene- 
ral, from their cheerful and quiet dispositions, con- 
tented with their lot ; obey the illustrious House of 
Hapsburg, and have sustained its honour in innu- 



AUSTRIA. 



83 



merable wars. Nevertheless these populations are 
not connected by the bond of Nationality. 

At the same time it must not be imagined alto- 
gether, as a consequence, that in the large king- 
doms composing the Austrian Empire, the popula- 
tions, which are not German, yield a merely pas- 
sive submission, and are alienated from the reign- 
ing dynasty. Their attachment is grounded on 
an interest perfectly obvious and well under- 
stood. Who does, not at once perceive that the 
Hungarians owe to the House of Hapsburg the 
maintenance of their nationality ? Without such 
aid, they would long since have fallen under the 
yoke of Islam. They have also preserved their 
constitution under a king of German descent; a 
privilege they would never have retained had they 
fallen under Turkish rule ; or had they, like the 
Poles, been subjected to Russia. It accords with 
the Austrian method of government to leave each 
nation of the empire to its own individuality, and 
in the enjoyment of its ancient customs ; while the 
Russian system demands an implicit and uniform 
obedience to the all-levelling pressure of autocracy. 



84 



AUSTRIA. 



But is a distinct existence a possible condition for 
Hungary ? Forsaking her ancient attachment, did 
she refuse any longer to unite her destiny with 
the German ; would she not be compelled to admit 
another supremacy in exchange for the mild sway 
of Austria? And the Poles, — have they not mani- 
festly inclined the more strongly to Austria, in pro- 
portion as they recede from the North ? 

From the power of Religious Opinion and the 
Church, Austria accepts only a conditional sup- 
port. By far the larger number of her subjects 
are Catholic, and thoroughly Catholic. There 
are no religious heart-burnings in Austria : scepti- 
cism has no influence within her dominions : — 
an immunity invaluable for the executive. Since 
France has lapsed into infidelity, and the Pyre- 
nean Peninsula has become disordered; Austria 
may now be considered as the only power which 
gives effectual support to the Romish See, and 
which, therefore, has a claim on Apostolical gra- 
titude and services ; — an additional and manifest 
advantage to Austria. • Nevertheless the posses- 
sion of this source of power is accompanied with 



AUSTKIA. 



85 



much embarrassment. Austria gains an authori- 
tative countenance for her internal, but not at the 
same time for her external, policy. The stronger 
emphasis she might lay on her Catholicism ; the 
more she might seek to employ her apostolical in- 
fluence against other nations ; the greater would 
be her risk of exciting antipathies, which on no 
consideration she dare hazard ; lest, instead of ac- 
complishing any object of her own, she should 
merely promote the designs of her enemies. 

The advantage which Austria derives from the 
power of Political Principle, at least in regard 
to her external policy, is also conditional. She 
stands on the side of Absolutism, but only in 
the second rank, the first being occupied by Rus- 
sia. Austria must feel that Russia appropriates 
the whole merit of that system, while she herself 
is unable to obtain a share. In one instance, the 
constitutional forms of Hungary are an exception 
to the absolutism of Austria ; by Russia, however, 
that mode of government is maintained without the 
slightest deviation. Then, again, Austria borders 
immediately on the constitutional states of the 



AUSTRIA. 



West, and is more exposed than Russia to the 
effects of contiguity and example. Russia, shut 
out in the back ground of Europe, possesses in 
Austria and Prussia two bulwarks against the free- 
dom of the West. 

Finally, from the power of material interests, 
Austria obtains a slender benefit. She avails her- 
self of the abundant wealth of her own territory ; 
but her gains from abroad are not in equal pro- 
portion, nor does she provide for herself any natu- 
ral alliances by the removal of commercial restric- 
tions. 

Such being the relative position which Austria 
holds, as compared with England and Russia ; it 
will be admitted that, in truth, her situation is 
not equally secure, nor does she enjoy an equal 
amount of power. Besides, let us look back into 
history, and we shall find that England and Russia 
have for many centuries remained unconquered ; 
while Austria has been twice overrun, has twice 
been on the brink of nun, first during the thirty 



AUSTRIA. 



87 



years' war, and afterwards in the time of Na- 
poleon. 

Thus the more the Austrian policy is conserva- 
tive and defensive, the more urgent becomes the 
necessity of rendering herself impregnable; an 
object to be attained only by means of natural 
alliances. 

The Russian alliance is not a natural alliance for 
Austria ; though Joseph II. resigned himself to the 
illusion, and though both states agree in the princi- 
ples of Absolutism and Legitimacy. Every coalition 
of Austria with Russia only tends further to enlarge 
the dimensions of the latter state, already so col- 
lossal, — tends to augment the resources of the most 
formidable neighbour of Austria. In alliance with 
Russia, Joseph II. attacked Poland and Turkey ; 
but the event proved that Russia alone, not Aus- 
tria, was the gainer. Instead of the weak Polish 
republic ; Austria brought to her frontier the gi- 
gantic Russia, further strengthened by the spolia- 
tion of Poland. On the Turkish side, Russia has 
seized the harbours of the Euxine, and at last even 



88 



AUSTRIA. 



the mouths of the Danube ; while Austria has been 
unable to recover so much as Belgrade. Russia 
is not the natural ally, but the natural rival, of 
Austria ; and we shall not err when we assume 
that the feeling of Russia cannot be more ran- 
corous even toward England than it is toward 
Austria. 

The fleets of England may do much ; but without 
the help of Austrian troops they can effect nothing 
against the military force of Russia. The prime 
mover in the East must be Austria, a power so 
close at hand, so determined, and which can so 
easily be reinforced by means of sympathies even 
within the Russian dominions. We have indeed 
always believed, and still believe, that the pen of 
Prince Metternich is a more efficacious guardian 
of the East than the Danube, the Balkan, and the 
Caucasus ; more to be relied on than all the navies 
of England.* 

* The guardian pen must have been slumbering when 
the Russians were permitted to establish themselves at the 
mouths of the Danube and pocket the house-key of Aus- 
tria. The efficacy of a different weapon may be learnt at 
Acre. — Tr. 



AUSTRIA. 



89 



On this account, also, we are not surprised to 
read in the Portfolio, the despatches of Count Pozzo 
di Borgo, the Russian ambassador at Paris, written 
in as anti- Austrian a tone as can well be imagined ; 
and where an endeavour is made to rouse every 
one (that is to say, Prussia and France) against the 
cabinet of Vienna.* For the same reason the sen- 
timents of Russian pamphleteers of a somewhat 
later date do not appear incongruous. The Me- 
moir on the State of Germany for the year 1834, 
and the " European Pentarchy," attempt to pro- 
duce a bias against Austria among the minor con- 
federate states of Germany ; to call to mind the old 
Austrian policy in respect to Bavaria ; and even 
condescend to aim at propitiating the liberals, by 
characterizing the stedfast principle of Austria as 

* " The attitude, the language, the demonstrations of 
Prussia, have, until now, been favourable to Russia ; the 
fear of seeing her unite with us in a last emergency, over- 
awes Austria ; and serves as an encouragement to France, 
confirming her in the favourable sentiments she evinces to- 
wards us." 

" In my whole intercourse with the French ministry, I 
strive to maintain their friendly relations with the cabinet 
of Berlin." — Despatch from Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated 
Paris, the 28th November 1828. 

H 



90 



AUSTRIA. 



" not adapted to the present time the prin- 
ciple of Russia being presumed to be of a nature 
more liberal.* The " European Pentarchy" an- 
nounces also the existence of a desire in Bohe- 
mia for a union of all Slavonians (naturally under 
the Czar), and during the last thirty years Russia 

* " The system on which the stability of Austria rests is 
ancient, but not of very exalted character, and ill adapted 
to the present time. It has never been forgotten that, by 
means of this system, the Ferdinands attempted to effect 
the subjugation of Germany." " If the cabinet of Vienna 
succeed in carrying into execution their own particular 
views, for which purpose they may avail themselves of the 
interposition of the Diet of Frankfort ; then would the whole 
of Germany be in the grasp of Austria." — From the Russian 
Memoir of 1834 on the State of Germany, published in the 
Portfolio. 

" Austria shewed, at least at an earlier period, an evident 
longing for the possession of Bavaria ; a longing which was 
quite natural while Austria stood forth as the predominant 
power of Germany." — From " The European Pentarchy," 
published at Leipsic by Wigand, 1839. 

In the last publication the minor confederate states of Ger- 
many are counselled to adopt a Russian protectorate, as a 
shield against Austria and Prussia. " Russia (says the 
pentarchist) has, by the acquisition of Poland, carried a mili- 
tary position which severs Austria and Prussia from each 
other, and is to Russia invaluable, if she were called on to 
protect the weak states of central Germany." 



AUSTRIA. 



91 



has flattered herself with the idea of cajoling the 
Bohemians ; as if, through her connexion with 
France, she had become irresistible.* 

Armand Lefebvre remarks on this political con- 
stellation in the following terms : 66 The vocation 
of Austria, — her true and actual vocation, hazard- 
ous indeed, but worthy of her grandeur, — is, to pre- 
erve the central states of the Continent in their 
Integrity and independence, to shield them against 

* The author of the " Pentarchy" has printed in Italics 
the words of Fallmerayer and Kollar. The first says, " The 
supremacy over the human race seems now to retire from 
the people of Romanic and German origin, and to go over 
to the great nation of the Slavonians."' The last says, 
" Russia, the most potent branch of the Slavonic stem, has 
much reason to form a closer connexion with the rest of the 
Slavonian nations, to vindicate the menaced purity of their 
Slavonianism, and, by reciprocal good ofiices, to renew and 
strengthen it." — Page 410. Bignon relates, in his History of 
Napoleon, that when the Emperor Alexander wished to take 
possession of Moldavia and "Wallachia, he offered the Empe- 
ror Napoleon Bohemia as a counterpoise. " When we un- 
derstand one another, Napoleon and I," said the Emperor 
Alexander, " all the world must e'en come to an understand- 
ing along with us." That is to say, Austria was not to be 
the least consulted about the matter. Napoleon, however, 
did not accept the " magnanimous" offer of the Czar. 



92 



AUSTRIA. 



the ambition of France, and above all things against 
the ambition of Russia ; to hold these two powers 
in check and in equipoise, the one by means of the 
other. Now, in the Oriental question, Russia is 
the most threatening and dangerous foe. Should 
she succeed in gaining possession of the Lower 
Danube, the mountain-range of the Balkan, and 
Constantinople ; Austria would be hemmed in by 
the Russian territories along the whole extent 
of her eastern frontier ; and the Austrian com- 
merce, both in the Euxine and in the Adriatic, 
would be under Russian control. There is also 
ground for solicitude in the secret endeavours 
of Russia to tamper with the loyalty of Aus- 
trian subjects professing the Greek faith. No one 
believes that Russia can be withheld by over- 
conscientious scruples from meditating covert in- 
trigues of this nature. The conquests of Russia 
in Turkey place her in a situation to realize all 
her fondest designs. Austria would be thus fear- 
fully menaced : her relative strength would be 
so materially weakened that freedom of move- 
ment would be lost. To oppose the advances of 
the North ; there would remain to Austria nothing 



AUSTRIA. 



93 



save an inert resistance like that with which Prus- 
sia must content herself. Fallen from her high 
estate, she would be compelled to act an entirely dif- 
ferent part. Instead of being the bulwark of the 
West against Russia; she would become a tool in the 
hands of that power for holding the East in subju- 
gation. All the central armaments which ought to 
guard the West would be paralyzed, and the central 
states themselves threatened with the loss of their 
independence. Even the possession of Bosnia, Ser- 
via, Turkish Dalmatia, Albania, and Macedonia, 
would then be to the court of Vienna no adequate 
compensation for the superior aggrandisement of 
Russia. Russia directly, and with the aid of the 
Greeks, necessarily at her devotion, would exert so 
overwhelming an influence in these ostensibly Aus- 
trian provinces; that they would prove to their new 
masters much more a source of weakness and em- 
barrassment, than a real increase of strength." 

" Thus the policy of the cabinet of Vienna may 
be sketched by anticipation. As the enemy of 
Russian projects, as the extreme post of Western 
Europe against Russia, as the natural guardian of 



94 



AUSTRIA. 



Turkey and of all the interests menaced by the 
jeopardy of the Porte ; Austria must risk her last 
man and her last florin, rather than suffer the Czar 
to extend his dominion beyond the south bank of 
the Danube." 

" But Russia is not the only antagonist whom 
Austria fears. France is viewed with still greater 
alarm ; and from that quarter an attack would in- 
deed be perilous. The French maxims of govern- 
ment might undermine the social condition of the 
Austrian monarchy, and the French armies endan- 
ger her Italian ascendency. What confusion 
would then ensue in an empire which extends over 
Italians, Hungarians, Poles, and Germans ; main- 
taining as various forms of administration as there 
are countries under its sway ; which, even during 
peace, is reduced to the violent necessity of em- 
ploying the force of one-half of its dominions to 
keep the other half quiet ; which, in fine, is upheld 
by the antiquated maxims of a feudal oligarchy 
quite repugnant to the present age ? Hence the 
dread of the court of Vienna for the July revolu- 
tion, which threatened to set Europe in a flame. 



AUSTRIA. 



95 



This dread, not yet allayed, impelled Austria to 
the adoption of the Russian system, and explains 
the acquiescence which for eight years has been 
deemed necessary regarding the pretensions of the 
Czar in Oriental affairs." 

" But would Austria, in a really decisive crisis 
of the East, continue in the attitude of non-re- 
sistance, to which she has hitherto accustomed her- 
self? A very grave question. Let an assertion 
be allowed, drawn from the nature of the case : 
to France, first of all, the task of the solution of 
this question will be assigned. The situation of 
Austria is simply this ; that she is unconstrained 
in her proceedings against Russia, only when she 
can thoroughly depend on the moral and physical 
aid of France. A compact with England alone 
would not suffice to give the requisite energy to 
the tone and actions of the cabinet of Vienna. 
Neither could Austria wage war against Russia 
unless assured of the unequivocal co-operation 
of France. If France denies her concurrence ; 
Austria is then fettered by the apprehension 
that, while she despatches troops against Russia, 



96 AUSTRIA. 

France may cross the Alps, and suddenly pour 
down on Lombardy. Austria would much rather 
accede to the dismemberment of Turkey, than 
leave her Italian possessions unguarded. Con- 
sequently, she would delay ; and make her ap- 
pearance on the stage, only when nothing further 
remained to be done but to accept thankfully her 
allotted share of the partition. On these grounds 
we are convinced that, should a war break out in 
the East, the policy of Austria would be determined 
by the resolutions of France." 

But no true German can entertain this convic - 
tion. Austria is in no way constrained to sell her- 
self to the French at the price of her independence ; 
so long as she can enter into other alliances which 
will enable her to hold in check Russia and France 
combined. 

An alliance with France is, at all times and un- 
der all circumstances, unnatural and destructive 
to the real interests of Austria ; because it is at- 
tainable only at the expense of the rest of Ger- 
many ; at the expense of Prussia, or of the smaller 



AUSTRIA. 



97 



states, who must ever be the natural allies, offen- 
sively and defensively combined with Austria. 
When Austria, at the instigation of Prince Kaunitz, 
allowed herself to be persuaded to coalesce with 
France against Prussia ; she committed a mistake, 
of which, fortunately, the results were averted by 
the genius of Frederick. Even had Austria suc- 
ceeded in effecting the dismemberment of Prussia, 
along with France and Russia ; had she given up 
to France the Rhenish provinces, at that time be- 
longing to Frederick, or an equivalent for them ; 
had she likewise yielded East Prussia to Russia, and 
taken Silesia to herself ; still she would have gained 
nothing. France (and Russia) would, by such 
partition, have become overpowerful at the ex- 
pense of Germany ; and very soon have inspired 
terror into the cabinet of Vienna. Austria would 
now commit exactly the same mistake, were she to 
engage in an alliance with France; the first condi- 
tion of which would be the assignment of the left 
bank of the Rhine to France : a scheme which has 
not only been proposed by Armand Lefebvre, but 
must also be necessarily the sole interest and aim 
of French policy. France would acquire the as- 



98 



AUSTRIA. 



cendant over Germany ; would exert a preponde- 
rating influence on the rest of the smaller states ; 
and Austria herself would no longer have any de- 
fence on her western frontier. 

The Frenchman holds his alliance to be indis- 
pensable. But he offers his wares somewhat too 
soon, and asks too high a price, before knowing 
whether any one is really in want of them. We 
shall now look around ; and try to discover some 
other guarantees for the safety of Austria. 

A natural alliance for Austria is an alliance with 
England, England, too, has ever been on her side 
in all the great European wars ; the conflicts aris- 
ing from the Reformation, and the blunder of the 
Austro-Gallican alliance in the Seven years' war, 
alone excepted. England and Austria have always 
an identity of interest in preventing Russia and 
France from becoming too powerful. However, 
England alone, with her fleets, and descents on the 
enemy's coast, cannot give adequate support to 
Austria. Her aid is powerful, and ever to be duly 
appreciated ; but it does not of itself suffice. Aus- 



AUSTRIA. 



99 



tria, in order to be invincible, must have on her 
side not England alone : some other great conti- 
nental power is required in addition. 

Against France, the Spanish is an appropriate 
alliance for Austria ; but Spain is no longer a 
great power. 

A Danish and Swedish alliance would be quite 
suitable against Russia ; but neither Denmark nor 
Sweden possess the necessary strength. 

The truly natural alliance for Austria, on the 
continent, is an alliance with Prussia. Formerly, 
to make such an assertion would have been consi- 
dered a paradox ; but it is otherwise now. So long 
as the ascendency of Prussia in Northern Germany 
remained doubtful ; so long as she had not tho- 
roughly established herself ; while Austria still 
claimed imperial supremacy, adhering to the estab- 
lished usage, that a prince of the empire could not 
rank as equal, but must of necessity be subordi- 
nate to the emperor; the continued rivalry of 
Austria against Prussia was intelligible. The mo- 



100 



AUSTRIA. 



tive for such rivalry was the stronger ; because 
Russia and France had not then, in the same de- 
gree as they have since, extended their power and 
pretensions so as to have become dangerous to 
both ; not less dangerous to Prussia than to Aus- 
tria. But now that the Prussian dominion in 
Northern Germany has been rendered secure ; now 
that the old imperial connexion has been dissolved ; 
there have ceased to be any legitimate grounds for 
Austrian jealousy. After Russia has encroached 
so far on the one side ; and on the other France 
has given proof, under Napoleon, of the evils she 
was capable of inflicting — after France and Rus- 
sia, in 1808, divided between them the dominion 
of Europe ; and the two leading powers of Ger- 
many, Austria as well as Prussia, under the pres- 
sure of this alliance, so formidable and hostile 
to them both, experienced the melancholy conse- 
quences of their former dissensions — after all these 
things have happened ; it must appear, not only no 
longer a paradox, but, on the contrary, the most 
fitting and the most urgent policy, that Austria 
should endeavour to form the closest possible con- 
nexion with Prussia. Prussia is, besides, the only 



AUSTRIA. 



101 



ally who, associated with Austria, would herself 
perfectly suffice to brave every hostile power ; even 
without taking into account that England, and 
probably too the other confederate States of Ger- 
many, would not remain inactive spectators. The 
military force of Prussia, combined with that of 
Austria, has no cause to dread any enemy, come 
whence be may, from the east or from the west ; 
nay though enemies should approach on both sides 
at once. At the same time it is not to be over- 
looked, how popular such an alliance would be in 
Germany; how much it would be in conformity 
with the inclinations and general interests of the 
German people ; and to what an extent it would 
rouse that national enthusiasm, which achieves such 
marvels in the hour of danger. 

For the same reasons, an alliance with the mi- 
nor confederate States of Germany would form a 
natural alliance for Austria. Can she, under 
all circumstances, place the same dependence on 
her Slavonians, Magyars, and Italians as on the 
German population ? Must she not under all 
circumstances, as hitherto, derive her vigour 



102 



AUSTRIA. 



most especially from her German stock % "Were not 
the old contingent of the empire for many centu- 
ries, her truest and most efficient companions in 
arms against France, and even during the gloomy 
period of her rivalry with Prussia % Is it not her 
natural policy to bind to herself the mass of small 
states ; for that purpose contributing her aid, to pro- 
mote their utmost strength and prosperity ; seeing 
that they constitute her bulwark toward France. 
Not om slight grounds did the ancient imperial 
house, with so much energy, and with so many 
sacrifices, guard, during their protracted wars, the 
Rhenish frontier ; and with such stedfastness, till 
they could no longer, stretch the shield with the 
double eagle over Alsace and Lorraine, the endan- 
gered Palatinate, and the ecclesiastical principali- 
ties. The larger the mass of German States on the 
Rhine, the better for Austria ; the further France 
encroaches, so much the worse for her safety. 

If this aspect of the case be duly considered ; Mr 
Von Gentz's prayer against the restitution of Al- 
sace to Germany in the year 1814 will appear 
very ill-advised. It could not have been Aus- 



AUSTRIA. 



103 



trian jealousy of Prussia, that caused this vexatious 
interference ; when a German country, about to be 
recovered from the French, would have been as- 
signed either to Austria herself, or to some other 
German power not in any intimate connexion 
with Prussia. That Russia should zealously strive 
to maintain the strength of France on the Rhine, 
in order thereby to weaken Germany, was quite 
natural; because Russia must dread much more 
any augmentation of the territory of Germany, her 
next neighbour, than a consolidation of the strength 
of France, which is more remote. But Austria had 
no interest identical with the Russian. She ought 
far rather to have extended the German confedera- 
tion as widely as possible ; knowing that in every 
future European crisis, she would invariably find 
her stay and support in German nationality alone ; 
and that such an extension of the Confederacy 
would, within Germany itself, have added to the 
counterpoise against Prussia. Austria could have 
sustained no loss ; on the contrary, she would have 
been a gainer by such an enlargement of the Con- 
federacy : indeed the former emperors were offi- 
cially styled the enlargers of {he empire. 



104 



AUSTRIA. 



This community of interest is the more un- 
doubted, as, in spite of all mercantile and literary 
obstructions, and in spite of so many hostile tirades, 
from every quarter against Austria ; cordial sym- 
pathies are ever cherished between the other inha- 
bitants of Germany and those under Austrian rule. 
In fact, there is, in a certain sense, hardly a branch 
of the German family so popular, and regarded 
with so much affection by the rest, as the Tyrolese 
and the mild inhabitants of the banks of the Da- 
nube. A junction of Austria with the German 
Commercial League would tend greatly to increase 
these sympathies. On a dispassionate inquiry such 
will be found to be the only mode by which em- 
barrassments can be avoided in future. 

If ever an offensive alliance of Russia and France 
should be brought about ; on which, as a probable 
occurrence, Mr Von Gentz, even in 1814, ought 
to have ventured to reflect, when he saw how 
keenly the Russian diplomatists strove to retain 
France in possession of Alsace ; the cabinet of Vi- 
enna will not forbear lamenting the noted prayer 
of Von Gentz. In such an event Austria would 



AUSTRIA. 



105 



find the most intimate alliance with Prussia, and 
with the other Confederate States, to be an act of 
necessity ; and then would she be able to felici- 
tate herself, if, by having concluded such an alli- 
ance beforehand, and by having upheld the inte- 
rests of Prussia and the Confederate States against 
foreign aggression, every German sympathy had 
in return been secured. 



( 107 ) 



PRUSSIA. 



The Prussian monarchy includes only a small 
part of Poland, and essentially rests on the basis of 
German nationality. This national unity of Prus- 
sia secures to her the same advantage enjoyed 
by England, Russia, and France ; but of which 
Austria is destitute. Prussia, in fact, owns not 
more than a third of the geographical extent of 
territory, throughout which the German language 
is spoken. Yet in this third part, she has not only 
developed a wonderful degree of power, greatly 
beyond the proportion due from its size ; but she has 
also, since the establishment of the commercial 
league (Zoll-verein), acquired strong sympathies in 
the rest of Germany; and, whenever Prussia identi- 
fies her own interests with the welfare of Germany, 



108 



PRUSSIA. 



she will obtain by these sympathies the active sup- 
port of her countrymen. It is not to be denied 
that in Southern and in Western Germany, antipa- 
thies, to a certain extent, prevail against the so- 
called Prussian ism. These antipathies, however, 
proceed entirely from adverse political principles ; 
and the apprehension lest Prussia should raise up 
an interest, at variance with the general prosperity 
of Germany. But the struggle of principles never 
lasts long, when it interferes with questions of sub- 
stantial gain ; and the fear of Prussia, among other 
Germans, would speedily vanish in the hour of 
peril. Prussia would come forward to share every 
danger that might threaten the German nation. 

As to the Slavonic part of the Prussian popula- 
tion, they unavoidably must be at length assimilated 
with the predominant German part. If the Slavo- 
nic population of Prussia were more numerous ; 
they might possibly claim an independent existence 
such as the Hungarians enjoy. But it is singular 
that Brandenburg has never, in regard to her neigh- 
bours on the East, followed the policy of Austria, 
though the example came so near home. How much 



PRUSSIA. 109 

more favourable would the situation of Branden- 
burg have been ; had the illustrious Princes of Ho - 
henzollern conjoined with their hereditary States 
the two kingdoms of Poland and Lithuania,* just as 
the House of Hapsburg rules alike the two king- 
doms of Bohemia and Hungary ; and had they 
likewise bestowed on Livonia, Courland, and Es- 
thonia, the same regard the house of Hapsburg 
has had, in the opposite direction, to Lombardy 
and the Dalmatian coast. The relations are so 
very similar, that Germans are strongly tempted 
to wish the policy of both houses had also been the 
same. But Brandenburg inherited the system of 
the Teutonic knights, who, as is well known, were 
enjoined to celibacy : consequently war, pillage, 
the conversion and civilization of their infidel vas- 
sals, were preferred ; and perhaps, with a regard 
to circumstances, must still be preferred, to the sys- 
tem followed by the House of Hapsburg, of increas- 
ing their dominions by marriage, and leaving un- 
disturbed the various states from time to time so 

* Another fate may be in reserve for Poland and Lithua- 
nia too, than continuing parcelled out among illustrious 
Houses, not Jagellons. — Tr. 



110 PRUSSIA. 

acquired.* From this system Prussia has at least 
derived the advantage of being able more freely to 
avail herself of German nationality. 

Now, in truth, the German nationality is far from 
being represented by Prussia alone ; and she has 
perhaps too much disregarded the growth of an 
anti-Prussian opposition in the rest of Germany. 
But who does not perceive, that any great impend- 
ing danger, or general distress, would cast into ob- 
livion the quarrels and petty jealousies produced 
by a long continuance of peace ? 

That Polish nationality itself likewise, so hostile 
to Germany, is, we know, still more inveterate 
against Russia. And here let us not forget the sage 
policy and wondrous fortune of Austria, so long 
and so faithfully served by heterogeneous nations, 
while employing their energy as her shield and pro- 
tection, both against the Sultan and against the 
Czar. 

Hence Nationality must on every account be 
* Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube. 



PRUSSIA. 



Ill 



viewed as a sustaining power of the Prussian mo- 
narchy ; and we hold it to be one of the most effec- 
tual supports of Prussia, though, on a first statisti- 
cal comparison, it may be seen to be deficient. 

On the contrary, the power of religious opinion 
communicates not the slightest stability to Prussia : 
a singular fact, and well worthy of being scru- 
tinized. Prussia is the natural heir of the Re- 
formation ; the chief defender of Protestantism 
on the continent. This conspicuous part she as- 
sumed, when it was relinquished through the apos- 
tasy and feebleness of the electoral house of Saxony. 
Prussia became also the guardian of Calvinism when 
the power of Holland declined. That in her new 
position she should bring together the two great 
reformed parties was natural ; and a consequence 
of their mutual relations. The personal will of his 
majesty the king was in this matter identified with 
a historical law. The rigour against some old Lu- 
therans ought perhaps to have been mitigated ;* 

* According to whatever laws the Prussian government 
may have acted, there is understood to have been no exces- 
sive regard shewn for tender consciences. — Tr. 



112 



PRUSSIA. 



but does not call for particular notice as affecting 
the national welfare. By the conjunction of the two 
reformed churches, though there have been indivi- 
dual sufferings, the people at large have gained. 

The Prussian government, while conferring 
greater external unity on their Protestant subjects ; 
have not been equally attentive to the promotion 
of internal unity. By internal unity we do not 
here mean a uniformity of thoughts and feelings. 
In such an attempt, the Prussian government would, 
among an enlightened people, have failed in their 
aim ; besides acting in opposition to the Protestant 
principle of free inquiry. Still they ought perhaps 
to have interfered less, either with the one sect or 
the other, in the uncontrolled adjustment of their 
belief and tenets: a far preferable course would 
have been to have left such things alone. By their 
open approbation of Hegel's philosophy, not a little 
encouragement has been given to the schism of 
Speculative theology and Pietism at this time 
threatening the evangelical church. Though Spe- 
culative theology may, in Prussia, continue to dis- 
guise its real object ; yet what has already taken 



PRUSSIA. 



113 



place at Zurich, sufficiently demonstrates that such 
dogmatism is a mere relinquishment of Christianity, 
and only calculated to benefit a party from whom 
Prussia has nothing to expect. 

Added to these dissensions among the Protes- 
tants, is the odious dispute with the Catholics ; a 
dispute ten years ago no one would have imagined 
possible ; but which nevertheless has suddenly re- 
kindled in our day all the passions exhibited in the 
middle ages, during the controversies about inves- 
titure. We shall not here enter more particularly 
into a subject so polemical ; and shall satisfy our- 
selves with remarking, that this religious discord 
weakens the position of Prussia externally, and 
keeps up mutual antipathies among her own po- 
pulation ; — operating not .unlike a fatal move at 
chess made, as it were, by the evil demon of Ger- 
many, against the Commercial League, the move of 
Germany's good genius. 

Thus, in ecclesiastical matters, which by right 
ought to have most contributed to the strength of 
Prussia, she exhibits only weakness. 



114 



PRUSSIA. 



Political Principle must likewise on no ac- 
count be considered a source of power to Prussia. 
Here she stands merely in the third rank ; de- 
riving less advantage than Russia, and even than 
Austria, from the principles to which she adheres. 
Externally, it is evident that her principles attract 
no friends, save those who are linked still more 
closely with Austria and Russia. Indeed the 
political principles of Prussia excite antipathies, 
just where sympathy would be most desirable ; 
and where these antipathies, besides being po- 
litical, are turned forcibly against her in every 
thing else. 

These pages may be imagined to contain para- 
doxes, though, in reality, there are none ; and the 
opinion we are about to hazard may be thought 
equally absurd : it is, that, under a constitutional 
government, and at the head of all the constitu- 
tional States of Germany, connected with them not 
only by interest but by political principle ; Prussia 
would assume a position incomparably stronger and 
more formidable than she now occupies among abso- 
lute powers, ranking only third after Russia and 



PRUSSIA. 



115 



Austria.* Meanwhile we shall not pursue further 
a conception, at the present time, without doubt, 
perfectly idle. The following remark will suffice : 
The system of the militia (landwehr), and the mu- 
nicipal administration of Prussia, are institutions 
which presuppose one of these alternatives; — either, 
in all time coming, a ruler universally beloved by 
the people ; or, the establishment of a general con- 
stitution for the whole kingdom. 

The power of Material Interests is, together 
with nationality, the strongest and most unfailing 
support of Prussia. The plan of a uniform scale 
of transit duties for the different States of Germany 
(the introduction of the zoll-verein), and the glo- 
rious campaign of the year 1815, shed a lustre over 
the long and memorable reign of the late king. 
The peaceful league and the warlike exploits have 
equally proved what may be effected by Prussia 
combined with the rest of Germany ; when the rest 
of Germany and Prussia join heart and hand. 
These two events, so well known and so unam- 

* Most English readers will think the term " paradox," 
as here applied, somewhat of a misnomer. — Tr. 



116 



PEUSSIA. 



biguous, contain a fund of political instruction for 
the future ministers of Prussia. 

It is painful to reflect that the scheme of the 
Commercial League, which was in reality promised 
in the German act of confederation, had not been 
earlier introduced, and better digested.* What 
an advantage was thrown away by the cession of 
East Friesland to Hanover ! The very shore of 
the North Sea had been reached ; an acquisition 
which must now be purchased at so high a price. 
Still retrospect is fruitless, if for the mere object 
of collecting matter for unprofitable blame ; better 
far is it to deduce wisdom from experience, and to 
be thankful that coming prospects are more favour- 
able : besides, there is now a greater probability 

* The whole of the world's surface might be as compactly 
paved with such painful reflections, as another place is said to 
be with good intentions. Prussia has much more cause for 
gladness than for mourning when she views her actual posi- 
tion ; and as to her regrets about East Friesland, however 
well founded ; that ancient abode of freedom, though not now 
Prussian, has never ceased to be German ; and, along with 
every other part of Germany, will, sooner or later, understand 
the benefits of commercial concord.— Tr. 



PRUSSIA. 



117 



of the ultimate adhesion of Hanover herself to the 
Commercial League. 

On the whole, Prussia is weaker than the other 
four leading powers of Europe ; and, in the event of 
a continental war, her position would be threatened 
from more quarters than one. She has precisely 
the same natural enemies as Austria, and in Eng- 
land not so impartial a friend ; the Commercial 
League being opposed to English interests.* 

On account of the great extent of her frontier, 
and the limited breadth of her territory, Prussia 
could not successfully engage in war on the east 
and on the west at the same time ; unless Austria 
and all the rest of Germany, together with Eng- 
land, were on her side. So long as Prussia conti- 
nued jealous of Austria, and was less desirous to 
protect the smaller German States than to enlarge 
her dominions at their expense ; she declined the 

* No league to facilitate commercial intercourse can be 
really opposed to English interests ; unless in said league 
there be a departure from the broad principle of free trade. 
— Tr. 



118 



PRUSSIA. 



German alliance, and sought rather a connexion 
with France or Russia. 

The French connexion was long a darling ob- 
ject of the Prussian government ; and to her cost 
was realized at the peace of Basle in 1795. The 
Prussian statesmen flattered themselves that, by con- 
cluding their treaty, they had, in the first place, se- 
cured their country against an attack from France 
herself ; secondly, that they would thereby be ena- 
bled to hold in check both Austria and Russia ; 
thirdly, that with such aid they might clear away 
some of the smaller States in their neighbourhood, 
and so give more roundness to the Prussian ter- 
ritory. But all was a delusion. It is perfectly 
astonishing how any one could believe that France 
was serious in her friendship, and would honestly 
further the aggrandizement of Prussia. To France 
the Prussian alliance was never any thing but an 
artifice ; a cunning method of disarming the one- 
half of Germany, so that there might be less trouble 
in crushing the other half, namely, Austria. Prus- 
sia was kept in play for the purpose of isolating 
her ; she was reserved for a convenient opportunity, 



PRUSSIA. 



119 



when Austria had been completely despatched. It 
has been the invariable practice of the French to 
disunite the Germans from each other ; and having 
thus become an overmatch for any single state, they 
have tried to beat them in detail. Never could 
they acquire this advantage on more reasonable 
terms, than when some cabinet allowed itself to 
be gained over as an ally, or to observe neutrality ; 
while a neighbouring and kindred State was deli- 
berately victimized. 

The Prussians permitted themselves to be led 
away by the idea that France, as the oldest and 
most natural enemy of Austria, would gratefully re- 
ceive and acknowledge their assistance in weakening 
that empire. But they forget that France has still 
more cogent reasons for hostility against Prussia 
herself ; and must, at whatever risk, prevent the 
augmentation of her power. Prussia has the largest 
number of German subjects ; indeed her subjects 
are almost exclusively German. She is essentially 
a German State ; consequently more fit than Aus- 
tria to represent the national interests of Germany, 
without regard to Italians, Hungarians, and Sla- 



120 



PRUSSIA. 



vonians ; and more likely to animate the Germans 
with zeal in her behalf. Prussia, moreover, has been 
gradually approaching the French confines, nay, 
has encamped on the very frontier ; while Austria 
has been withdrawing herself more and more from 
the vicinity of France, and has moved away to the 
east. Lastly, Prussia is a young and aspiring mo- 
narchy, far more inclined to aggression than the 
ancient and conservative empire of Austria. It 
must hence be evident that Prussia is a neighbour 
whose advancement France never can earnestly 
promote. Should the Prussian diplomatists at any 
future time relapse into such an error as the French 
alliance, continued from 1795 to 1806 ; they would 
fatally entangle their country, while the expiation 
would be more terrible than the last. 

It is difficult to say any thing decisive regarding 
the position of Prussia with respect to Russia ; not on- 
ly on account of the tender family connection which 
at present unites the two northern sovereigns ; but 
chiefly for this additional reason, that these States, 
a few years ago disjoined from each other by Po- 
land, have now entered into different relations, 



PRUSSIA. 



121 



and which bring into view a host of future possi- 
bilities. For a long time it has been generally 
believed that Prussia and Russia are most inti- 
mately connected together, and due regard has not 
been paid to the incalculable results which would 
be produced by a collision of these States ; a turn 
of events, though not in immediate prospect, still 
not altogether beyond anticipation. 

The alliance of Prussia with Russia has always 
from time to time been broken off by the tampering 
of Russia with other powers in a manner injurious 
and hostile to Prussia. Prussia first allied herself 
with Russia against Sweden at the beginning of 
the last century. Russia thereby acquired Livonia, 
and shortly after Courland ; while the gain to Prus- 
sia was insignificant. But scarcely had Russia 
established herself in Livonia, when she rapidly set 
about further encroachments, and tried even to 
grasp at the kingdom of Prussia. The former al- 
liance through which Russia had made so large ac- 
quisitions, was ungratefully forgotten ; and by the 
notorious treaty of Versailles in 1756, she conjoined 
herself with Austria, France, Sweden, and Saxony, 

L 



122 



PRUSSIA. 



for the purpose of overwhelming Prussia. A com- 
plete dismemberment was beforehand arranged ; 
and how nearly did the scheme succeed ! Almost 
the whole of Europe assailed the petty dominion of 
Prussia. A miracle seemed indispensable for her 
salvation ; and that miracle was wrought by the 
military genius of Frederick. But are such mira- 
cles always in readiness \ Can they be bespoken ? 

Russia, ever bent on conquests in the west, 
after the failure of her scheme to destroy Prussia, 
undertook forthwith the partition of Poland ; and, 
to effect this object, she again entered into an al- 
liance with Prussia; — an alliance which continued 
for some time ; Russia requiring it for the second 
and third partitions of Poland. But Prussia hav- 
ing been discomfited and crippled by Napoleon, 
from her there was nothing more to fear or expect ; 
and the alliance was broken off. Russia at once 
leagued with Napoleon at Tilsit ; and not only raised 
no obstacle to the dismemberment of Prussia, but 
even appropriated a portion of the Prussian territo- 
ry to herself ; leaving unfulfilled the stipulation of 
indemnity to Prussia for the loss of Hanover, though 
that indemnification formed one of the articles of 



PRUSSIA. 



123 



the treaty of Tilsit.* Soon after the conclusion of 
this treaty, Russia combined with Napoleon in a 
yet more formal manner at Erfurt, and divided with 
him the supremacy of Europe. By this second 
transaction she obtained Finland, and at the ex- 
pense of Austria a part of Gallicia : every thing fa- 
vouring her designs of encroachment on the west. 
Meanwhile the catastrophe of 1812 put an end to 

* The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit stipulated that, 
if Hanover were united with the new kingdom of Westphalia, 
Prussia should in return be indemnified by the cession of 
some other territory containing 400,000 inhabitants. Napo- 
leon thought fit to join Hanover to Westphalia, without con- 
ferring any indemnification whatever on Prussia ;t and the 
Emperor Alexander was so " magnanimous" as to write to 
him on the subject the following letter, which has been pub- 
lished by Bignon: — " Sire and Brother, — Moved by the friend- 
ship which your majesty has never ceased, on every occasion, 
to evince for me ; and in order to give your majesty an incon- 
testable proof of the friendship which I also entertain for 
you; I hasten to inform your majesty that I attach no im- 
portance to the fulfilment of the eventual article relating to 
Hanover." Bignon remarks on this letter, that it is quite 
natural Russia should concur in the weakening of Prussia ; 
but by reason of his noble and delicate feeling for the so- 
much lauded Emperor Alexander, he yet terms this conduct 
" a cruel indifference" for his old friend. 

f With regard to Hanover, Prussia at all events received her deserts. 
— Te. 



124 



PRUSSIA. 



Russo-Gallican amity ; Russia returned to the al- 
liance of Prussia, by which she was placed in a 
condition to follow the Emperor of the French to 
Paris ; and, as an immediate result of the general 
success, she acquired the greater part of what had 
been Prussian Poland, along with the province of 
Warsaw; — thus, as we see, continually advancing 
her frontier toward the west. 

Since that time the Prusso-Russian alliance has 
continued seven and twenty years. Much has Prus- 
sia done for Russia, particularly in the last Po- 
lish war ; still she has been unable to obtain for her 
Baltic Provinces, even the smallest relief from the 
great annoyance to which they are subjected by 
the commercial prohibitions of the Russian govern- 
ment. We do not certainly attach any weight to 
the anonymous Russian pamphleteers who, in the 
Memoir for the year 1834, and in the work entitled 
" The European Pentarchy," have endeavoured to 
excite among the smaller States of Germany anti- 
pathies against Prussia ; and who, with no friendly 
feeling to her, have proposed that the smaller States 
should place themselves under a Russian protec- 



PRUSSIA. 



125 



torate ; yet even these writers admit that Russia 
has an interest at variance with the interest of 
Prussia.* 

The neighbourhood of a state, intelligent, re- 
nowned in war, still youthful, still aspiring, and 
backed by the whole vigour of German nationality ; 
cannot be agreeable to the Russians, who, with 
a tendency to universal dominion, have hitherto 
enlarged their empire on every side ; and are in- 
clined to tolerate as neighbours the insignificant 

* " The minor states composing the Diet, now saw plainly 
that neither Prussia nor Austria sufficiently guaranteed their 
existence as separate and independent sovereignties ; and that 
the guardianship of either the one or the other must to them 
be always prejudicial. Their wish is to remain free ; and not 
to descend to the rank either of Austrian or of Prussian pro- 
vinces." From the Russian Memoir on the state of Germany 
in 1834, published in the Portfolio. 

In " The European Pentarchy," p. 70, it is stated " Russia 
cannot countenance an aggrandizement of Prussia in Nor- 
thern Germany;" and at p. 60, " a wider extent of territory is 
indeed required by the Prussian monarchy, in order to main- 
tain that position which it now occupies." But the minor 
confederate states ought to be warned of this tendency of 
Prussia, and in their defence be persuaded to accept a Rus- 
sian protectorate ; because Russia never would consent to 
Prussian aggrandizement. 



126 



PRUSSIA. 



remains only of kingdoms, in earlier times so cele- 
brated. What Sweden and Poland once were, 
that now is Prussia in a yet higher degree ; a knight 
in panoply who never quits his post on the bank of 
the Vistula, and who, though he may be entombed 
with the chivalry of yore, or effaced from the ancient 
escutcheon of Lithuania,* is ever ready to start 
again to life. This championship of the north 
Prussia has inherited ; and well is she worthy of 
the proud and glorious succession. 

"We have formerly, when treating of Austria, 
pronounced her intimate connexion with Prussia 
to be a political necessity : this necessity, it is our 
firm belief, will continue to become more and 
more evident, as the veil of futurity is withdrawn. 
Prussia, siding either with France or with Russia ; 
or even daring a combination with both ;t while 

* The heraldic bearing of Lithuania was an armed war- 
rior. — Tr. 

t That what we have said is not mere fancy, is apparent 
from Pozzo di Borgo's despatch of 28th November 1828, 
printed in the Portfolio ; in which the scheme of an alliance 
of Russia with Prussia and France, against Austria, was 
really contemplated. All the endeavours of Metternich, it is 



PRUSSIA. 



127 



abandoning Austria to her fate, would only pro- 
voke her own destruction, as was evinced by the 
result of the treaty of Basle, namely, that other 
treaty afterwards concluded at Tilsit. Every im- 
pending danger hangs alike over Prussia and Aus- 
tria. They stand each in need of mutual assistance. 
The author of the " Pentarchy" has himself made 

there said, must prove ineffectual, Prussia being entirely 
devoted to Russia. " Prussia strengthens the ties of blood by 
those of policy" ; and France knows he/ own interest too weii 
to act unless in harmony with Russia. " If we display the 
front we ought and can display ; the strongest party, as well 
as the Government of France, will court us ; and, from the 
necessity of providing for their own welfare, will at once enter 
the lists, should Austria and England throw open the bar- 
riers." In the next sentence of the despatch it is remarked, 
that Prussia must be flattered with the prospect of acquisi- 
tions at the expense of England and Austria, so that she 
may the more readily attach herself to Russia and France. 
" Prussia has her part already assigned ; the very objects of 
her ambition are within her grasp." This ambition would 
cost Prussia dear, were Austria previously subdued by Russia 
and France ; indeed it would soon bring on the catastrophe 
of Prussia. 

A more clumsy snare than the foregoing passage indicates, 
oould hardly have been laid for Prussian policy. It is a 
complete affront to the diplomatic reputation of the cabinet 
of Berlin, to imagine them possessed of so little retrospective 
knowledge or foresight as to be thus easily outwitted. 



128 



PRUSSIA. 



this acknowledgment, when exulting that Russia 
occupies a position whence she can defy the menaces 
both of Austria and Prussia. " The Czar," says he, 
" by the acquisition of Poland, has gained a terri- 
tory which cleaves Austria from Prussia, and for 
Russia is invaluable." 

But an alliance with the rest of Germany is quite 
as necessary for Prussia as an alliance with Austria. 
In every great European contest, which to Prussia 
has always hitherto been a struggle for existence, 
it is indispensable for her to be upheld by the whole 
vigour of German nationality. In a war with 
France, the States of southern and western Ger- 
many are naturally leagued with Prussia ; and 
she must prevent at any cost a renewal of the Con- 
federation of the Rhine. But she can check the 
reappearance of such a confederation, only by a 
zealous support of the real interests of the minor 
States, and by identifying their interests with her 
own. It does not admit of doubt that the Com- 
mercial League of Prussia advances this noble ob- 
ject. Still the weak military position of southern 
Germany on the side of France is much to be la- 



PRUSSIA. 129 

mented. From Strasburg, the French may in a 
few marches be in the heart of Swabia, and on the 
Danube. Prussia, as a military state, as the guar- 
dian of Germany, ought perhaps to have attached 
greater value to the proposal of making Strasburg 
a fortress of the German confederacy, in the same 
way as Wittenberg had been made Prussian. Every 
thing that contributes to expose the states of 
southern Germany to French invasion and to French 
influence is alarming to Prussia. The great Elec- 
tor knew well how requisite to his country was 
the preservation of the Upper Rhine. Hardenberg 
would seem not to have been so well aware of the 
fact. The minor German States are dangerous to 
Prussia only when they are the allies of France ; 
and they have never yielded themselves to so 
anti-national a procedure, except when, themselves 
defenceless, they could discover no other means of 
salvation. 

In addition to the ease with which the French 
can from Strasburg operate on Upper Germany, 
there are many well known sympathies in favour 
of the liberal principle now ascendant in France ^ 



130 



PRUSSIA. 



sympathies "which, almost as a matter of course, 
appear to be accompanied by an antipathy for the 
opposite principle avowed by Prussia : — a truth 
highly disagreeable to every German who under- 
stands the necessity of a cordial and unreserved 
adjustment of the particular interests of all the 
German States. Undoubted^ the conflict of prin- 
ciples is no longer active ; but who can decide 
whether the flame will not burst out anew ? and 
then what an advantage might not a foreign enemy 
derive from the civil discontents of Germany? 
This consideration leads naturally to the wish, that 
Prussia may do her best to obtain satisfaction of 
all the just and reasonable demands made by the 
German people, for example in Hanover ; so that 
distrust may be banished, and confidence restored. 
With reference to these discontents, the policy of 
the Commercial League is yet incomplete. The 
minor States are attracted to foreign powers only 
in proportion as they are detached from Austria 
and Prussia. 



( 131 ) 



MINOR CONFEDERATE STATES 
OF GERMANY. 



The smaller states of Germany have entertained 
a continual dread of being overpowered and swal- 
lowed up, at one time by Austria, at another time 
by Prussia. Hence they have always endeavoured 
to benefit by the jealousy of these two powers ; and, 
guided by circumstances, have allied themselves 
either with Austria against Prussia, as in the Seven 
years' war ; or with Prussia against Austria, in the 
so-called League of the Princes. This policy is 
natural, and of no recent date. It was the policy 
adopted by the smaller states of the empire, when- 
ever two dynasties in Germany, with large ter- 
ritorial possessions, were opposed to each other. 



132 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



It was the policy which, as is well known to every 
reader of history, the petty princes and the impe- 
rial cities followed, during the rival contentions of 
the Guelfs with the Ghibbelines, of the Hapsburgers 
with the Wittelsbachers, and of the Hapsburgers 
with the Luxemburgers. Had not foreign powers 
intermeddled s ; these internal quarrels among the 
Germans would be undeserving of notice. If by 
these quarrels the unity of the nation!was weakened ; 
the evils of uniformity were by the same means 
warded off. The various tribes reciprocally pre- 
served a due equilibrium. Their nationality se- 
cured to itself distinct rallying points ; so that the 
rich and beautiful country of Germany cannot, like 
France, be carved out for the behoof of one all- 
absorbing metropolis. 

Disastrous to Germany has been the interfe- 
rence of foreign powers. Still it redounds to the 
honour of the secondary princes of the empire, that 
in almost every instance, they have invited foreign 
aid, only when compelled by extreme necessity ; or 
they have yielded to overwhelming external force. 
Necessity was the motive in the religious wars. 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 133 



The Protestant princes applied for relief to France 
after they had been vanquished in the field by the 
Catholic party, and were menaced with their in- 
sufferable tyranny. The agency was Force, when 
the minor princes, being deserted by Prussia, and 
finding Austria incapable to restore victory, were 
left without any alternative but prompt submission 
to the mandates of Napoleon. Only once, and much 
to the detriment of Germany, did Bavaria heed- 
lessly and voluntarily join with France under 
Louis XIV. 

But every foreign mediation has been prejudicial 
to the German people, and has tended to diminish 
the general strength of the nation. The French 
owe all their earlier successes in Germany to the 
mutually destructive conflicts of popular parties 
among the Germans, or to the reciprocal enmity of 
the various cabinets. When the Germans ranged 
themselves as Guelfs and Ghibbelines (partizans of 
the Pope and of the Emperor), the French wrested 
Artois and Burgundy from the German Empire. 
Again, when the Germans were divided into 
Leaguers and Reformers ; the French laid hold of 



134 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



Alsace ; secured the friendship of the Swiss ; and 
obtained a commanding influence in Italy, where 
the enfeebled Emperors redeemed their authority 
only by permitting Lorraine to revert to France. 
At a later period, the unhappy jealousies between 
Austria and Prussia afforded the French many an 
opportunity of exercising a malign control over 
Germany ; and nothing but the despicable policy 
of Louis XV., and his chamber councils, prevented 
their fully availing themselves of these opportuni- 
ties. But so soon as France, by the revolution, 
was again placed under an energetic government, 
one that understood admirably how to profit by the 
follies of the greater German powers ; Austria and 
the Empire were isolated, while Prussia was ca- 
joled at the treaty of Basle ; and immediately 
after, France achieved boundless success, gaining 
possession of Holland and the Netherlands, the 
whole left bank of the Rhine, and Switzerland. 

The glorious war of 1813 drove back the French ; 
but the new condition of Germany still bears much 
resemblance to the old. The mutual relations of 
the different parts of that country continue nearly 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 135 



the same as they have been. There are two great 
powers, always to a certain extent viewed as rivals ; 
and there is still a mass of smaller States, whose 
existence is preserved by means of the equilibrium 
between their more potent neighbours. 

Nevertheless, the common danger which had 
been escaped, and the general triumph which was 
obtained, produced a strong impression ; while now 
the dread of foreign interference neutralizes the jea- 
lousies which survived. Such is the deportment of 
the rulers of Germany toward each other, that there 
is no longer fear of internal usurpation ; and conse- 
quently, no chance of the German union falling 
asunder, as the author of the " Pentarchy" desires. 
The silly wish of the Russian pamphleteer* could 

* The stupidity is quite amusing. The Memoir, circulated 
in 1834 among the minor German courts, attempted to excite 
their hatred against the absolutism and stability which form 
the political principles of Austria, as " not being of exalted 
character, and ill adapted to the present age." But to what 
principle, then, does Russia do homage % That same Memoir 
endeavoured to attract suspicion toward Prussia, representing 
her as desirous of gradually reducing the other States of Ger- 
many by means of her Commercial League. 

If the Russian pamphleteers have the assurance to employ 



136 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



not in fact have been disclosed at a more unsuit- 
able time. In spite of many anomalous interests ; 
throughout Germany men now possess stronger in- 
ducements, and more than ever exhibit a disposi- 
tion, with German calmness, thoughtfulness, and 
sound judgment, to come to an understanding in 
regard to those interests which most universally 
affect them; — as, among other things, has been 
proved by the happy beginning and progress of the 
Commercial League. 

Hence the invitation the author of the " Pen- 
tarchy" gives to the smaller States, to enact a fe- 
lony against the German union, by constituting, 
of themselves, a new independent Rhenish league, 
or, as he styles it, a European central association ; 
is not insolent only, and a direct summons to breach 
of faith, but is likewise politically a miscalculation. 

We shall not avoid the real question. Some of 
the smaller States, it is true, often displayed high 

language so ungrateful with respect to Prussia ; what confi- 
dence can be reposed on Russia by the smaller States of Ger- 
many, who have merited far less at her hands 1 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 137 



expectations, when combining with foreign powers 
against the rest of Germany. But on the whole, 
the system of roundings of territory has been in- 
jurious to the smaller States ; and the return of 
the ancient system of equilibrium has alone res- 
cued them from perdition. Every general round- 
ing has diminished the mass of the small States, 
which form the great fund drawn on for acquisitions 
and indemnifications. Even the few small States 
individually favoured in the partitions, have still 
not become sufficiently powerful to maintain them- 
selves unassisted. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, 
and Hanover, have been separately amplified ; 
but the geographical extent of the countries ori- 
ginally included within the empire has been re- 
duced. Austria, Prussia, France, Holland, and 
Denmark, have torn away large portions ; so 
that the remnant has no longer the political 
weight the cqnfederate imperial States possessed, 
when Prussia tendered the League of the Princes. 
Consequently, though there may have been single 
gains of a,W additional half million of inhabitants, 
the confederacy has lost eight millions ; and the 
power of the minor States has thus not been aug- 

M 



138 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



mented but lessened : the case of Saxony, too, proves 
that an individual State whose wings have been long 
growing, may have them clipped at last. The gene- 
ral roundings are for the small States a lottery ; in 
which no doubt singly they may win ; but after- 
wards they must repeatedly risk their winnings, 
and incur the danger of losing all ; for in the long 
run the whole stake comes into the hands of the 
larger powers : and it would be well for the small 
States, that by a secure settlement of the internal 
affairs of Germany, they were never constrained to 
hazard their existence in this perilous game. 

The losses sustained by the German States, as a 
whole, have been most severe in the west. Upper 
Germany is continually threatened from Strasburg, 
and in the event of a war, would be subjected to 
the most painful sacrifices ; perhaps would be again 
compelled feloniously to desert the German Con- 
federacy. This exposure to attack is a manifest 
obstruction to the safety and independence of the 
Minor Associated States. The position of these 
States cannot be secure, till the Vosges again mark 
the confines of Germany ; and Strasburg once more 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 139 



becomes a German fortress, garrisoned by the Con- 
federates. In addition to the actual danger from 
Strasburg ; France has never relinquished the ex- 
pectation of some day possessing the whole left 
bank of the Rhine. Were this expectation ever 
realized ; not only would Bavaria be deprived of 
the Palatinate ; but the French would exert be- 
yond the Rhine an influence on the residue of the 
Minor Confederate States of Germany, who would 
be condemned to a new vassalage, should they es- 
cape being swept away by a final consolidation, 
and a partition of their respective territories among 
the larger powers. 

France has at all times been ready, according as 
it happened to be most for her advantage, either 
to flatter the numerous petty princes with hopes 
of absolute authority, or to excite the people of 
Western Germany with prospects of a republican 
government and Utopian dreams of freedom. How- 
ever clumsy the contradiction ; still the Germans 
have often been so simple as allow themselves 
to be deceived. In proportion as the petty princes 
seemed unwilling to confide in a French protecto- 



140 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



rate; France invariably became more urgent in ad- 
dressing herself to the liberalism of " the populace. 

We believe they are in error who have supposed 
that in the character of the constitutional govern- 
ments of Germany, there is a secret tendency to 
Radicalism. We are much rather inclined to 
think that the Germans are by nature most con- 
servative : so much so, that we are convinced 
French influence on the political feeling of Ger- 
many, will diminish in the same degree as re- 
liance is placed on the character of the German 
constitutions : on the other hand, we maintain 
that political distrust will only serve to augment 
ihe predominance of France. 

Along with these considerations, the Hanove- 
rian question necessarily obtrudes itself. The 
affairs of Hanover are by themselves clearly too 
unimportant to have any effect on the general 
policy of Europe. But on the decision of the con- 
stitutional question in Hanover, depends in a great 
measure the future credit of modern constitutional 
governments : this question therefore operates for- 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 141 



cibly on the confidence or suspicion which may pre- 
vail in regard to the internal policy of Germany. 

Confidence would appear to be a union of satis- 
faction and loyalty ; hence thoroughly conservative. 
Such confidence, moreover, seems to us to promote 
the increase of that moral strength which we never 
see disappear from public life, without being fol- 
lowed by a merited penalty. Granting that the 
people of such parts of Northern and Eastern Ger- 
many, as have not yet been habituated to consti- 
tutional forms, take no interest in this political 
progress, and that their confidence may be settled 
on a different basis ; — yet it is not to be misunder- 
stood, that the western populations must either be 
strengthened and confirmed in their adherence to 
the system of national representation, established 
among them many hundred years ago, and which, 
though suspended at times during the last century, 
has now been restored and purified, so as to suit 
the altered exigencies of this age ; or otherwise, that 
the risk is incurred of these western populations 
relapsing into indifference, which would only be 



142 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



conducive to the growth of French ascendency, 
whenever a European crisis shall arrive. 

The opposition of the Radicals in England 
to the Whigs, and of the Republicans in France 
to the Conservative chambers; even the slight 
schism in Germany between the revolutionary 
youth, and their constitutional seniors, displayed 
immediately after the July revolution at Paris ; 
make known the direction in which men's opinions 
would wander, if reliance on constitutional autho- 
rity should be extinguished. Without doubt, there 
is not the smallest reason to apprehend that the 
German nation, of whom a vast majority are still 
peaceable and loyal, can be seriously disturbed or 
excited by any internal movements of Radicalism ; 
but, in the event of a European crisis, political in- 
difference or distrust would infallibly weaken the 
moral and national vigour of Western Germany, 
and would render the frontiers accessible to French 
intrigues. 

In whatever way the affairs of France may 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 143 



henceforward be regulated ; danger will always, 
from that quarter, menace the German Confe- 
derates. It may happen that France will be 
wasted by intestine commotions ; or, like Spain, 
sink into lethargy ; but such a termination is not 
to be anticipated. Only two results are probable. 
Either the revolutionary principle must again ob- 
tain the upper hand, and once more throw all Eu- 
rope into commotion, reviving discontent every- 
where ; or the monarchy will rise superior among 
parties in France, and become strong enough to 
engage, as formerly, in external operations. In the 
first case the question arises, whether the French 
would not again, as in 1792 and in 1830, be more 
or less aided by sympathies within Germany itself ? 
All history and precedent shew us, that the assist- 
ance the French offer in the name of liberty is a 
mere pretext ; and designed only as a means of 
foreign conquest and subjugation. 

When the German Protestants allowed them- 
selves to be supported by the French ; they came 
under the yoke of that despotism which Louis 
the XIV. exercised in Lorraine and Alsace, per- 



144 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



sonally, and in the other States of Germany by 
the force of his example. When the German II- 
luminati, Cosmopolites, and Friends of Freedom, 
intoxicated with admiration of the great French 
Revolution, permitted themselves to be backed by 
the French in 1792 ; they by no means obtained 
that freedom they had expected, but were brought 
under the absolute sway of Napoleon and of the 
sovereigns of the Rhenish Confederation. Should 
the Liberals, or even the Religious party, in Ger- 
many, accept at any future time the aid of the 
French, in whatever manner such aid may be 
given ; they will not experience a better fate. 
The interest of France is merely to weaken Ger- 
many ; and this interest never varies under any 
change of political principles. As kingdom, as 
republic, as empire, conquest is her sole aim in 
Germany. Thus even now the republican party 
in France is less eager about the triumph of 
their political principles, than about war and vic- 
tory. They dream less of Brutus than of Caesar. 
Though the flame at present smoulders among the 
ashes ; any unlooked for event, any change in the 
person of their ruler, or serious mistake of the Go- 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 145 



vernment, proceeding from arrogance or from im- 
becility, would revive a general conflagration. 

As the example of the French people has often 
electrified other nations ; so, on the other hand, 
would the French themselves be electrified by any 
kind of national movement elsewhere. If a new vol- 
cano were to burst out in Germany ; the old pre-ex- 
isting volcano in France would reassume activity. 
But if none of these things come to pass ; if every 
trace of combustion should be extinguished ; then, 
doubtless, would the Orleans family succeed in estab- 
lishing their sway ; and not only inspire the Rus- 
sian diplomacy with that confidence, which the 
pamphleteer, to whom we have so often alluded, 
makes the first condition of an alliance ; but it 
would also coincide with their peculiar interest, to 
return to the cabinet policy of Louis the XIV. and 
Napoleon ; and, under the favourable auspices of 
the Russian alliance, to occupy with projects of 
foreign conquest, the ambitious and ever-warlike 
Frenchmen ; to flatter them with the hopes of new 
victories, and the certainty of regaining the left bank 
of the Rhine, &c. This state of things would the 

N 



146 MINOE STATES OF GERMANY. 



more inevitably be produced ; if in Germany itself 
encouragement were given to dissatisfaction, rest- 
lessness, and mutual jealousy. 

Consequently, France can never be the true 
friend and supporter of the Minor States : from her 
contiguity, she is rather their most dangerous ene- 
my. The welfare of these states urgently demands, 
that France be permitted to encroach on them no 
further ; on the contrary, if in any way it were 
possible, that she should be driven back again be- 
yond the Vosges, and the still small confederacy 
strengthened by the annexation of Switzerland, 
Belgium, and Holland. The interests of Austria, 
Prussia, and the Minor States, entirely correspond ; 
since, for these large sovereignties, an augmenta- 
tion of the number and aggregate strength of the 
smaller states, is incomparably less dangerous than 
an aggrandizement of France. 

Hitherto, whenever foreign powers wished to 
array the small German states against Austria or 
Prussia ; they always addressed themselves, in the 
first place, to the court of Munich. If this method 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 147 



of procedure be attentively examined; it will be 
seen to be a circumstance highly important for 
Germany, and well deserving national gratitude ; 
that the present king of Bavaria has so often and 
decidedly declared his German patriotism, and his 
strong dislike of ail foreign interposition in the 
affairs of Germany. 

The independence of the Minor States is indis- 
soluble from the permanence of the German Con- 
federacy. Should a breach once be made in that 
Confederacy ; then would the thrones totter, and the 
constitutions go down ; then would there be a re- 
newal of the tyranny and official insolence of stran- 
gers ; foreign troops would again banish prosperity 
and freedom ; German nationality itself would be 
threatened. Let every western and southern Ger- 
man clearly understand what awaits him, should 
Austria and Prussia no longer support the nation- 
al cause. Under Napoleon, the French empire 
stretched right across Germany, beyond the Elbe 
and the Weser, even to the Baltic ; exhibiting, 
to the astonishment of the old East Frieslanclers, 
French prefects, French custom-house officers, and 



148 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



French police spies. On the other side, Russia, 
ven in the Seven years' war, would gladly have 
laid hold of the kingdom of Prussia : indeed Ko- 
nigsberg was actually in her possession. More re- 
cently, as Bignon informs us, she negotiated with 
Napoleon for Bohemia ; without Austria knowing 
any thing about the arrangement. What would hap- 
pen were Germans again taken by surprise, before 
they had become convinced of the necessity of a 
united resistance ? — were they, a second time, com- 
pelled to bear the evils of dissension and foreign 
rule ? What would be their fate ; should the bar- 
riers of German nationality give way on either 
side, before the wily assaults of Russia, or the im- 
petuosity of France ? 

It would seem not to have been sufficiently con- 
sidered how deep are the obligations of all Ger- 
many to Austria, for her powerful defence and 
guardianship of their south-western boundary. Here 
Germans still bear sway over men of divers lineage ; 
as in the olden time was the case along the whole 
extent of the German frontier. Here no exotic in- 
fluence is to be dreaded. No Strasburg exists in 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 149 



this quarter. Here no kindred village languishes 
under foreign domination. But what a change 
would ensue, were this bulwark of German inde- 
pendence overthrown, — had its fall arisen from the 
extinction of national sympathy, and from German 
malevolence ! If, in the one direction, Russia suc- 
ceeded in establishing herself on the Danube ; at 
the same time that France acquired the ascen- 
dant on the Po, ready to march against Germany 
through Carinthia, as in 1797 : while, in the other 
direction, Prussia, similarly deserted by her Ca- 
tholic subjects on the Rhine and in Westphalia ; 
involved in internal commotions ; and denied the 
assistance of her fellow-countrymen ; was over- 
powered by a Russian and French coalition : — 
would the inhabitants of Southern Germany have 
much cause to rejoice over this humiliation of Aus- 
tria and Prussia \ Would their own doom then be 
far off? 

The Germans have already seen the Russians on 
St Gothard ; and the French at Dantzic. That 
the Erfurt alliance caused them no greater injury, 
was an ordination of Providence ; of the same Pro- 



150 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



vidence which has bestowed on them judgment, 
enabling them to deduce instruction for the future 
from an experience of the past. 

In particular, it must not be misunderstood, that 
against the Germanic influence which for more 
than a thousand years has been predominant in 
Europe, a momentous historical reaction has, 
during the last century, been in progress ; on the 
one side, frOm the Romanic influence of France ; 
on the other, from the Slavonic influence of Rus- 
sia.* Both those more recent influences continue 
to press forward. Both, after intervals of repose, 
have always seized, or found again, an opportunity 
to make acquisitions at the cost of the intermediate 
influence of Germanism. On the one hand, Ger- 
many has been bereft of Alsace and Lorraine ; on 
the other, the Baltic provinces have been alienated. 
Napoleon grasped still more on his side ; and so 
early as the Seven years' war, Russia displayed 
her insatiable temper. In language, moreover, 

* As a counterpoise, the same century also witnessed the 
full expansion of German literature. — Tk. 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 151 



and in fashions too, the Romanic influence has, 
through the prevailing French taste, even in Ger- 
many itself, long maintained a degree of superior- 
ity over the Germanic influence. In the opposite 
direction also, Slavonic influence has diffused itself, 
supplanting German manners, and announcing its 
future triumphs to be gained by the extinction of 
German nationality. Under these circumstances, 
all the powers who essentially depend on their 
Teutonic character, ought to be aware that, in 
each further partition and weakening of the col- 
lective body of the German people, every one, 
without exception, the small as well as the great, 
is vitally concerned. 

A separation of Prussia from Austria would, in 
any great European crisis, be equally destructive 
to both ; even though one of them should be ag- 
grandized by the ruin of the other : for thus either 
France or Russia would be aggrandized in a still 
larger proportion ; and prove, to the survivor of 
the two, incomparably more dangerous than before. 
Such was the situation of Prussia after deserting 
Austria in 1805. 



152 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



But a separation of the smaller German States 
from Austria and Prussia, with the view of form- 
ing a new Confederation of the Rhine ; whether 
again under the protection of France, or under a 
newfangled Russian protectorate, as advised by the 
author of the "Pentarchy" ; would, beyond doubt, 
lead to their utter ruin. For, admitting that such 
new confederation, by the aid of France or of Rus- 
sia, or by the aid of both powers, should contribute 
to the weakening or to the overthrow of Austria 
and Prussia ; and that this Anti- German coalition 
should triumph as in 1805, 1806, and 1809, would 
such a triumph be attended by the same results ? 
It is impossible to calculate on a repetition of the 
wonderful events of 1813 and 1815. The supre- 
macy of foreign conquerors and protectors would 
not again disappear so soon from the German soil ; 
but would probably be riveted with an iron force, 
and disguised with multiform attractions. Then 
would the new Confederation of the Rhine expe- 
rience a change of a different kind ; — degraded to 
the most ignominious vassalage; and annihilated 
by their own decree, the first and last act of their 
political existence. 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 153 



It is of equal importance to Russia and France, 
that the small German States should be, as much 
as possible, independent of Austria and Prussia; at 
least so long as Austria and Prussia are of them- 
selves powerful. If the power of Austria and 
Prussia were to come to an end ; the demolition 
of the small states would be a very short process. 

Let us reflect on the events previous to the Con- 
gress of Vienna, by which the new arrangements 
in Germany were established: we shall then be 
able to calculate for the future ; and judge how far 
the Minor States, by hitherto over-exclusively oc- 
cupying themselves with their own internal poli- 
tics, and with disputes in reference to constitu- 
tional principles, have lost sight of that Germanic 
unity which forms the basis of their existence. But, 
on the other hand, there have been omissions in 
what was requisite to connect the hopes and sym- 
pathies of the minor with the larger States. Had 
Austria and Prussia come forward earnestly to help 
to disentangle the question of the Hanoverian Sta- 
tutes ; — or had the leading Catholic States endea- 
voured in a friendly manner to extricate Prussia 



154 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



from her embarrassments, regarding the matter of 
the Archbishop of Cologne ; in order, with sincere 
patriotism, to remove every baneful Romanish in- 
fluence likely to disturb the general welfare of Ger- 
many ; an object which was perfectly attainable : — 
national confidence, so much diminished by inter- 
nal heartburnings, would everywhere have been 
restored ; — the German Confederacy would have be- 
come more powerful in their foreign relations ; and 
their expressed opinion would have carried weight 
even in Eastern affairs. 

At present these remarks may be thought to 
partake of simplicity : but we are entering on an 
uncertain future, during which, as at every former 
period, tempests of overwhelming violence will con- 
tinue to burst over Germany. 

In these latter days were any of the able poli- 
ticians of antiquity — let us suppose Demosthenes — 
to rise from his grave, and survey the actual con- 
dition of the world ; what opinion would he give 
on the situation of Germany I Might he not. thus 
speak? — To conjoin in a hearty and enduring al- 



MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 155 



liance Austria and Prussia, who have so often fought 
against each other, and have so long been swayed 
by mutual jealousy; would be difficult. — The Mi- 
nor States having already twice formed a Rhenish, 
Confederation under a French protectorate ; to 
withhold them in all circumstances from a third 
combination, and from being similarly misled ; 
would be also difficult. — To bring back Holland, 
Belgium, and Switzerland exclusively to German 
interests ; would be an attempt still more arduous. 
— To check the employment of religious schisms 
by foreign powers, for disquieting and weakening 
the German Confederacy ; would be nearly imprac- 
ticable. — To satisfy the political dreams and ex- 
pectations of the people ; to sooth discontent ; to 
quell the antipathies entertained against domestic 
forms of government, and to banish so many lik- 
ings for foreign modes of rule ; to animate with 
reciprocal confidence the various races, who for 
hundreds of years have been actuated by bitter en- 
mity, who still revile and hate each other ; and 
to gain them over to a sacrifice of their narrow 
provincial questions for the advancement of the ge- 
neral welfare of Germany ; — seem all to be tasks 



156 MINOR STATES OF GERMANY. 



equally hopeless. Yet these alarming obstacles 
must be overcome, if Germany would not sink into 
utter decay. Should these obstacles prove insur- 
mountable, nature will infallibly resume her course ; 
— in other words, the lax national association of 
Germany must, sooner or later, yield to the com- 
bined efforts of its strongly consolidated neighbours 
on the East and on the West. France alone in 
1792 laid Germany prostrate by force of arms. 
Russia alone in 1814 reduced her by diplomacy. 
If ever both these powers act in concert ; then, we 
repeat, it would be a work of exceeding difficulty 
to guard the German nation from the most severe 
calamities. 

The Greeks, he would continue, were a noble, a 
mighty, and a highly civilized nation : — but they 
perished because of their disunion. The Germans, 
who are a nation not less noble, mighty, and civi- 
lized, must also perish ; — because, like the Greeks, 
they are disunited. 



( 157 ) 



HOLLAND, BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND, 



The small territories which are situated between 
the German confederacy and France, once formed 
part of the German Empire ; and still nature en- 
joins their re-annexation to Germanic nationality, 
and to the brotherhood of the German States. On 
the one side ; they are menaced by a foreign people, 
great, united, and thirsting for conquest ; to whom 
they have once already fallen a prey, and from 
whose dominion they were liberated only by the 
German arms in 1813 : at which period these 
small territories were attached to the French Em- 
pire ; even Switzerland, ostensibly uncontrolled, 
being in complete dependence on France : and for 
the freedom now enjoyed by them, they are in- 
debted to the victories of Leipsic and Waterloo. 



158 HOLLAND, BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND. 



On the other side ; is the German nation, to which 
the Netherlands and the Swiss really belong ; and 
their immediate neighbours are that confederacy 
of small kindred states, in no way formidable to 
them ; security, not conquest, being the purpose of 
the union. 

The Netherlands and Switzerland possess Euro- 
pean importance, only when France succeeds in 
making these countries the basis of her armaments 
against Germany; an object she has at all times 
been eager to accomplish, on undertaking a Ger- 
man war. An alliance with the Swiss or an oc- 
cupation of Switzerland, and a seizure of the Ne- 
therlands, have invariably been the steps with which 
France has sought to commence operations ; in or- 
der that she might gain the first advantage, by 
outflanking Germany both on the west and on the 
south. The German confederacy, by its nature 
merely defensive, has never been sufficiently prompt 
to forestall France. The Netherlands and Swit- 
zerland have been respected by the German powers ; 
who, for the defence of Germany itself, have sought 
to maintain unimpaired the neutrality of these se- 



HOLLAND, BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND. 159 

condary states. Only when this neutrality has been 
violated by France, have the German powers come 
forward. 

But now France possesses the means, and with- 
out direct occupation, avails herself of every op- 
portunity, to make each little bordering country a 
dependent of her own. For this reason, it is of great 
moment for the German confederacy, in every way 
to befriend the Netherlands and Switzerland ; so 
that, by means of German sympathies, the French 
influence may be weakened. In the Belgian ques- 
tion sufficient regard was not bestowed on this 
point. Belgium must be viewed by Germany only 
as a German bulwark against France ; and nothing 
must be left undone to render Belgium available 
for that object. On the same account the interest 
of Holland must be postponed to the larger inte- 
rests of Germany. Belgium too must ascribe her 
independence, her wealth, and her future prospects, 
not to France ; but to the German confederacy, and 
to her close union with German nationality. 

Holland is placed in a peculiar relation to Bus- 



160 HOLLAND, BELGIUM. 

sia. It w5uld be far more desirable, and for Hol- 
land herself ultimately more beneficial, were she 
in more familiar connexion with Germany ; and 
were Germany again the source of her power. Hol- 
land has isolated herself too much within her nar- 
row provincialism. Holland forms the anchoring 
ground for German navigation. If, as at the begin- 
ning of her fortunate career, she had always drawn 
fresh vigour from the inland districts of Germany, 
and had not preferred to shrink within her own 
confined territory ; instead of losing her colonies to 
the English, she would have augmented their num- 
ber. 

At present both these petty kingdoms are estran- 
ged from German interests. Belgium is more re- 
signed to the influence of France ; Holland to the 
influence of Russia. 

66 Truly," says Arendt in his excellent work,* 
u when we contemplate the demeanour of Germany 
toward Belgium since the July revolution ; we 

* The Interests of Germany in regard to the Belgian Ques- 
tion. Brussels, 1839. 



BELGIUM. 161 

might suppose Germany had discovered, that re- 
latively to her own interests, she could follow no 
better course in Belgium, than to urge the Belgians 
to throw themselves into the arms of France ; and 
thereby constrain them to forget their origin, and 
to sever those numerous ties by which they are 
bound to Germany. We say constrain them ; and 
we adhere to the expression. For, with a blindness 
which is unpardonable ; and of which the only ex- 
planation can be, the strong prejudices of German 
politicians, and their unwillingness to yield to any 
sort of reasoning ; the fact has in Germany been 
quite overlooked, that in Belgium itself, this great 
and exclusive approximation to France, is not in the 
least degree national ; that the Belgians as a people 
desire, above all things, to maintain an independent 
existence ; and that a large majority of them would 
prefer a German connection to every other. Ger- 
mans are convinced of the necessity of preventing 
a foreign influence from gaming the ascendant in 
Belgium ; yet for the fulfilment of so patriotic an 
object ; — one of the most urgent duties imposed on 
them by the external relations of their country ; — 
every thing has been done to render the influence 

o 



162 



BELGIUM. 



of Germany in Belgium as slight as possible, and 
eventually to destroy it altogether." 

We conceive the Belgian question to be, more 
than any other, a boundary question between Ger- 
many and France. However multifarious the se- 
condary interests ; the political and strategical 
questions involved in a military frontier are be- 
yond comparison the most weighty. From time 
immemorial, the estimation of Belgium in this re- 
spect has been pre-eminent. A rapid historical 
sketch will best elucidate the opinion now offered. 

Even so early as the first dawn of Belgian his- 
tory, Belgium had already become German. Caesar 
distinguished the Belgians as Germans, from the 
Gauls dwelling further to the west and to the south : 
and the districts they inhabited were of even larger 
extent than Belgium of the present day. The 
Romans, immediately on their acquiring the do- 
minion of Gaul, became aware of the strategical 
importance of Belgium. Their first solicitude was 
to strengthen themselves in that quarter ; and 
irom thence to outflank Germany. They attached 



BELGIUM. 



163 



much higher value to the possession of Belgium, 
than to the subjection of the countries on the Da- 
nube ; though these countries lay much nearer to 
Italy ; — knowing well that the Danubian terri- 
tory would, at an after time, fall spontaneously into 
their hands, as soon as they had reduced the war- 
like tribes of Germany on the lower Rhine. Be- 
sides, it must not be allowed to pass unnoticed, 
that the loss of Belgium occasioned to the Romans 
the further loss of Holland and Friesland ; a result 
which has occurred in later times also; plainly 
shewing that Holland has ever been overcome, 
when a superior power, holding possession of Gaul, 
has effected a lodgment in Belgium. 

Immediately on the commencement of the great 
Germanic reaction against the authority of the Ro- 
mans ; Belgium was the first Roman Province oc- 
cupied and peopled anew by the advancing Ger- 
mans. Ere the Goths had migrated into the em- 
pire, — ere the Allemanni had seized Switzerland 
and Alsace, — the Salic Franks were already esta- 
blished in Flanders and Brabant. Proceeding from 
these early settlements of his race, the first Louis 



164 



BELGIUM. 



conquered Gaul : thus Flanders and Brabant formed 
the basis of the mighty empire acquired by the Car- 
lovingians. Nothing can more clearly illustrate the 
value of their political and strategical position be- 
tween Germany and France. 

The new kingdom of the Franks, the Neustria 
torn off from the great Carlovingian domain, con- 
tinued at first politically insignificant alongside the 
German Empire. But no sooner did the Emperor 
quarrel with the papal power, and the empire it- 
self fall into confusion from the rebellion of the 
native aristocracy, than France was enabled to de- 
vise her scheme of enlargement at the expense of 
Germany; and, by placing herself next to the 
empire, to substitute in room of the old European 
system of unity, where the emperor alone predomi- 
nated, the system of a political equilibrium oscil- 
lating among the chief European powers.* But al- 
though Flanders passed under the nominal sove- 
reignty of the French kings; when the Franks who 

* A most beneficial change for the progress of European 
civilization ; therefore most of all to Germany ; for which, as 
would appear, mankind are indebted to France. — Tu. 



BELGIUM. 



165 



had migrated into Gaul became Romanized, she 
again ranged herself on the side of the Germans. 
The German Flemings remained perfectly distinct 
from the Eomanish Walloons ; and their repugnance 
toward the foreign language and dominion, was the 
true cause of all their numerous revolts against the 
French monarchy. To slay all who spoke Walloon, 
was a frequent watchword in their battles and 
civic commotions. The intrepid German popula- 
tion withstood in many a memorable conflict the 
might and subtlety of France. In the fourteenth 
century, though very feebly aided by the dis- 
tracted empire, their individual courage guarded 
its right flank, that inestimable bulwark of Western 
Germany. 

The frontier defence of Germany, Belgium, re- 
mained ; till, through the deplorable error of the em- 
peror Charles V., having been committed to his son 
Philip, it was brought under the thraldom of Spain. 
The Dutch cast off the yoke of that insufferable 
tyranny. The Belgians continued Spanish ; an evi- 
dence of their having no desire to become French, 
in spite of every allurement held out to them from 



166 



BELGIUM. 



that quarter. In the mean time, France saw the 
consequences which would ensue on the separation 
of Belgium from Holland ; namely, a dissolution of 
that power which, when combined, had in one di- 
rection successfully opposed all her efforts. She 
saw Belgium isolated ; and less supported in her 
rear than menaced by Holland. Thus embolden- 
ed, she repeatedly renewed her attempts on Bel- 
gium ; which, during all her hostilities against 
Spain and Germany, was invariably the chief object 
of attack. The blood shed throughout the Nether- 
lands in the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. 
is corroborative of our assertion. To gain or to 
hold possession of Belgium has been the first and 
the last question in every war between France and 
Germany. 

When France, through her revolution, reached 
instantaneously a gigantic strength, competent to 
defy all the sovereigns of Europe ; she flung her- 
self on Belgium, and wrested that province from 
Germany as more desirable than every other. Scarce- 
ly was her conquest secure, when Holland fell, — 
Holland, which hitherto had always found herself 



BELGIUM. 



167 



protected by the fortunate interposition of Belgium. 
Whenever Belgium became French, Holland alone 
could not retain her independence. The same ef- 
fect had been produced in the time of the Romans ; 
nor can the result in future ever be different. 
Thus may Holland be taught the lesson, how deeply 
she is herself interested in preserving Belgium as 
much as possible exempt from French control. 

When the great national movement began in 
Germany against the dominion of France ; Belgium, 
along with Holland, as they had been the first 
German countries seized by the French, were also 
the first delivered ; and partly indeed they delivered 
themselves. After the submission of France ; the 
allied troops set to watch the French, and to guard 
Germany from any new dangers threatened from 
thence, were still concentrated in Belgium only ; 
and in Belgium, by the final overthrow of Napo- 
leon, the fate of Europe was decided. 

Now, if we hold steadily in view the strategical 
importance of Belgium, which for two thousand 
years has continued unaltered ; it must be acknow- 



168 



BELGIUM. 



ledged to have been a most natural and practical 
resolution on the part of the German powers, and 
their allies against France, to confer on Belgium a 
greater ability to withstand in future every French 
invasion. But since it was manifest that this 
ability had at a former time been impaired by the 
disjunction of Belgium from Holland ; the plan im- 
mediately occurred to unite them again, and thus 
re-establish the former imposing kingdom of the 
Netherlands ; which, if hearty in the cause, was 
perfectly qualified to bear the first shock of French 
impetuosity, and to second the Prussian efforts on 
the Rhine. Had an exclusively military view been 
taken of the projected arrangement ; and had it 
not been determined according to other political 
considerations ; Belgium would have been united, 
not with an adjoining small state, but with a large 
and neighbouring German power ; consequently 
with Prussia :* a measure which would have been 
the more conformable to the original design ; since 
the population of Belgium harmonizes infinitely 
more with the population of Rhenish Prussia, than 

* For Prussia an acquisition more desirable even than 
Hanover. — Tn. 



BELGIUM. 



169 



with the Dutch. A restoration of Belgium to Aus- 
tria would, on military principles, have been un- 
justifiable. Austria might, on the same ground, 
have sought to reclaim the whole of ancient Bur- 
gundy, Lorraine, and Alsace ; and thereby estab- 
lish a compact power on the left bank of the Rhine. 
A resuscitation of the Austrian Netherlands alone, 
would, on the contrary, have been a mere renewal 
of all the inconsistencies which experience has 
taught us to avoid. That province would have 
been found much too far removed from the centre 
of the Austrian power, to be left as a forlorn sta- 
tion for purposes either military or political. 

The union of Belgium with Holland did not con- 
tradict the expectations which had been formed re- 
garding it. The more earnestly endeavours were 
made from without, to unite them to each other ; 
the more violently did the mutual repugnance of 
the populations of both countries display itself 
within. The question whether that repugnance 
might have been neutralized, is henceforth super- 
fluous. The separation has been effected ; and is 
now beyond remedy. Such having been the deci- 

p 



170 



BELGIUM. 



sion ; for the strategical reasons previously assign- 
ed, no choice could have been more in accordance 
with the welfare of Germany, than to have united 
Belgium to Prussia. But in the year 1831, from 
political considerations, such a measure was per- 
haps still less practicable than in 1815. Belgium 
has been constituted an independent kingdom. 

This innovation is, on strategical grounds, hazard- 
ous to the safety of Germany, in the event of a war 
with France. If Belgium, when connected with the 
distant indeed, yet powerful Austria, was ill adapted 
to form the north-western frontier, the right flank, 
of Germany ; a small kingdom, quite distinct, and 
in noway belonging to the German confederacy, 
seems still less capable of fulfilling such a design. 
But the security of the frontiers of Germany is an 
object of which Germans must never lose sight. 

The particular situation Belgium now occupies 
resembles that of the kingdom of Sardinia. But 
Sardinia, as is well known, was, from her position, 
unceasingly condemned to the trammels of a faith- 
less and versatile policy. When Germany was 



BELGIUM. 



171 



successful elsewhere; the aid of Savoy was of little 
benefit, and cost but a share of the spoil. When 
Germany was unsuccessful ; Savoy instantly veered 
about, and helped to plunder her former allies. 
Belgium, in circumstances so much alike, can 
hardly adopt any other system. At the present 
time Sardinia has no weight, except in Italian af- 
fairs ; and as regards the welfare of Germany, her 
conduct is immaterial : while the policy of Belgium 
would operate directly on German interests. 

Holding always in view the military necessity 
of retaining the most efficacious bulwark of Ger- 
many against France ; it behoves Germans to in- 
quire how Belgium may, in her actual position as 
a distinct kingdom, be made available for securing 
an object so important. 

The proceeding which would be most advanta- 
geous for Germany is, that Belgium should connect 
herself with the German confederacy; and as an 
integral portion of that confederacy, aid the de- 
fence of the military frontier, acquiring in return, 
the full support of the confederacy for the promo- 



172 



BELGIUM. 



tion of her individual objects as apart from France. 
Though such a union may at this moment be un- 
attainable ; still it is right for Germans to declare 
at least their wish, that nothing may occur to pre- 
vent the future adherence of Belgium as a member 
of the German confederacy. 

In every case, it is of the highest strategical mo- 
ment to the German confederacy, that whenever 
they may be threatened with war by France, they 
should be able without difficulty to assume the mi- 
litary occupation of Belgium. On this account it 
is most desirable to encourage, by means of high- 
ways and railroads, a frequent commercial inter- 
course between the Belgians and the Rhenish Prus- 
sians, whose interests may be said to be in so many 
respects identical. 

We are fully aware of the caution required of 
Germany to eschew any procedure, which, by indi- 
cating too high an estimation of Belgium, would be 
likely to give umbrage to Holland. The Germans 
have an affection for the Dutch, as a people of true 
German origin, who have proved themselves much 



BELGIUM. 



173 



better qualified than the Belgians, to preserve their 
nationality from degrading foreign servitude. But 
an enlarged policy — -if indeed the interests of Ger- 
many are to be decided according to such policy — 
imperatively demands that Germany should attach 
Belgium to herself, in preference to Holland. That 
Holland will be firm to Germany does not admit 
of doubt. She never can nor will resign herself 
to France. Under all circumstances she must re- 
main the close ally of Germany against France. 
Belgium, on the other hand, is to be treated with 
the most wary and delicate tact. The security of 
Germany is perceptibly endangered by the ascend- 
ancy of French influence in Belgium. In order 
to withdraw Belgium from this influence ; to gain 
her over to the interests of Germany ; and make 
her a permanent and thoroughly effective bulwark 
against France ; Germans cannot be sufficiently 
zealous and active. Even Holland herself can, as 
hitherto, be protected from the attempts of France 
solely by means of Belgium. If the policy to which 
Holland adheres, led to the neglect and abandon- 
ment of Belgium by the German confederacy, and 
her throwing herself unreservedly and exclusively 



174 



BELGIUM. 



into the arms of France ; not only would Germany 
be thus deprived of her most important military 
frontier, but France would strike dowTi Holland 
with the same blow. 

We well remember, in the years 1814 and 1815, 
when many sagacious and patriotic Germans la- 
mented the non-accomplishment of the reunion of 
Alsace and Lorraine to Germany ; they were met 
by the reply, that the kingdom of the Netherlands, 
and the strong fortresses on the Belgian frontier, 
were an ample protection, — that no French army 
of the Rhine would hazard an advance into Middle 
and Upper Germany, so long as Paris itself was 
threatened so closely from the German stronghold 
of Belgium. But how positions are now altered ! 
Five and twenty years have brought about an en- 
tire change. That stately kingdom of the Nether- 
lands no longer exists. These strong fortresses, 
from which Paris was to be held in continual awe, 
were, in 1830, after the urgent entreaty of the Bel- 
gians for French assistance, opened amid the ut- 
most rejoicing to the tricoloured flag. The auxi- 
liary force was indeed obliged to march back 



BELGIUM. 



175 



again ; but it may be asked, whether there is not 
cause for solicitude lest a visit to these fortresses 
may not perhaps at some time or other be repeated 
under circumstances more critical. 

To Germany Belgium is of chief importance as 
a military frontier. But, in the next degree, the 
Belgian question affects the commercial interests 
of Germany. 

So much has already been written about the 
noted diplomatic phrase 64 jusqu' a la mer" as ap- 
plied to rivers, that we spare ourselves the trouble 
of repetition. It suffices to know, first, that im- 
mediately after the downfall of. Napoleon and his 
Continental system, the free navigation to the 
North Sea was deemed one of the primary objects 
of the German Confederacy; and its realization 
promised in the very document by which the 
Confederacy was established : secondly, that since 
that time, the necessity of an immediate communi- 
cation with the sea, for the trade of Germany, has 
become every day more urgent : and lastly, that, 
by the formation of the Commercial League, an 



176 HOLLAND — BELGIUM. 



authoritative advance has been made, which brings 
the German commerce effectually nearer to its 
maritime boundary. The commerce of Germany 
must now be directed either through Holland or 
Belgium ; if not through both. Each of these two 
countries possesses harbours on the sea, termina- 
tions of radii proceeding from the Commercial 
League as a centre. 

AVith Holland Germany has negociated long 
enough, and to no purpose. Holland will not Open 
her ports to Germany ; unless under burdensome 
restrictions. Her grounds of objection are well 
known : being the same as those to which even the 
little Hamburg pretended, as a reason for not 
joining the Commercial League. Further, they 
are the exact grounds on which, at an earlier pe- 
riod, Spain legislated in regard to her South Ame- 
rican, and England as respects her North Ame- 
rican, Colonies.* Nevertheless, we may, from the 
instance of these Colonies, obtain a direct proof, 

* There is very little resemblance between any impedi- 
ments to the trade of the English Colonies, and the rigid pro- 
hibitions which were enforced in the Colonies of Spain. — Tr. 



HOLLAND. 



177 



that Holland, for the sake of a very precarious ad- 
vantage to her narrow commercial and colonial sys- 
tem, has neglected the much more solid benefits 
which an enlightened policy would have secured. 
For how did the petty Holland become so mighty? 
How was she able to acquire such splendid trans- 
marine possessions I Merely by having, in the 
course of a century distinguished by great religious 
struggles, granted an asylum to the multitudes who 
flocked from Germany ; thereby continually recruit- 
ing her exhausted population. By means of this in- 
flux of men, was she enabled to found these distant 
settlements. Her proud Amsterdam itself was no- 
thing more than a colony ; indebted for its exten- 
sion, to the crowd of refugees whom the religious 
persecutions drove thither out of Germany, and 
also in smaller numbers from France. Holland 
thus became the emporium of German commerce. 

Had not Holland at a later time secluded herself ; 
had she fully considered what measures were to be 
adopted, for guiding along her canals the supernu- 
merary population of Germany ; had she always con- 
tinued to associate the German interests with her 



178 HOLLAND. 

own ; then would she have been empowered to main- 
tain her colonies against England, and along with 
them the dominion of the sea.* Holland, as is well 
known, lost her colonies, because she had not men 
enough to defend them ; remaining the small se- 
cluded Holland, and no longer the great outlet to 
the sea for the whole of Germany. Had the hun- 
dreds of thousands of Germans who have emigrated 
to North America, Poland, and Russia, gone over 
to the Dutch Colonies as to colonies essentially 
German ; they would have been able to defy the 
English.t Holland disjoining her transmarine in- 
terests from the general interests of Germany ; and 
though so inconsiderable a country, persisting in her 
attempts to execute, when opposed to England, what 
at no time could have been achieved, unless by all 
Germany and Holland combined ; was the sole ori- 

* From the unyielding valour displayed by the navy of 
Holland, her chance of success would certainly have been 
improved : but two conditions were requisite ; namely, a per- 
manence on the throne of England of such sovereigns as 
Charles II. ; and a removal of the shoals on the Dutch coast, 
that her harbours might allow the entrance of first-rate ships 
of war. — Tr ( 

t If Holland could have defied the Portuguese, she would 
haveretaineda colony worth all those she lost to England. — Tr. 



HOLLAND. 



179 



gin of the wretched decay now exhibited by her 
maritime and colonial power. If ever an English- 
man should read this remark ; he must acknow- 
ledge its truth. We should regret if by any Hol- 
lander, or by any German, it were considered as 
futile. 

Holland was satisfied with affixing the price of 
goods indispensable to Germany. Her views did 
not extend beyond this lucrative traffic. She never 
once inquired, whether there was a hope of perpe- 
tuating these advantages otherwise than by liberal 
and judicious regulations. She slighted the policy 
of the warrior and the statesman ; and preferred 
the craft of the small trader. She dealt out her 
wares and amassed wealth ; but took no thought of 
upholding and enlarging her maritime resources 
and foreign settlements, by means of continual ac- 
cessions of people from the interior of Germany. 
Then were her fleets captured, and much the great- 
er part of her colonies seized, by the English. One 
may ask, can she permanently retain the rest ? 

That which it might have been possible for Ger- 



180 



HOLLAND. 



many to effect in concert with Holland, is now 
since England and the United States of North 
America have secured the dominion of the sea, 
clearly no longer attainable ; or at least not for 
centuries to come. It is vain for Germans to throw 
away anxiety about the formation of transmarine 
establishments for united Germany, rivalling the 
colonial supremacy of England. German solici- 
tude ought rather to be turned to a combination of 
their divided strength for an object less remote ; — 
the preventing a sacrifice of the greater for the 
profit of the less ; — a vindication of the interest 
of the Commercial League against the opposing 
claims of Holland. England may ridicule this dis- 
pute : and while Germans along the course of the 
Rhine wrangle with other Germans at the mouth 
of the river ; the English may continue their ridi- 
cule : as the Germans might, were the dwellers on 
the banks of the Thames engaged in a quarrel 
with their countrymen at the Nore.* 

* The hindrance to an admission of colonial produce would 
seem to be not the only evil which has resulted from a closure 
of the Bhine, Information evidently is defective about the 



HOLLAND. 181 



We have on a former occasion asserted, and 
our opinion remains unchanged, that Holland will 
date her revival from the hour when she shall 
associate herself with the general interests of Ger- 
many. Not before then can her clipped wings re- 
sume their plumage. But it appears that Holland 
it still disposed to languish on her ancient but 
much curtailed heritage ; so long as the indulgence 
of England grants permission.* Notwithstanding 
the many able calculators throughout Holland ; 
never in a single instance have they yet proposed to 
themselves the questions; — -Whether, as a country 
in the most intimate geographical and ethnographi- 
cal connexion with Germany, Holland ought not to 
share the eminence which the industry and com- 
merce of Germany have attained \ Whether 
there is nothing to gain ; more indeed than her 
due proportion, by choosing such a line of con- 
duct ; and whether there is nothing to lose by a 

amusements of the English, who take very little concern in 
the petty jealousies of their neighbours. — Tr. 

* "With perhaps less error, blame might have been im- 
puted in another direction. The statement at page 160 
regarding the influence to which Holland is now resigned 
will shew where. — Tr. 



182 HOLLAND — BELGIUM. 

different decision, and allowing events to pursue 
their course ? Events we would understand to 
signify, the acknowledgment of the German Com- 
mercial League at the harbours of the North Sea; 
which assuredly will sooner or later be conceded 
by Belgium, if not previously offered by Holland. 
Holland cannot evade the certainty of being a 
loser by some great concurrence of such events ; 
when, feeble and inanimate, she will wistfully gaze 
on the fervid and vigorous progress of the extend- 
ing traffic of Germany. 

From the stubborn and recluse Holland, our at- 
tention is immediately drawn to Belgium. Since 
the two are now separated ; the commerce of Ger- 
many must endeavour to acquire in Belgium what, 
up to this time, has in Holland proved to be un- 
attainable. The negociation is still pending. In 
the mean while we shall attempt to bring proof, 
that Germany ought to form engagements with 
Belgium, rather than with Holland ; even though 
Holland were disposed to compliance. Holland 
certainly would at no time comply, on any other 
condition than the exclusion of Belgium from all 



HOLLAND — B ELGIUM. 



183 



share of benefit. But to concede this point, would 
not only be injurious to the commercial wel- 
fare of Germany, but would likewise operate pre- 
judicially on those more important military and 
political interests we have before examined. Bel- 
gium is indispensable to Germany ; and she must 
be debarred from no participation which would 
be equally beneficial to both. Germany must not 
alienate the affections of Belgium, lest she be 
driven to espouse the cause of France — the main 
point in the Belgian question to be held in view 
by the statesmen of Germany. It would be most 
injudicious conduct to relinquish Belgium, in order 
to purchase the mercenary favour of Holland: 
while again, on the other hand, it is certain that, 
as soon as Belgium is open to German commerce ; 
Holland will be powerless for harm, and probably 
will feel herself constrained to vie with Belgium 
in liberality. From Holland Germany can, with 
and through Belgium, obtain completely, what, 
unless to outbid Belgium, Holland never would 
freely grant. 

There is further to be considered the favourable 



184 



BELGIUM. 



situation of Belgium relatively to the Prussian 
frontier ; her internal opulence, and pre-eminent 
industry. The Germans, as a commercial people, 
would, as it were, cut off a right arm ; did they 
neglect these advantages which a union with Bel- 
gium would secure. Hence nothing is so much 
to be recommended, or to be desired; as that every 
means should be employed for inducing Belgium 
to join her wealth, her youthful activity, and her 
splendid position, either directly or indirectly, with 
the extensive capital of the German Commercial 
League. 

Only as third in order, though properly it ought 
to be the first ; we shall endeavour to explain 
the interest, German nationality has to uphold 
in the Belgian question. On this subject an un- 
accountable indifference prevails. They who are 
akin to Germans in language, in descent, and in 
the numberless minute features of character which 
distinguish nations from each other ; always have 
essentially a common interest with Germans ; — 
are their brethren and natural allies ; as has inva- 
riably been proved in times of danger. So widely 



BELGIUM. 



185 



has the same speech extended ; and so forcibly 
does the same original character still predominate, 
the same sympathies, and the same antipathies. 
This brotherhood, a people ought never to re- 
nounce. They ought never to shew themselves 
unconcerned toward affinity of race and language ; 
nor look on tamely while a kindred people is over- 
come by a foreign race. National relationship 
ought to be viewed as an inherited fund ; a pos- 
session never to be thoughtlessly sacrificed, and 
with which an alien people ought on no account 
to be allowed to enrich themselves. The levity 
which would permit such a catastrophe, violates 
all the essential interests of nations ; nay, more, 
offends as a dereliction of national honour. 

The smallest part only of Belgium is French or 
Walloon, the remainder is all German. Even now, 
beyond the small Walloon districts, the people speak 
a German dialect, not varying more from the writ- 
ten language of Germany than many diversities of 
tongue within the German Confederacy itself. A 
Fleming speaks as little high German as a Swiss 
or a Frieslander. Is he therefore less German 

Q 



186 BELGIUM. 

than they are ? Still, the French minority in Bel- 
gium maintain a remarkable ascendancy over the 
German majority. In polite society French alone 
is spoken. The official language is French. The 
literature is a French literature. If the inferior 
classes were gradually to copy the higher ; the 
German element in Belgium, notwithstanding its 
preponderance, would in the end be extinguished ; 
and thus would the Belgians, as in their language, 
so also in their feelings, speedily become French. 
Such a change would indeed be a grievous loss and 
shame to the Germans as a people. The German 
language, sentiments, and culture, are surely not 
so barbarous that they must wane before what is 
termed French civilization. 

Besides, Belgium was in ancient times highly 
celebrated for her contributions to German litera- 
ture. Many of the most exquisite original com- 
positions of the middle ages proceeded from Bel- 
gium. Vying with the poets of Upper Germany, 
the poets of the Netherlands composed ballads, 
and longer metrical works, in a profusion which 
is quite astonishing ; though even yet they have 



BELGIUM. 



187 



not ail been brought to light. These ancient 
Swabian and Netherland bards sang in different 
dialects, but in a similar strain ; their thoughts, 
their feelings, their minstrelsy alike. The two 
countries maintained the most lively intercourse. 
And are all these connexions to be finally dis- 
solved? Shall the grandchildren, who on both 
sides still speak in a kindred tongue, no longer un- 
derstand each other as their fathers did I Shall 
the rich, the contemplative, the intellectual Flan- 
ders and Brabant, where German act and Ger- 
man speech once flourished in such perfection, be 
now reduced to the insignificant rank of a French 
province ? What would the old poets, painters, 
and architects say, who have bequeathed to these 
venerable Belgian towns their immortal works, 
were they to start from their graves, and find their 
proud homes desecrated by counterfeiters of tawdry 
Parisian taste 1 

It concerns German honour, that the Germanic 
population of Belgium should again take a share 
in the intellectual progress of Germany. But 
how can such participation result; if sympathy 



188 HOLLAND — BELGIUM. 



between Germany and Belgium be not in every 
way fostered, if all paths be not opened which 
may lead them to each other ? For promoting 
these objects; the friendly intercourse of men con- 
nected by similarity of language, will be much more 
effectual than warfare. 

In this same national relation, Holland and Bel- 
gium exhibit a remarkable contrariety. The Dutch 
are a people of pure German stock ; devout and up- 
right; who will in no respect imitate strangers ; who 
have never allowed themselves to be inveigled by 
Gallicism of phrase or of thought ; whose charac- 
ter is quite unsophisticated. But they are — if Ger- 
mans will admit the possibility — ultra German. 
Wrapped up in their self-willed provincialism, in 
no wise troubling themselves as to what may be 
the custom among those of kindred lineage, they 
display every true German fault in the highest 
degree. From other Germans they are as un- 
willing to learn any thing, as they are from fo- 
reigners. The Belgians, on the contrary, are too 
little animated with national zeal ; too susceptible 
of foreign impressions : like a little rough pebble 



BELGIUM. 



189 



they have received the French polish. Where the 
Dutch are in excess, the Belgians are deficient. 

But now, reverting to the national interests 
of Germany; we must again repeat, the Dutch 
will continue stedfast. Let the Germans then 
only take heed that the Belgians do not desert 
them. 

So long as the Germans made no sort of in- 
quiry about the peculiar nature of the Belgian po- 
pulation, and scarcely knew that any Germans 
existed in Belgium ; so long as the German news- 
papers spoke of the Belgians as a foreign race, 
not entirely French, but at least an offset from 
France; there were evidently no hopes of rekindling 
the natural sympathies between the two branches 
of the German stem. The only wonder is that 
the Belgians were not attracted more irresistibly to 
France. In truth the Belgians are as much the 
children of Germany as the Germans are them- 
selves ; not as has been over hastily affirmed, lost, 
only neglected, children. Interest, honour, and 
duty, call on Germany to resume the fatherly 



190 



BELGIUM. 



charge ; to feel for them as for brothers ; and to 
bring them back again to the paternal mansion. 
And now that the Belgians themselves are con- 
vinced of the necessity of leaning on Germany for 
support ; it appears the extreme of political negli- 
gence and guilt in the German- nation scornfully 
to reject their advances. 

Hitherto we have discussed the Belgian ques- 
tion altogether as affecting the general interests of 
Germany : it is fair that we should now consider 
the same question with especial reference to Bel- 
gium herself. 

In the first place we assume, as an incontestable 
fact, that Belgium wishes to be independent. Bel- 
gium is independent, if not quite de facto, still 
de jure. She wishes to continue really so, in order 
to accomplish her own particular objects, to which 
the Dutch are hostile ; and because of her unwil- 
lingness to yield and sacrifice herself for the grati- 
fication of France. Her bias in favour of an unre- 
strained condition is grounded withal on bitter ex- 
perience. Belgium passed through the ordeal of 



BELGIUM. 



191 



the foreign dominion of Spain, to reach her mu- 
nicipal freedom. The more recent French sway 
led to the final attainment of her well-being, 
What Belgium requires, is to perfect the develop- 
ment of her immense internal wealth in a course 
of activity safe from all external hindrance. Bel- 
gium was by Spain condemned to the repose of 
the churchyard : a wild soldiery were let loose 
to transform her proud and industrious burghers 
into monks and mendicants ; while Holland throve 
in liberty, in opulence, and refinement. Belgium 
was neglected and falsely treated by Austria : 
several times plundered, and finally swallowed up 
by France ; stripped of the relics of her ancient 
splendour; estranged from her nationality ; subjected 
to the detestable system of centralization, impo- 
verishment, and conscription. On her last trans- 
ference, she was again neglected and falsely treated 
by Holland, as she had before been by Austria ; — 
a treatment the weak have too often endured from 
the strong, but never from those as weak as them- 
selves. It is thus sufficiently manifest, why, after 
so severe trials, exemption from control is now the 
aim of Belgium. And has she not already, during 



192 



BELGIUM. 



the short time she has been in the enjoyment of 
independence, fully availed herself of it, to pro- 
duce an astonishingly rapid advancement of her 
material interests I 

To Belgium all recollections of foreign dominion 
are blended with scenes of mourning and out- 
rage. On the other hand, prosperity and renown 
distinguished the era of her independence. So 
long as Flanders and Brabant continued in the en- 
joyment of municipal and constitutional rights, un- 
der their own counts and dukes ; and even under 
Burgundy till the time of Philip II. ; their inhabi- 
tants surpassed all Europe in wealth, refinement, 
and intellectual culture. From thence Europe ob- 
tained her first lessons of well regulated freedom. 
The Keuren are the earliest authentic memoirs of 
any constitutional state in modern times. Here 
Western art first flourished ; — painting and music 
before even in Italy they had gained estimation. 
Here was the great school of European industry. 
Splendour and taste were conjoined in all the pro- 
ductions of Bruges, Ghent, Antwerp, Louvaine, 
Mechlin, and Brussels. Here also was the source 



BELGIUM. 



193 



from whence the other nations of Europe derived 
their fashions. Even yet the traveller is astonished 
at the antique magnificence of the towns in the 
Low Countries. The whole of this architectural 
grandeur is to be ascribed to the period of freedom 
and immunity from foreign control. 

When Belgium, justly mindful of her ancient 
renown, and of the inalienable rights with which 
her independence has been conjoined ; intent on 
holding inviolate, and guarding, these rights ; looks 
around to discover from what quarter they are me- 
naced : unless utterly blind, she cannot fail to per- 
ceive that the vicinity of France is her most formi- 
dable danger. Holland is no longer strong enough 
to recover her ascendancy over Belgium. The 
union of Belgium with Holland was simply an ex- 
periment, made for the interests, and in obedience 
to the peremptory commands, of other powers quite 
distinct from Holland. As soon as the attempt 
failed, and it was clearly seen that the means adopt- 
ed had not led to the desired end ; though the ac- 
complishment of the end still continued in pros- 
pect ; the means were abandoned, never to be again 

R 



194 



BELGIUM. 



employed. Little as Belgium has to fear from 
Holland in regard to her independence ; she has 
still less cause of alarm from the German confede- 
racy. Where there are so many adjoining States 
of various magnitude ; a respect for a neighbour, 
however weak, has necessarily become an inherent 
principle of the league. Aggression does not in the 
least degree characterize the German confederacy, 
— throughout there is shewn no tendency to con- 
quest : and a vital interest demands the protec- 
tion of Belgian independence ; because their con- 
servative policy can never tolerate, that immediate- 
ly westward, a restless power should be further 
enlarged at the expense of Belgium. 

Consequently France alone threatens the securi- 
ty of Belgium. France has not, like the German 
confederacy, a defensive and conservative, but an 
aggressive vocation. She has been incessantly la- 
bouring for the extension of her frontiers ; and 
aggrandizement will continue her invariable aim. 
Among all the objects on which she has directed, 
and ever will direct, her assaults, Belgium stands 
first ; and any one endowed with military skill must 



BELGIUM. 



195 



acknowledge, that the strategical importance of 
Belgium cannot be sufficiently appreciated, and 
ought never to be lost sight of. 

Belgium has been laid under obligation by the 
powerful exertions of France to forward her disse- 
verance from Holland. But it is clear that France 
has done so, only for her own peculiar objects, and 
not in the least from any feeling of generosity. 
Belgium maintains relations of friendship with 
France. Her sovereign has married a daughter 
of the king of the French. Still a Belgian knows 
well himself how to distinguish such friendly ties 
from political subjection. Belgium has had abun- 
dant reason to know the felicity of being governed 
by French prefects. She will not, as a rich pro- 
vince, allow herself to be fleeced for the purpose 
of diminishing the exactions in the more needy 
provinces of France. She is not desirous to lose 
all that is peculiarly her own, her ancient cele- 
brity, and her name ; in order to come under that 
system of Gallic centralization, which is unwearied 
in the endeavour to assimilate all the provinces of 
the kingdom, — -to efface every individual charac- 



196 



BELGIUM. 



teristic, — and thus augment the solitary ostenta- 
tion of Paris. 

If any thing whatever can prove to the Belgians 
how advisable it is for them to lean more on Ger- 
many than on France ; it is the historical experi- 
ence that in Germany, the peculiarity of the indi- 
vidual provinces has at all times been respected, 
that every province has been allowed to ameliorate 
its condition apart from the rest ; while in France, 
a tendency has ever been shewn to annihilate the 
local distinctions, and originality of the provinces. 
In Germany every individual race, nay, every in- 
dividual tribe, has preserved its uncontrolled free- 
dom : beyond the confederacy are Switzerland and 
Holland ; within the confederacy itself, the Con- 
federate States, of which it is composed. Even 
in the larger German States, notwithstanding the 
Bureaucracy, which during the last century has pre- 
dominated, and which would centralize every thing 
as in France ; along with a peculiarity of their phy- 
siognomies, a separate existence is maintained by 
each province, contrary to what is in France any 
where to be found. With regard to the Austrian 



BELGIUM. 



197 



Empire, this quality of the German institutions is 
sufficiently known. But in Prussia, too, the recent 
introduction of provincial diets, has manifested that 
the more provinces a German state may acquire, 
the greater concessions to provincialism must be 
made from the system of centralization. 

In Germany, nature has in so far always pro- 
ceeded stedfastly in her usual course ; and though 
she may for a short time yield to violence, she al- 
ways imperceptibly resumes her rights. But in 
France nature follows an opposite path : for which 
reason we thus would counsel the Belgians ; — ■ 
Whoever among you desires to be associated with 
the dignity of France, indulge him ; but let him 
go and reside in Paris ; there he may solace him- 
self with the enjoyments of a true Frenchman. 
In a province he would always have a melancholy 
part to play. But if you wish to remain a distinct 
nation ; and find that, by your own unassisted ener- 
gy, you cannot effect your object ; seek a guaran- 
tee for your exemption from foreign sway, in that 
quarter only, where at all times, the independence 
of small states, the peculiar manners and customs 



198 BELGIUM. 

of individual provinces, have been thoroughly re- 
spected and defended ; that is to say, in Germany. 

It is true" that, under all possible circumstances, 
Belgium is shielded against usurpation on the part 
of France, by the political interests of the German 
and other powers, who can never consent to Bel- 
gium becoming French. But Belgium would be 
in still greater safety, were she to cement a close 
union with Germany. The more ambiguous the 
position of the small states between Germany and 
France ; the greater was at all times their peril 
from French invasion. Lorraine, Burgundy, Flan- 
ders, Liege, Treves, had ever more cause to regret 
their alliances with France, than their adherence 
to the German Empire. As often as amicable re- 
lations were entered into with France ; a claim 
was subsequently advanced by the French, who en- 
forced their mere claim as a customary right ; and 
finished in every instance by taking possession of 
the weaker country. On the side of Germany these 
small frontier states were never endangered ; they 
were rather upheld in their undisturbed freedom. 
If, in the calamitous period of general disorder, this 



BELGIUM. 



199 



support sometimes proved inadequate ; still, on the 
return of prosperity, it always became again effec- 
tual. Oftener than once has Belgium been rescued 
by German aid, from the armies and the governors 
of France ; and even at the present moment, Bel- 
gium owes her exemption from dependence on 
France, to the German battalions who delivered 
her in the year 1813. 

Let us now proceed from the question of indi- 
vidual existence, to the Matetual Interests of 
Belgium ; and we shall find, that with a view to 
these interests, Belgium requires just as much the 
support of the German Commercial League, as it 
must be the object of the league itself to reach the 
sea through Belgium. The reason is, that Belgium, 
unaided, has not the means to avail herself of her 
geographical position, for augmenting her trans- 
marine commerce ; in the same degree she might, 
were her endeavours seconded and protected by 
the interest and power of the Commercial League 
of Germany. The jealousy of a neighbour, the 
more sensitive from holding the command of the 



200 



BELGIUM. 



sea, is the obstacle Belgium has to encounter.* 
She must add to her strength from the countries 
in her rear. The more the powers occupying the 
inland parts of Germany shall be affected by re- 
straints on Belgian commerce ; the more will Bel- 
gium herself be in a condition to brave such re- 
straints. As in political, so also in commercial 
relations, Germany is the natural ally of Belgium. 

Besides, so preponderating is the industry of 
Belgium ; that, in case of her adhesion to the Ger- 
man Commercial League, she would less be ex- 
posed to rivals, than gain a far more extensive 
market for her productions. But to the States who 
have already adopted the League, the competition 
of Belgian industry would be counterbalanced by 
the advantage of a right of way to the sea. In fact, 
by means of Belgium, the theor}^ which constitutes 
the foundation of the Commercial League, would be 

* Said neighbour, according to the avowed opinion of her 
most enlightened statesmen, in the last as well as the present 
age, nourishes not by the poverty but the opulence of adjacent 
roun tries. — Tr. 



BELGIUM. 



201 



proved in the clearest manner. With a view to 
the material interests of both the contracting par- 
ties, her adhesion unquestionably is not desirable 
alone, but obligatory ; and unless by considerations 
of a nature altogether different, it could not have 
been so long prevented. 

Belgium, therefore, on grounds political and 
commercial ; in so far as she would uphold her 
independence, and gain the utmost extension for 
her industry and trade ; is guided to Germany as 
her natural ally : and there is just as little doubt, 
that, in regard to her national interests likewise, 
she must still cling to the same support. 

The Belgians cannot escape from obedience to 
that general law of nature, which imposes on the off- 
sets of every people the duty of holding fast by their 
primary stem. No collateral branch of any nation 
can ever, with impunity, renounce their inborn 
character, or their hereditary speech. The history 
of the Belgians themselves is the best voucher for 
what we now affirm. The German population of 
that country never, unless with great detriment, sue- 



202 



BELGIUM. 



cumbed to the influence of foreigners. Did Bel- 
gium enjoy prosperity when under the rule of the 
Spaniards ; when she assumed the Spanish garb, 
language, and sentiments, and yielded to Spanish 
institutions ; unnerved and degraded by intolerance, 
the Inquisition, and tyranny ? Was Belgium for- 
tunate when, at a later period, she became subject 
to France ; endured the pillage of the hungry Sans- 
culottes ; was then overrun by a host of French 
soldiers and civilians, and infected with every sort 
of demoralizing agency I Even yet does this bi- 
formed influence of exotic nationalities continue to 
operate in Belgium. Even yet are these two foreign 
elements perpetually thrusting themselves forward, 
and repressing the original Germanic element. 
There still exists among the clergy a vestige of 
the Spanish temper ; and still, in the libels and 
emeutes, a tinge of the old French Jacobinism. 
Still the ghost of Granvelle prolongs its wander- 
ing through the streets of the venerable towns in 
search of the ghost of Pacheco. 

Belgium was happy, only while, in possession of 
her ancient constitutional and municipal freedom, 



BELGIUM. 203 

she cultivated and spread afar the public spirit and 
the arts of Germany. Instead of being ashamed 
of her German language and modes of thought ; 
much more were they to her a subject of pride, in 
those days to which are referred all the high re- 
collections of the Netherlands. The unhappiness 
of Belgium was confined to the period of her sub- 
jugation and estrangement. 

" The wellbeing of a people consists not in their 
assimilation to what is foreign, but in the proper 
development of their own national character." 
Under every circumstance, this law of nature is 
confirmed ; and exceedingly beneficial would it be 
for Belgium, did her repressed Germanic element 
again come forward with energy. Such is the 
feeling among the Belgians themselves. They 
have begun to entertain a lively remembrance of 
the olden time ; and every page of their ancient 
history, of the monuments of their language, tells 
them they are German. Whenever they shall 
know, in all its extent, the share their fathers took 
in the mental culture of Germany ; doubtless the 
national sympathy will act with greater keenness. 



204 



BELGIUM. 



And why should not at last the noble ambition re- 
animate them, of becoming connected with the 
Germans of the present day, as their forefathers 
were with an earlier generation ? 

The first thing necessary, is to restore the an- 
cient literature of Belgium. Let the Belgians be- 
gin by learning to appreciate these remains. When 
they shall thus have acquired a due sense of their 
old German nationality ; they will proceed with 
eagerness to examine into the intellectual deve- 
lopment of Germany in their own time. They will 
retrieve what, since the Spanish ascendancy, has 
been neglected. They will not fail to understand 
and admire, like other Germans, those works of 
German philosophy and taste, so perfectly conge- 
nial to their own thoughts and feelings ; but which 
have remained hitherto screened from their view- 
by a superficial Gallic refinement. Such, we doubt 
not, will be the actual, because it is the natural, 
termination. Yet fain would we have it come to 
pass early enough to enable many true Belgians, 
who zealously uphold their country's interest, to 
become aware of this mode of effecting their ob» 



HOLLAND — BELGIUM. 205 



ject, and join in the endeavour for promoting the 
extension of German literature in Belgium. 

The Belgians have in this respect an advantage 
over the Dutch ; possessing an ancient provincial 
literature ; but now, at least, very insignificant 
traces of modern authorship. Hence they may, 
with much greater facility, adopt the literature of a 
kindred nation. The provincial jealousy of the 
Dutch will long resist any introduction of the gene- 
ral literature of Germany: among the Belgians 
the case is different. Their written language is 
French. But as they have become more conscious 
of their independence ; they must allow the Ger- 
man element to reassume its natural rights. The 
Belgians would encounter no small obstructions in 
imitating the example of the Dutch, and writing 
Flemish, as the Dutch write their Holland's dia- 
lect. They must employ the classical German, and 
will probably, sooner than the Dutch ; unless nature 
shall deviate from her regular course, and the 19th 
and 20th centuries be unreasonably guided by the 
precedent of the 17th and 18th. 



206 HOLLAND — BELGIUM. 



The spread of the language of France in coun- 
tries originally German, is manifestly unnatural. 
So long as the higher ranks in Germany admitted 
the prevalence of the French language, the just 
development of the nation was stationary ; render- 
ing indispensable some violent reaction, to banish 
the foreign intruder from the land, and re-establish 
the genuine character of the people on its own basis. 
How, when throughout Germany, the French 
tongue had become predominant ; when the com- 
mon people had shared the delirium of the higher 
ranks ; — can anything be imagined more revolting, 
than that the noble nationality of Germany, her lan- 
guage, and her literature, should disappear from the 
European soil X But that which as a whole would 
have been unjustifiable, why should it be attempted 
to justify in part ? For the old German population 
of Belgium to cease to be German, would be in no 
degree less ignominious to them, than for the whole 
of the other Germans to relinquish their nation- 
ality. 



But in the end, Belgium has only a choice be- 
tween the unnatural transmutation of becoming 



BELGIUM — SWITZERLAND. 207 



French, and the opposite course of associating her- 
self with the general literature of Germany. The 
sphere of German literature is in a state of pro- 
gressive enlargement toward its rightful limits ; 
absorbing within itself all separate and provincial 
literatures. Three hundred years ago, the written 
language of Switzerland was Swiss ; of Pomerania, 
the Pomeranian dialect. These dialects have now 
fallen into disuse. Holland alone withstands, and 
with injury to herself, the great law of assimilation. 
Nature would seem to prescribe, that in writing, one 
general language should prevail ; but that the pro- 
vincial speech may be retained unaltered, and 
appropriated to colloquial discourse. Such is the 
happy example afforded by Switzerland. - Politi- 
cally independent ; maintaining her provincial pe- 
culiarity of language and usages in all their ancient 
integrity ; she has yet conjoined herself with the 
great national literature of Germany. Herein the 
benefit has been mutual. Swiss rank among the 
highest of German reasoners and poets ; among the 
mighty in German philosophy and art ; yet do they 
ever remain free and independent Switzers. Would 



208 BELGIUM — SWITZERLAND. 



not such a relation be also the most natural for 
Belgium ? 

Perhaps it is not altogether superfluous here to 
add a remark, which likewise has reference to the 
subject of Material Interests already examined. 
The distinguished industry of Flanders and Bra- 
bant has all along been exclusively attributable 
to their Germanic origin and public spirit. In 
France, with a licentious feudal nobility, and un- 
der kings who always aspired to autocracy, this old 
German spirit lay hid. Industry and commerce 
never ventured on so bold a course. Even yet 
the blessing of civic assiduity and wealth rests on 
the nations of Teutonic origin, — the Germans, 
Swiss, Dutch, English, and North Americans ; 
nor can the French, Italians, and Spaniards com- 
pare with these nations. 

All countries where a Romanic tongue is spo- 
ken, have a disposition to concentrate their activi- 
ty, their wealth, and their renown ; in courts, coun- 
cils, and armies. The people throughout their pro- 
vinces are, in the mass, nowhere so industrious, 



BELGIUM — SWITZERLAND. 209 



wealthy, and civilized ; nay, they are not, in any 
instance, possessed of so much civic freedom; as the 
inhabitants of the towns and districts where the 
Teutonic languages prevail. Accompanying these 
languages, nationality exerts a decided influence. 
In regard to material interests, therefore, it is not 
an unimportant circumstance to what country we 
belong ; or to what national speech, habits, and 
manner of thought we have been familiarized. Un- 
der Spain, together with her old German public- 
spirit, Belgium lost that opulence which she had 
derived from her industry. Holland, on the other 
hand, remaining German, was able to secure those 
advantages her neighbour had forfeited. In Ame- 
rica, the Anglo-Saxon population has, with Teu- 
tonic perseverance, steadily pressed forward, both 
against the French Louisiana and the Spanish 
Texas : while among the Romanic population of 
Europe, this perseverance, this steadiness, and civic 
energy, are not less found wanting. To Gallicize 
Belgium therefore, is to subvert her industry. To 
revive the Germanic feeling of Belgium, is to 
invigorate her skill, and lead her to a boundless 
duration of prosperity and renown. 

s 



210 



BELGIUM. 



The whole of these considerations ought to im- 
press Germans with an eager solicitude, that every- 
thing be done, on the part of the Confederacy, to 
win Belgium to German interests, and teach her 
to meet cheerfully the advances of a kindred race. 

Austria, on strategical grounds, must desire that 
in every war which may ensue between Germany 
and France, Belgium should enlist on the side 
of Germany, and remain her foremost bulwark 
against France. Prussia, too, for commercial ob- 
jects, must seek a closer union with Belgium : and 
the Minor States collectively, are interested in 
setting up between France and the larger powers, 
an additional confederate ; to increase their number 
and political weight, and afford another guarantee 
of their future independence. 

Prussia, it may be argued, has no interest in 
fostering sympathies between the Catholics of 
Belgium and those of her Rhenish provinces ; at 
least not while she remains entangled with eccle- 
siastical disputes. But, according to our opinion, 
statesmen who adopt an enlarged policy, may 



BELGIUM. 



211 



slight the apprehensions created by journalists and 
pamphleteers, and even partial movements in favour 
of the church; when counterbalanced by the proved 
and stedfast affections of the majority of the people. 
We believe that sound knowledge and toleration ; 
the habitual enjoyment of religious freedom ; the 
control of fashion ; and especially the guidance of 
material interests ; are far more effective than the 
outcry of church parties. Finally, it is our convic- 
tion, that the sterling worth of that neutral influ- 
ence in society, which regards church squabbles 
with perfect unconcern, would be greatly strength- 
ened ; were a fresh impulse given to the material 
interests of Germany, by a commercial union with 
Belgium. In truth a more effectual diversion could 
hardly be imagined against these trifling conten- 
tions, which are so thoroughly opposed to the real 
welfare of the kingdom. Nothing is so likely to. 
withdraw men from a strife so perfectly useless, 
and to engage their attention in promoting objects 
of general advantage. 



And have not the statesmen of Germany already 
had some experience as to the degree of excite- 



212 



BELGIUM. 



ment which may be quelled by advancing the ma- 
terial interests of the people ? Prohibitions, censor- 
ships, even armed force, were brought into action, to 
suppress the movements which took place in conse- 
quence of the July revolution. These remedies 
did not, however, sooth public irritation ; they did 
not tear from the passions their concealed sting, 
nor introduce a new and unwonted feeling of con- 
tentment. No negative, but positive measures only, 
could bring about that wished for result ; it could 
not arise unless from the Commercial League. 
Statesmen who zealously act on an enlarged po- 
licy, are sure to overcome the prejudices and the 
virulence of narrow politicians : by studying to 
forward the essential interests of the community : 
they will always have the community on their side, 
and will triumph over party. Ultramontanism has 
given check to the king: a move against the 
queen;* the advance of German commerce to 
Ostend ; would, more certainly than any thing else, 
compel Ultramontanism to retreat. 

It is incontrovertible that, bringing under view 
* What queen \— Tk. 



SWITZERLAND. 



213 



objects beneficial and salutary to the whole nation, 
is far more praiseworthy than embittering party 
hatred. May therefore a preference be shewn 
for measures corresponding with the public in- 
terests at large, and which, as the German Com- 
mercial League has proved, never fail to operate 
with a magical power. A measure of a perfectly 
similar kind would be the annexation of Belgium 
to the confederate interests of Germany.* 

Switzerland has altered her government in 
consequence of the July revolution ; clearly indi- 
cating how very susceptible she still is of impres- 
sions from France. Had another result been pro- 
duced by the July revolution ; — instead of the in- 
auguration of a new dynasty, had the plans of 
the Republican and War party been successful : 
the new governments in Switzerland would, in 
the great movement, have infallibly been carried 

* In a note here appended, the author intimates that the 
preceding investigation of Belgian affairs had been extracted 
from his literary journal, on account of its bearing on that 
important question ; but chiefly because of the earnest wish 
therein expressed, still remaining unfulfilled. 



214 



SWITZERLAND. 



along with, and would have become dependent on, 
France ; like the Helvetic Government in the time 
of the Directory and Napoleon. Meanwhile the 
opposite party gained the ascendant. The new 
Governments of Switzerland came unexpectedly 
into collision with the King of the French about the 
adventure of young Louis Napoleon.* Calmness 
returned. From 1798 to 1814, the Swiss had suf- 

* This young prince has now learnt by experience, that it 
is not enough merely to personate Napoleon ; but that it is ne- 
cessary to be a second Napoleon in order to reach Napoleon's 
greatness. As the genuine "princeps juventatis" of young 
Europe, he advanced the most extraordinary claims, founded, 
as the event proved, on no sort of merit of his own. Where 
men have halted, after the most fearful exertions ; there 
would these striplings resume the enterprise ; not with steady 
labour, but with money in hand ; not at the starting post, but 
at the goal. 

When the prince failed in the part of a hero, he recom- 
menced as a radical : and shortly after produced a pamphlet, 
in which he roundly asserts that popular freedom was the sole 
aim of Napoleon ; who assumed the crown, and introduced a 
despotic form of government, for no other reason than to further 
the establishment of republican institutions ; and that his ap- 
parently insatiable thirst for conquests, was merely for the pur- 
pose of emancipating the European nations, and rendering them 
independent of each other. Yet the speculation of a prince so 
foolishly credulous as the pamphlet testifies him to be, was 
not altogether ill devised : for there are many people in west- 
em Europe, who enjoy this spirituous extract of Beranger's 



SWITZERLAND. 



215 



fered too much from France, to admit of their de- 
siring the renewal of a French protectorate. 

But why did not the German Confederacy in some 
way avail themselves of the occurrence of the Swiss 
dispute with France. A greater approach to fellow- 
ship with the Confederacy would be advantageous 
to both parties. An abolition of the custom-houses 
on the Swiss frontiers, together with an equitable 
and friendly alliance between the University of 
Zurich and the German universities ; seem to be 
the measures through which the interests of Swit- 
zerland may gradually become identified with those 
of the Confederacy. The influence of France 
in Switzerland can be permanently counteracted, 
only by an equal participation in the advantages of 
free trade ; and by the diffusion of German cul- 
ture, literature, and science. 

songs, and become doubly intoxicated with the glories of the 
revolution and of the Empire.* 

* With a little deviation from the unities of time and place ; the Boulogne 
farce was an apt sequel to the theatrical effort at Strasburg.— Tb. 



( 217 ) 



SCANDINAVIA. 



Since the Danish fleet was destroyed, and Swe- 
den lost her hold of Finland, Scandinavia has lan- 
guished in a condition singularly inconspicuous. 
Yet it must not be imagined that in this rude cli- 
mate national vitality has altogether disappeared. 
The Teutonic race — to which the Danes, Swedes, 
and Norwegians belong — are endued with remark- 
able stedfastness of character. They may pause 
and slumber ingloriously for a time, but their in- 
nate worth is not extinguished ; and sooner or later 
they awake to fresh proofs of vigour and magna- 
nimity. 

The actual position of these kingdoms is certain- 
ly unfavourable. In maritime strength the}- are 



218 



SCANDINAVIA. 



surpassed by England ; and on land Russia is pre- 
dominant. Matched with such powers, the weak- 
ness of Denmark and Sweden cannot involve a re- 
proach. Still in truth, for their progressive de- 
cline, they have partly themselves to blame ; as, 
during a period when they were still mighty, they, 
in the most inconsiderate manner, warred against 
and enfeebled each other, — for the ultimate advan- 
tage of their grasping neighbour Russia. Not with- 
out Danish assistance did Peter the Great triumph 
over Sweden, and gain possession of her provinces 
on the Southern Shore of the Baltic. Had the 
union of the dynasties at Kalmar, produced an 
amalgamation of the people ; that union would 
have endured, and been the means of founding for 
the whole of Scandinavia, an energetic instead of 
a tottering throne. In such case, it is most likely, 
St Petersburgh would never have been built. 

Recollections so depressing ought at least to 
teach the Scandinavians of the present day, that 
their mutual contentions and jealousies become 
alike unprofitable to both. 



SCANDINAVIA. 



219 



If Denmark and Swecler do not henceforward 
go hand in hand with relation to their external 
policy, it is little to be doubted that their ill for- 
tune will remain unchanged. Should they both per- 
sist in adhering to opposite European parties, neces- 
sarily one of the two must again incur a penalty. 
But every detriment sustained by the one, is really 
injurious to the other ; since only when the two 
are combined, do they enjoy any importance, or 
exhibit a power which will be held in considera- 
tion by Europe. Denmark and Sweden are nearly 
in the same circumstances as the Minor Confede- 
rate States of Germany. Neither of the two can 
be a gainer when the other loses ; because what is 
lost by either of them, is ultimately a deprivation 
to the political system of which both are compo- 
nents. 

In every event, Germany is the most natural 
ally of the Scandinavian kingdoms. Only by 
Germany, can they be protected against the ma- 
chinations and further encroachments of Russia. 
Only by means of an intimate connexion with Ger- 



220 



SCANDINAVIA. 



many, can they, after a time, be placed in a situa- 
tion to retrieve the advantages of which England 
has deprived them.* 

* Certainly by no appropriation of Baltic territory. Nor 
will the peril of Scandinavian independence *' come over the 
salt sea,"— Tr. 



( 221 ) 



SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 



The affairs of Spain and Portugal have not much 
weight in the European scale. These countries 
have with justice been esteemed as merely sub- 
ordinate in rank ; though their importance has, 
perhaps, been somewhat undervalued. A benevo- 
lent commiseration for the noble and unfortunate 
inhabitants of the beautiful Peninsula, is not on 
that account diminished. Yet as we are treating 
of general policy alone, we can bestow no more 
than a transient regard on the South- Western ex- 
tremity of Europe. 

An augmentation of Spanish strength would 
not tend to promote the views of France, because 
thus France might soon find herself in troublesome 
neighbourhood. Neither would an improvement 



222 SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 



of the warlike resources of Spain be advantageous 
to England ; since Spain might become, if not an 
equal, yet, in the Mediterranean at least, a ha- 
rassing naval power.* 

A revival of Spanish greatness is adapted only 
to the schemes of Russia, in order that Spain may 
be employed against England ; or is conducive to 
the objects of Austria, Prussia, and the rest of 
Germany, that there may be raised up for them 
a more efficient ally against France. But these 
powers are too far distant from the Peninsula : and 
if England or France thought themselves in the 
least danger from such attempts of the potentates 
in the east of Europe, they have already guarded 
against them, by encouraging and maintaining the 
ascendancy of Constitutional principles in Spain 
as well as in Portugal. 

* Hardly a ground for national jealousy, unless there were 
no other naval power in the Mediterranean. — Tr. 



( 223 ) 



ITALY. 



As Spain is a volcano which has been long burn- 
ing ; Italy, on the other hand, is a volcano which 
has been long burnt out.* If we compare the 
situation of Italy and of the East ; we cannot fail to 
perceive that the whole southern half of Europe 
is in utter decay. The dominion of the world has 
completely changed. Formerly it proceeded from 
the south ; now it has come northward. 

The only influence which Italy at present exerts 
on Northern Europe, is through the Papal Court : — 
an influence by no means beneficial to the Italians 
themselves ; nor does it in these latter days gua- 
rantee the old supplies. That broad stream of 

* Perhaps only smouldering, like Vesuvius before Pliny's 
time. — Tr. 



224 



ITALY. 



gold, which at an earlier time poured over the 
Alps, has become a slender rill, less lucrative to 
the pontifical Romans than the visits of the heretic 
English. The States of the Church are needy, 
and their hunger is fed by freethinkers. 

The political importance of Italy is, in truth, 
confined to her remaining the apple of discord be- 
tween Austria and France. For centuries have 
these two powers been constantly renewing their 
struggles for Italian predominance. But the House 
of Hapsburg has always maintained the upper hand, 
and holds it still, 

Germany, or whatever government takes the 
lead in Southern Germany, is necessitated to pre- 
serve the absolute command of Italy ; so long as 
Fran ce ndeavours to approach in that direction, 
either with the view of seizing Italy itself, or of 
gaining a clearer line for operations against Ger- 
many. It is proper to notice, that the founder of 
the House of Hapsburg relinquished Italy ; leav- 
ing her exempt from all German interference, 
under the authority of her native rulers. His sue- 



ITALY. 



225 



cessors, however, felt themselves compelled to re- 
cross the Alps and drive out the French. They 
were, further, obliged to occupy Northern Italy 
permanently ; else the French would have con- 
firmed their superiority in that quarter, and have 
kept the German empire in perpetual dread of 
attack. 



( 227 ) 



THE EAST. 



The East here presents itself to our view, merely 
as a large object ; about which the European powers, 
though guided by their several interests, are all 
conjointly occupied. It is now long since the series 
of events in the history of mankind, forming the 
reaction of Western Christendom against the Ma- 
hometan world, has been prepared and begun. 
In this reaction the great powers have all partici- 
pated, Prussia alone indirectly. Russia has con- 
quered in Turkey and in Persia. France has, at 
Algiers, resumed the projects she was unable to 
execute at the time of her Egyptian expedition. 
England, advancing beyond the Indus, has already 
assailed the Mahometan coalition in the rear ; and 
from her rocky strongholds in the Mediterranean, 
exerts herself to establish the shortest thorough- 



228 



THE EAST. 



fare to her Eastern dominions. Austria, at an ear- 
lier period the chief antagonist of the Ottomans, 
who suffered the most from their attacks, who the 
most perseveringly, and with the greatest sacrifices, 
warred against the Porte ; Austria, to whom Europe, 
in this respect, is under the deepest obligation, 
has, nevertheless, gained no recent accessions of 
territory in the East ; having not even recovered 
Belgrade which she once possessed; and having 
permitted Russia to move on, and intercept her 
communication with the mouths of the Danube. 
Still less has been the share of Prussia. The Ger- 
man States, also — collectively— have, with regard 
to the Eastern question, been left at disadvantage, 
in comparison with the chief Romanic and Sla- 
vonic States ; though Constantinople is further re- 
moved from Petersburg and Paris, and from Lon- 
don too, than from Vienna and Berlin. No doubt 
Germany gained an advanced station in Greece, 
when an illustrious prince of the ancient German 
house of Wittelbach was elevated to the throne of 
Athens ; but this classic sovereignty is indeed feeble. 

All that has yet taken place in the East, — the 



THE EAST. 229 

reaction of Western Christendom, extensive as it 
already has become, — seems only the prelude to 
a great historical drama, for which mankind have 
been many years gazing in eager expectation. 

Before we proceed to consider the individual 
interests by which the great European powers are 
actuated with relation to Oriental affairs, may it 
be allowed to examine the question on its general 
bearings. 

The Mahometan nations appear no longer to 
possess the vitality, or creative energy, requisite for 
withstanding the pressure of the arms and civiliza- 
tion of Western Europe. Even the great Agita- 
tor in Egypt, who but the other day shook the 
throne of the Padishah, owes his main success to 
those reforms which, while vying with the Sul- 
tan, he carried more dexterously into execution. 
He might no doubt retain the turbans and va- 
riegated robes discarded by his superior ; yet the 
Mahometan people themselves could not have been 
really persuaded that they were to look to the 
Egyptian for a revival of their ancient usages. If 



230 



THE EAST. 



Mahommed Ali had seriously engaged in a* rege- 
neration of the old heroic times of Islam ; if there 
had blazed forth in the East a general fanaticism 
so excited ; then infallibly would the Pasha of Egypt 
with his reforms have been offered up as the first 
victim. But nowhere does there seem to be left 
any moral strength for such an effort. Mahom- 
medanism has outlived itself. 

Nothing besides the mutual jealousy of the great 
Western powers, gives a respite of pitiable exis- 
tence to the national system of the Mussulmans. 
Did these powers, acting in concert, march at once 
against the East, they would speedily amend the 
failure of the Crusades, by the overthrow of the 
now decrepit realms of Saladin. But eventually 
this demolition must take place ; either by a com- 
bined assault of Christendom, or by one of the 
Western powers having the good fortune to be 
before the rest in seizing the ample prize. 

The continuance of the East for another century 
in its present condition, is just as unlikely as that 
there should be a violent regeneration of the Ma- 



THE EAST. 



231 



hometan people. Even though Russia allow her- 
self to be withheld from further conquests, by a 
diplomatic combination like that which dictated 
the treaty of Adrianople ; still England cannot 
give up the plan of striking out for herself the 
nighest way to India, through the centre of the 
Mussulman territories ; and is not the accomplish- 
ment of this scheme, with regard to material in- 
terests, an essential concern of the whole West 
of Europe ? The more extensive the inquiries, 
and the greater the amount of information col- 
lected, regarding material interests in general ; 
the more imperatively will the enforcement of the 
nearest and most secure route to India, be de- 
manded not by England alone, but by all the west- 
ward European nations. 

Notwithstanding, the final decision may long 

be unattainable ; and the provisional state, though 

under frequent modifications, may yet continue for 

some time in the Levant. Russia cannot move 

forward without alliances, which are beyond her 

reach. England is placed in the same difficulty.* 

* Not altogether ; especially as the object of her move- 
ments is not spoliation. — Tr. 



232 



THE EAST. 



Prussia alone can determine the result, according 
as she may throw her weight into the scale. But 
Prussia seems to have cause for avoiding a hasty 
resolution ; and from her pacific bias, will study to 
maintain the tranquillity of Europe. 

England feels herself urgently impelled to 
strengthen her influence in the Levant, for the pur- 
pose of forming and defending an overland passage 
to India. The object of Russia, if not to prose- 
cute her long course of southern aggrandizement, 
undoubtedly is to impede the English route, and 
weaken the naval power of England in the Me- 
diterranean. The hopes of France rest on employ- 
ing the jealousy of these two powers, according to 
circumstances ; always holding herself in readiness 
to seize any available opportunity for consolidat- 
ing and enlarging the settlements she already 
occupies on the Mahometan soil, and to stretch 
across from Africa to Asia. The safety of Aus- 
tria depends on not allowing Russia to encroach 
farther southward; consequently Austria and Eng- 
land have an interest perfectly similar. France 
may go over from the English to the Russian 
alliance, exactly as suits her views, nnd as the 



THE EAST. 



233 



chances turn. But without Prussia, Russia is in- 
capable of venturing on hostilities with Austria 
and England ; nor can Austria without Prussia, 
let herself be pushed forward by England against 
Russia. The presence of Mr Von Muffing at 
Adrianople was in this respect very significant. 
Such was then, is, and will continue to be, the 
policy of Prussia. She may, on eastern affairs, re- 
solve as she pleases, or decline any resolution what- 
ever.* 

Though, as we anticipate, the great Oriental 
question may not be speedily determined ; ano- 
ther subject of inquiry still remains. Joining in 
the European struggle for political principles, is 
quite the reverse of participation in a rivalry about 
opposite interests. The surest means of allaying 
the one contest are to be derived from the other ; 
but one of the two must ever be in progress. Dis- 
cussions regarding internal policy and constitutional 
reforms, even disputes on matters of religion, cease 
exclusively to engage the people as well as the go- 
* Most enviable Prussia ! 

u 



34 



THE EAST. 



vernments, whenever great questions of interest, 
of war, and of alliances, are brought forward. But 
as soon as attention is withdrawn from external 
policy, domestic affairs necessarily come again 
into notice, and the strife of hostile principles is 
resumed with greater eagerness. 

The importance of this consideration cannot be 
overlooked by any government which has more to 
fear than to hope from internal quarrels. But the 
power which has least to apprehend on that ground, 
will not fail in obtaining most advantage from a 
vigilant study of the Eastern crisis. 



Our last observation is, Since the age in which we 
live is an age of events; so, according to the natural 
course of things, again — at an appointed period — the 
arrangements now existing will undergo change. 
The rising generation, habituated, under diploma- 
tic guardianship, to a long peace, has hardly any 
conception of the scenes witnessed and endured by 
the generation which preceded them. But this 
oblivious feeling, — this indifference to the blessings 



THE EAST. 



235 



of tranquillity, — this uneasiness, — this thoughtless 
and petulant longing for greater and more striking 
realities, and this ignorance of all their attendant 
horrors, — are preparing for Europe another age of 
marvels. The longer the transition is postponed, 
the fewer may be left of the older men, who, hav- 
ing been tried in severe misfortunes, lean to the 
continuance of the peace now maintained, by the 
prudent agency of statesmen, and by the material 
interests of the people ; — the greater will be the 
augmentation of that electric vehemence, with 
which the very atmosphere of the present time is 
charged. 

Then will they be the gainers who find their 
enemy's station defenceless ; and they the losers 
who are taken unawares. Security will depend on 
forethought, a consolidation of natural alliances, 
and a judicious advancement of kindred interests. 
Whoever permit the elevation, increase, or coali- 
tion of hostile powers to obtain the ascendant ; be- 
sides phlegmatically, thoughtlessly, and suspicious- 
ly, neglecting to invite union where interests are 
alike, and to encompass themselves with natural 



236 



THE EAST. 



alliances ; or, by a fluctuating policy, waste time, 
and excite general mistrust ; will have sufficient 
opportunities to rue their negligence. If, like- 
wise, all animation should become extinct among 
the people, and the revolutionary principle seem 
to be obliterated ; so much the more certainly will 
the initiative of some great movement proceed 
from a cabinet policy, which, with boldness and 
intelligence, has well calculated its objects, and 
insured to itself the aid of the strongest alliances : 
for it is written, Eternal peace is not to be hoped 
for in this life ; but only Hereafter. 



( 237 ) 



POSTSCRIPT. 



The year 1840 is past. It has exhibited to our 
contemplation novel and unlooked for scenes. Eng- 
land and Russia have become reconciled, for the 
purpose of arranging, in alliance with Austria and 
Prussia, the complicated affairs of the East ; — that 
is to say, with the hope of substituting one provi- 
sional condition for another ; since a definitive set- 
tlement of the Oriental question is still very far 
from being realized. It is true, they have taken 
Syria from the Egyptian Pasha, designing its res- 
titution to the Sultan : and, in this course of pro- 
cedure, they have shewn little deference toward 
France, — that loud-talking France, who lavished 
on the Pasha her unprofitable advice, promising 
assistance, and granting him none ; who menaced 
so boldly the Four Powers, yet proved so reluctant 



238 



POSTSCRIPT. 



to fulfil her threats ; whose preparations for war 
were on so enormous a scale as to rouse all Ger- 
many ; but whose ministers again so hastily adopt- 
ed a pacific language. — The bones of Napoleon, 
personifying the demon of war, had been conveyed 
into Europe from their distant tomb ; but the icy 
blast of the Beresina, reappearing at the final cere- 
mony, chilled the martial ardour so fiercely grandi- 
loquent, and evoked new oblations on the altar of 
Peace. 

Still, in. regard to interest and intentions, no- 
thing is changed. Powers reciprocally hostile have 
coalesced for a short time, in order to frustrate 
the plans of a third Power which was obnoxious to 
all. But these are mere demonstrations, and do 
not represent the actual bearing of the several 
Powers. England and Russia are, and must re- 
main, the great opponents. Yet why should Rus- 
sia have engaged in her recent alliance with Eng- 
land, since she cannot profit thereby \ Is it not that 
she is benefited through the disagreement which 
has taken place between England and France ? She 
would have been still more a gainer, if France and 



POSTSCRIPT. 



239 



Germany had been involved in a war with each 
other. The more the rest of Europe are at va- 
riance, the greater the satisfaction of Russia. 

S 

But should peace continue, the planets will ra- 
pidly assume a different aspect. We have, within 
no very long space of time, seen an alternation of a 
Western and an Eastern quadruple alliance, com- 
posed of very heterogeneous elements ; — evincing 
how much the English diplomacy excels the diplo- 
macy of the Continent. But the one alliance is as 
unlikely to endure as the other. As soon as the 
operation of the cause ceases, the effect must also 
terminate. If France give way, the Quadruple 
Alliance no longer serves any purpose ; and even 
though France should maintain her warlike atti- 
tude, the Alliance must undergo important modi- 
fications ; since unfortunately it is not to be ques- 
tioned, that the German Powers would, without he- 
sitation, be left to sacrifice themselves for the others 
in a war against France. Yet these same German 
Powers, should heaven grant them the victory, 
would find the most active exertions employed, to 



240 POSTSCRIPT. 

grudge and lessen the advantages it ought to yield 
them. 

There are artful combinations of policy which 
can convert friends into foes, and enmity into 
friendship ; and which may produce alterations in 
the real views, as in the natural interests of states. 
But these combinations of policy resemble only 
transient disturbances of the magnetic needle : 
When the interruption is removed, the needle 
points the more steadily in its proper direction. 



Stutgard, 20th December 1840. 



PRINTED BY NEILL & CO., OLD FISHMARKET, EDINBURGH. 



